Taiwan’s Place in the US and Japanese Conflict with China

Abstract: The role of Taiwan in the growing US and Japanese conflict with China for influence in the Asia-Pacific region is a highly relevant topic. This article notes that Washington and Tokyo intend to continue hindering Taiwan’s reunification with Mainland China, which would greatly strengthen Beijing’s position in the Pacific Ocean. Under the administration of President Donald Trump, the United States notably stepped up its support for Taiwan, in both expanding its official ties with Taipei and supplying it with American arms. The policy devised by Washington and Tokyo (and coordinated with Taipei) to strengthen the de facto independence of Taiwan is gradually taking shape. Beijing has made it clear that it will do whatever is necessary to maintain China’s territorial integrity within its official concept of One Country, Two Systems.

As the US and Japanese conflict with China for predominance in the Asia-Pacific region grows, so too has the role of Taiwan with its impressive economic, military, and technological potential – not to mention its 23 million highly-educated inhabitants.¹ Taiwan is an important part of the so-called first line of island chains (from Hokkaido to the Malay Archipelago) controlled by the United States and Japan. It guarantees the security of the sea lanes through which supplies of energy and other resources flow to Japan and other American allies in East Asia, while limiting the Chinese navy’s free access to the Pacific Ocean.²

The importance of Taiwan has grown even more in connection with China’s so-called maritime strategy, which was introduced at the 18th CPC Congress (November 2012) and set the task of transforming China into a sea power. Washington and Tokyo believe that China’s position in the Pacific Ocean would be greatly enhanced if it were to incorporate Taiwan and upset the existing strategic configuration in the region. The island would become mighty base for PRC naval actions in the APR.

Since the start of the Korean War in 1950, the United States and Japan have worked together to prevent Taiwan from being absorbed into China by the new Communist government that won its civil war – the People’s Republic of China, which has every right to the island according to the international law of succession (under the conditions of the Cairo and Potsdam declarations, Nationalist China acquired ownership of the island in October 1945). The San Francisco Peace Treaty drafted by Washington and its allies without the participation of China or the Soviet Union and signed on September 8, 1951, failed to resolve the Taiwan issue. It merely noted that “Japan renounces all rights, title, and claims to Formosa and the Pescadores Islands,”³ while not specifying to whom the territory should be given or what form its future existence would take. This gave the United States and its partners a free hand in the Taiwan situation, depending on how future events would develop.

Neither was the issue resolved after diplomatic relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China were established on January 1, 1979. Immediately after this step, the US Congress adopted the so-called Taiwan Relations Act, which took effect on April 10, 1979. It stated “[T]he United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.” It also pledged “to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” Washington also claimed the right “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”⁴

At the same time, the United States did not assume direct responsibility for defending Taiwan with its armed forces. This was in contrast to the situation in the Senkaku Archipelago, which extended the coverage of the American-Japanese Treaty on Mutual Security. Nevertheless, the United States sent its aircraft carrier groups into the area of the Taiwan Strait each time Beijing tried to launch an operation to reclaim Taiwan (the crises of 1954, 1958, and 1995-96).

Although the United States plays the leading role in guaranteeing the security of Taiwan by preventing the transfer of this strategically important island to China, we should not underestimate the influence of Japan on the Taiwan situation. It is the United States’ closest ally in the region, and has its own vital interests associated with Taiwan. Taiwan’s colonial past – fifty years under Japanese control (1895-1945) according to the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki – plays its role as well. A considerable number of Japanese-Taiwan ties are maintained on the nongovernmental level. In recent years, Washington and Tokyo have agreed to expand American-Japanese military cooperation in guaranteeing the region’s security far beyond the confines of Japanese territory, encompassing the area of Taiwan as well.

Under the terms of the so-called Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation, signed by the United States and Japan on September 23, 1997, and envisioning considerable expansion of American-Japanese military collaboration, Japan’s role “during contingencies” in the areas surrounding it is to provide comprehensive rear support for US forces.⁵

At the same time (and in contrast to the United States), Japan is expected to display special caution with respect to Taiwan affairs, due to both the restrictive articles of the Japanese constitution and (above all) the desire not to aggravate relations with Beijing. Tokyo must do its best to refrain from taking any binding positions on Taiwan, limiting itself only to acknowledging statements about the island’s status in joint declarations with China. It is emphasized that “Japan hopes that the issue surrounding Taiwan will be resolved peacefully by direct dialogue between the parties concerned, and that the Cross-Strait dialogue will be continued seamlessly from that perspective.”⁶ Tokyo commented disparagingly (through unofficial channels) on statements made by Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian, who came to power in 2000, in favor of holding a national referendum and drafting a new constitution for the island. This “caused unnecessary tension in relations between the People’s Republic and Taiwan.”⁷

Beijing harshly criticized the Guidelines, pointing out that the actions of the United States and Japan were aimed at “deterring” China and an instrument of “American domination and Japanese militarism.” Beijing was even more irritated by the statement (made in a joint communique of the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee on February 19, 2005) that one of the strategic aims of the two countries is “the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue.”⁸

Beijing’s response to these steps was the Anti-Secession Law adopted at the March 14, 2005 session of the Tenth National People’s Congress.⁹ The law was comprehensive and presented the PRC position on Taiwan. Article 1 of the law stated that it was adopted with the aim of “opposing and checking Taiwan’s secession from China by secessionists in the name of ‘Taiwan independence.’“ It also said “There is only one China in the world. Both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China.” (Importantly, it omitted the assertion – one that especially irritates Taipei – that Taiwan is part of China, i.e., a PRC province.)

The law also stressed that national reunification is an internal matter for China, which brooks no interference from outside forces. Special emphasis was placed on peaceful ways of reuniting the country, after which Taiwan can keep its system, which differs from the one on the Mainland, and enjoy a high level of autonomy. It was noted that peaceful reunification can be achieved through consultation and negotiation, based on equality between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

At the same time, Article 8 states “In the event that the ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ nonpeaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

Taiwan was not left on the sidelines as the United States launched its comprehensive assault on China’s position after the administration of President Donald Trump came to power. The policy Washington adopted showed clearly that the United States intended to strengthen its support for Taipei by both expanding what are essentially official ties and supplying it with American arms. The assessment of Taiwan as a “prosperous, stable, democratic society” was promoted as an example to its Asian neighbors.

US policy is conducted via close coordination with Tokyo and Taiwan’s governments, where the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is firmly entrenched with its platform of the island existing independently of Beijing. (DPP leader Tsai Ing-wen resoundingly won a second term in Taiwan’s January 2020 presidential elections.)

Beijing was irritated most by Tsai’s 2016 telephone conversation (at Taiwan’s initiative) with US President-Elect Donald Trump. Before this, no American leader had been in direct contact with Taiwanese officials since diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China were established in 1979.

Beijing also protested US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s official congratulations (January 11, 2020) to “President Tsai Ing-wen” upon being elected to a second term, in which he –to Beijing’s ire – roundly praised Taiwan as a model democracy and expressed his thanks to its leader for her efforts to establish a strong partnership with the United States. “We are not just partners, but members of the same alliance of democracies.”¹⁰

The United States also took concrete steps that went beyond the confines of its longstanding relationship with Taiwan. The Taiwan Travel Act, which allowed high-level American officials to visit Taiwan and vice versa, was adopted in 2018. American weapons continue to be supplied to Taiwan: According to the US Department of Defense, American military sales to Taiwan from 2010 through 2020 totaled $23 billion.¹¹ These reportedly included updated F-16C/D jet fighters ($8 billion), M1A2 Abrams main battle tanks, shoulder-fired FIM-92 Stinger ground-to-air missiles, and the accompanying hardware ($2.2 billion),¹² plus the MK-48 Mod 6 AT torpedo ($180 million). There have also been reports that the United States plans to sell ground-based cruise missiles and the latest pilotless drones to Taiwan. A growing number of high-ranking American officials have said it is time for Taiwan to become an “independent nation.”

Beijing was especially dissatisfied with the American administration’s latest major steps to establish high-level official ties with Taiwan. Under the provisions of the Taiwan Travel Act, and in violation of the responsibility assumed by Washington to create no such ties, US Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar made the first ministerial-level visit to Taiwan (August 9-12, 2020) since the United States severed relations with Taipei before establishing them with Beijing.

However, Beijing’s strongest response and protests came over Undersecretary of State (for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment) Keith Krach’s September 17-19, 2020 visit to Taiwan. The formal reason for the visit was (according to a State Department press release) for Krach to participate in the funeral ceremony for former Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui.¹³ In reality, however, it was a full-scale official visit to hold negotiations with the Taiwanese on a wide range of issues. The delegation included Assistant Secretary of State (for Democracy, Human rights, and Labor) Robert Destro, Assistant Secretary of State (for Global Markets) Ian Steff, and former Assistant Secretary of Defense (for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs) Randall Schriver. The American delegation met with virtually all of Taiwan’s most important leaders, including the President, Vice President, Prime Minister, and the Ministers of Economics and Foreign Affairs.¹⁴

One of the main aims of Krach’s trip to the island was to discuss matters associated with drafting a trade agreement between the United States and Taiwan, which also met with Beijing’s extreme dissatisfaction.¹⁵ According to Japanese press reports, Taiwan also expressed a strong desire to conclude a free trade agreement with the United States.¹⁶

Along with its harsh protests, China began military exercises in the area of the Taiwan Strait on September 18, in connection with the above visit by the American Undersecretary. Bombers, fighters, and antiship craft of the Chinese air force repeatedly crossed the so-called median line dividing the Taiwan Strait and approached the island’s coast. Secretary of State commented on this sarcastically, saying “We sent the delegation to a funeral and the Chinese have apparently responded by military blustering.”¹⁷

During an official briefing on September 18, official representative of the PRC Ministry of National Defense Ren Guoqiang stated the actions China took in the current situation with Taiwan “were aimed at defending the country’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Those who play with fire, he said, can play until they burn themselves: “The Chinese army has strength, resources, and resolve sufficient to uphold the country’s sovereignty, and prevent Taiwan from declaring independence, along with foreign interference in the internal affairs of the People’s Republic.”¹⁸

Along with the protests associated with the sudden growth of American military sales to Taiwan, Beijing warned it might impose sanctions on a number of the largest American companies manufacturing weapon systems intended for sale to Taiwan.

The development of events in the Asia-Pacific region is motivating Tokyo to make important adjustments in its Taiwan policy while moving closer to Washington in matters of ensuring Taiwan’s security and preventing the issue from being resolved by force.

On January 11, 2020, Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi made a special statement in which he welcomed on behalf of the government of Japan the “smooth holding of democratic elections” in Taiwan and congratulated Tsai Ingwen on her “latest victory.” It was also mentioned that the Japanese government would continue to work on strengthening cooperation and exchanges between Japan and Taiwan.¹⁹ Beijing was greatly disturbed by former Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori attending Lee Teng-hui’s funeral ceremony. Mori met with Tsai at the President’s office in Taipei on September 18. In Mori’s words, “both sides value freedom, democracy and the free market, and have a common philosophy. Japan will continue to work “in the interests of developing and strengthening relations between the two countries in all areas.”²⁰

It is of interest to examine the importance to Japan of relations with Taiwan in the so-called Blue Books of Japanese diplomacy for 2019 and 2020.

If the Book for 2019 called Taiwan a “crucial partner and important friend” for Japan, with which it “shares fundamental values,”²¹ a year later it was “an extraordinarily valuable partner and important friend.” Much more space was devoted to examining relations with it than in the corresponding Books for previous years.²²

It was noted that 4.89 million Japanese citizens visited Taiwan in 2019. Several new memoranda on collaboration (in the fields of environmental protection; the mutual protection of patents; the exchange of documentation on industrial projects; and cooperation in the import-export of organic food products) were signed by unofficial representatives of the two countries.

Taipei has been conducting a fairly uncompromising policy since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) came to power. In her inaugural address of May 20, 2020, Tsai Ing-wen declared “We will not accept the Beijing authorities’ use of ‘one country, two systems’ to downgrade Taiwan and undermine the cross-strait status quo. We stand fast by this principle.” Along with Taiwan’s traditional official name (the Republic of China), Tsai used the formula “the Republic of China (Taiwan).” In her words, Taiwan was “willing to engage in dialogue with China and make more concrete contributions to regional security. Here, I want to reiterate the words ‘peace, parity, democracy, and dialogue.’“ On the whole, the Taiwanese President’s speech was fairly restrained. It was emphasized that “Both sides have a duty to find a way to coexist over the long term and prevent the intensification of antagonism and differences.”²³

Events in Hong Kong and Beijing’s adoption of the Law on Ensuring the National Security of Hong Kong, which Taiwanese (and foreign) sources interpret as nothing less than “the end of Hong Kong autonomy,” have made it easier for Taipei to tighten its position. Fears have grown that such a fate awaits Taiwan as well, should it be reunited with the Mainland. Such attitudes and the desire to preserve Taiwan’s independence are especially strong among young people.

As a result of the government pursuing a policy of de facto Taiwanese independence (but with no calls for declaring it), the Tsai administration’s rejection of (among other things) the so-called Consensus of 1992 (i.e., the recognition by both sides of the “One China” formula, with each one interpreting it in its own way) raised the tension in relations between Beijing and Taipei considerably. The volume of trade and the flow of Chinese tourists to Taiwan were curtailed. Taiwanese businessmen began withdrawing their companies from Chinese territory. The mechanism of ties between the two countries established earlier (the PRC Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) and the Taipei Foundation for the Development of Relations between the Two Sides of the Taiwan Strait (SEF) have long since ceased to function. The two parties have exchanged sharp barbs with each other. Beijing has intensified its policy of isolating Taiwan internationally and managed to draw a number of other small countries over to its side that once maintained diplomatic relations with Taipei. As a result, the number of such countries has now been reduced to 15 (seven fewer than during the Tsai administration’s tenure).

The Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative adopted by the US Congress on March 26, 2020, is in this respect illustrative. It calls for the United States to support Taiwan’s diplomatic ties with other countries, along with the island’s participation in the work of those international organizations where there are no conditions regarding the mandatory “national status” of one country or another. Eyebrows were also raised by the Act referring to Taiwan as a “free, democratic, and prosperous nation.”²⁴

The new policy developed by Washington and Tokyo (and coordinated with Taipei) to strengthen the island’s de facto independence on the basis of today’s status quo on the Taiwan Strait has thus taken shape. At the same time, judging from American and Japanese statements, neither the United States nor Japan are about to alter the formula regarding Taiwan’s status as laid down in joint communiques with China, including the principle of “One China” (though Taiwan is not part of the People’s Republic; rather, it is one of China’s two parts). They have no wish to irritate Beijing, and continue to discourage Taipei’s attempts to formally declare Taiwan’s independence.

Though the number of countries that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan has (as was noted above) recently been reduced, we should not forget that Taipei also has unofficial ties with virtually all of the world’s major countries through the many nongovernmental offices and organizations that have been opened on Taiwan and in corresponding countries around the world. Many of these have established their own unofficial representations on the island that operate under a variety of names. Taipei has in turn opened unofficial representations of its own, staffed by experienced workers, virtually around the world. Taiwan belongs to a number of important international organizations of an economic character: the WTO (under the name Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu), APEC, and the ADB (as “Chinese Taipei”). It participates in the Olympic Games (under the Olympic flag and the name “Chinese Taipei”). With the support of the United States, Taipei is actively establishing ties with such organizations as WHO, the ICAO, and Interpol (though Beijing is obstructing this).

Also of interest is the ongoing debate among leading American experts on the problem of Taiwan where possible actions by Washington under the current circumstances are concerned. The tone was set by Richard Haass (President of the influential Council on Foreign Relations) and David Sacks with their article American Support for Taiwan Must Be Unambiguous in the September 2020 issue of Foreign Affairs journal.²⁵ The main idea behind the authors’ proposal is simply that “The time has come for the United States to introduce a policy of strategic clarity: one that makes explicit that the United States would respond to any use of Chinese force against Taiwan.”

A number of other American experts (Bonnie Glaser, Michael Mazarr, and Michael Glennon) expressed their opinion in the next issue of the journal (September-October 2020), making it clear they disagreed with that of Haass and Sacks.²⁶ They argued that under the current circumstances, it would be completely unnecessary and dangerous in the extreme for the United States to assume the responsibility of using force if Beijing takes military action against Taiwan, for the following reasons: Direct US responsibility could provoke Beijing into immediate action without waiting for Washington to prepare the task force needed for the defense of Taiwan; the obligations that exist under the terms of 1979’s Taiwan Relations Act are sufficient. In addition, there is no evidence at the moment that China is preparing to attack Taiwan. The United States assuming direct responsibility could provoke radical elements on Taiwan to declare the island’s independence, in hopes of obtaining American assistance. Every expert, however, agreed with the need to focus US efforts on strengthening Taiwan’s own defensive capabilities.

It is of extreme importance to examine the current correlation of forces in the Taiwan Strait. American and Japanese sources both believe that it has changed substantially in favor of China in recent decades. China has concentrated the bulk of its military forces in the East Asia region, including the zone adjacent to Taiwan. According to data from the US Department of Defense, China’s military spending in 2019 totaled $174 billion, while that of Taiwan was $10.9 billion (i.e., Chinese expenditures were 15 times those of Taiwan). There are signs that China’s real military spending was actually much higher, since (according to PRC statistics) these figures do not include the cost of research and development or purchases of foreign arms.²⁷ In August 2019, the Taiwan government set the goal of increasing military spending by 5.2%, to $11.6 billion. However, current data show that Taipei is unlikely to reach that target under the conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The armed forces of the two countries are hardly comparable. Chinese Ground Forces number 1.03 million personnel; Taiwan’s, a mere 88,000. (According to American data, the true number of Taiwanese military personnel is around 175,000 when well-trained reservists are included.)²⁸

The Chinese Navy and Air Force, now outfitted with the latest military aircraft, have grown substantially in both number and strength. China has deployed 250 bombers in the region. Taiwan has none; instead, it relies on highly effective modern fighters (400), powerful air defense capabilities, and a wide variety of artillery systems. The number of Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles is growing constantly, as is that of intermediate-range and operational-tactical missiles which easily cover the territory of Taiwan.²⁹

China has created Joint Operations Command-and-Control Center (JOCC) within the region. The number of Chinese military exercises in the area of the Taiwan Strait has grown, cooperation is being developed between different types of troops in the event of military actions in the region, and Chinese combat aircraft regularly circle Taiwan.

China’s growing capability to hinder the American armed forces’ access to the waters adjacent to the mainland are of special concern to Washington and Tokyo. American and Japanese experts have noted that China stepped up its program of building submarines and other warships capable of interrupting the deployment of US aircraft carriers in the area of the Taiwan Strait after the crisis there in 1995-’96.

According to estimates by the American military, China has the overall capability of seizing Taiwan. The only question is how much damage the Chinese Armed Forces would suffer in conducting such an operation, but the destruction of the infrastructure and industrial sites on Taiwan – let alone the number of civilian casualties – would hardly suit Beijing’s interests either.³⁰

Beijing must also consider that using military force against Taiwan would threaten China with considerable political harm and deal a major blow to its prestige in the eyes of world public opinion. In addition, the United States and Japan are doing their best not to give China an excuse to use force against Taiwan, while warning Taipei against any steps to declare independence or other actions that might provoke Beijing.

Tokyo is also refraining from the practical development of the Senkaku Islands, toward which right-wing forces in Japan are pushing it, in order to preserve the status quo in the region for the time being. The stubborn wish of Taiwan’s population to keep their distance from China, and especially not to reunite with their historical homeland, is major problem for Beijing where its policy toward the island is concerned.

When it comes to possible versions of PRC military operations against Taiwan, American experts consider a full-scale invasion unlikely, due to both the enormous losses China would suffer and its insufficient number of amphibious troops. An intimidating display of military power and a naval blockade of Taiwan to force its capitulation are far more likely. A surgical strike by Chinese missiles against key infrastructure facilities, command-and-control centers, air defense capabilities, radar installations, and important industrial objects is also possible.

For its part, Washington avoids making any official statements of what steps the United States might take if a conflict should break out in the Taiwan Strait.

In evaluating Taiwan’s armed forces, it notes they are equipped with the latest weapons, mainly purchased from the United States, even though the island also has its own fairly large arms industry. Special attention is given to strengthening its naval, air, and antimissile defenses, which include large numbers of F-16 fighter jets, P-3C Orion patrol planes, E-2 Hawkeye reconnaissance craft, and French-built Lafayette-class frigates. In January 2010, the Obama administration announced the sale to Taiwan of a large arms package (Patriot antimissile systems, UH-60M Blackhawk helicopters, Harpoon antiship missiles, Osprey-class minesweepers, and multifunctional command-and-control centers) worth $6.4 billion.³¹

On September 21, 2011, Washington announced it was supplying Taiwan with a new shipment of military hardware worth $5.85 billion for upgrading its F-16A/B jet fighters.³² In April 2014, the US Congress’ House of Representatives adopted a resolution allowing the sale to Taiwan of four retired Perry-class frigates. Citing budgetary difficulties, however, Taiwan agreed to buy only two of them. If the purchase goes through, these ships will join the eight other frigates of this class Taiwan already owns.³³ With the deployment on Taiwan of American Patriot PAC-3 anti-missile batteries, the island becomes part of a global ABM defense system created in the Asia-Pacific region by the United States. In light of the clear imbalance of forces, Taipei has recently been insisting more on a so-called asymmetric response to the threats from Beijing that would use powerful torpedoes and missiles capable of reaching the shores of the Mainland, pilotless aircraft, naval drones, cyber weapons, and so on.

As the American military note, the considerable attention given by China in recent years to developing its own forces and supplying them with the latest technological achievements has nevertheless largely undermined Taiwan’s earlier supremacy in different kinds of military hardware. During the US Congress’ June 2014 special hearings on relations between China and Taiwan, American defense experts expressed major concern over the current situation, pointing out the need for a substantial increase in US military aid to Taiwan and supplying the island with the latest weapons.³⁴

It is thought that the current situation surrounding Taiwan generally threatens further complications in Beijing’s relations with Washington and Tokyo. It is entirely obvious that the actions taken by Washington, Tokyo, and Taipei to strengthen the de facto independence of Taiwan in its current form. Of course, the categorical rejection by Taiwan’s present government of the “One China, Two Systems” postulate in no way pleases Beijing. It is also disturbed by the clearly growing separatist attitude of the Taiwanese population, especially among the young, while the position of the Nationalist Party, which favors taking a more flexible line in relations with China and developing economic and other ties between Taipei and Beijing, grows notably weaker.

Time will show what further actions China takes, but it is clear that the Taiwan issue remains serious and will continue to grow, being one of the main irritants in Chinese-American relations and a source of great tension in the area of the Taiwan Strait.

NOTES:

1. According to data from the World Bank, Taiwan’s GDP in 2019 was $605 billion. World Gold Council, August 2020. URL: https://tradingeconomics.com/taiwan/gdp (Retrieved on September 14, 2020.)

2. The Strait of Malacca is the main maritime transportation artery connecting the Indian and Pacific oceans. An overwhelming share of cargoes that are vitally important to the countries of East Asia (especially oil, liquefied natural gas, and other energy resources) pass through the strait. URL: https://www.oilexp.ru/news/world/malakkskij-proliv-klyuchevoj-punkt-transportirovki-nefti-mezhdu-indijskim-i-tikhim-okeanami/125170/ (Retrieved on September 16, 2020.)

3. Treaty of Peace with Japan. Signed at San Francisco, September 8, 1951. URL: http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm (Retrieved on September 23, 2020.)

4. Taiwan Relations Act. Public Law # 96-8 96th Congress. URL: https://www.ait.org.tw/our-relationship/pol-icy-history/key-u-s-foreign-policy-documents-region/taiwan-relations-act/ (Retrieved on September 10, 2020.)

5. Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation. September 23, 1997. URL: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html (Retrieved on September 20, 2020.)

6. Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan on the Presidential Election in Taiwan. January 14, 2012. URL: http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/2012/1/0114_01.html (Retrieved on August 18, 2020.)

7. Ba Dianjun, Issledovaniye politiki Yaponiyi v otnosheniyi Tayvanya posle okonchaniya kholodnoy voyny [A Study of Japan’s Taiwan Policy after the End of the Cold War], Jiuzhou Publishers, Beijing, 2010, p. 101.

8. Japan Ministry of Defense, 2006, pp. 221-2223. URL: https://www.mod.go.jp/epubl/w_paper/pdf/2006/4-2-1.pdf (Retrieved on September 20, 2020.)

9. Anti-Secession Law. URL: http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-03/14content_2694168.htm (Retrieved on September 12, 2020.)

10. Press statement. Michael Pompeo. January 11, 2020. URL: https://www.state.gov/on-taiwans-election/(Retrieved on September 5, 2020.)

11. US Office of the Secretary of Defense. Military and Security Development Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020. Annual report to Congress. URL: https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHFNA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FI-NAL.PDF (Retrieved on September 10, 2020.)

12. SShA odobrili prodazhu Tayvanyu oruzhiya [United States Approved the Sale of Arms to Taiwan]. URL: https://rg.ru/2019/07/09/ssha-dobrili-prodaxhu-tajvaniu-oruzhia-na-22-milliarda-dollarov.html (Retrieved on September 3, 2020.)

13. Undersecretary Keith Krach’s Travel to Taiwan. Press Statement. September 16, 2020. URL: https://state.gov/under-secretary-keith-krachs-travel-to-taiwan/ (Retrieved on September 19, 2020.)

14. US Diplomat Keith Krach Meets Taiwanese Leaders. September 18, 2020. URL: https://ww.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3102162/us-diplomat-keith-krach-meets-taiwanese-leaders-new-dialogue (Retrieved on September 19, 2020.)

15. China warns US of “serious damage” to ties over economic talks in Taiwan. Taiwan News. September 16, 2020. URL: https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4009974 (Retrieved on September 19, 2020.)

16. Nihon Keizai Shimbun. September 18, 2020. URL: https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO64079140Y0A910C2EA4000/ (in Japanese.)

17. Pompeo nazval “voyennym blefom” ucheniya KNR bliz Tayvanya v otvet na visit svoyego zama [Pompeo Calls PRC Exercises near Taiwan in Response to the Visit of His Deputy “Military Blustering”], Interfax. September 18, 2020. URL: https://www.interfax.ru/world/727674 (Retrieved on September 19, 2020.)

18. Minoborony Kitaya predupredilo SShA i Tayvan’ ob opasnosti igry s ognyom [China’s Defense Ministry Warns the United States and Taiwan about Playing with Fire]. Interfax. September 18, 2020. URL: https://www.interfax.ru/world/727529 (Retrieved on September 25, 2020.)

19. Result of the Presidential Election in Taiwan (Statement by Foreign Minister Motegi Toshimitsu) January 11, 2020. URL: https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002752.html (Retrieved on January 12, 2020.)

20. Nihon Keizai Shimbun. September 18, 2020. URL: https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGX-MZO64075460Y0A910C2EA4000/

21. Diplomatic Bluebook 2019. “Chapter 2. Japan’s Foreign Policy that Takes a Panoramic Perspective of the World Map. Section 1. Asia and Oceania.” URL: https://www.mofa/go.jp/fp/pp/page22e_000929.html (Retrieved on August 20, 2020.)

22. Diplomatic Bluebook 2020. “Chapter 2. Japan’s Foreign Policy that Takes a Panoramic Perspective of the World Map. Section 1. Asia and Oceania. URL: https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100105301.pdf (Retrieved on October 21, 2020.)

23. Inaugural address of ROC 15th-term [sic] President Tsai Ing-wen. May 20, 2020. URL: https://english.president.gov.tw/News/6004 (Retrieved on September 13, 2020.)

24. Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative. URL: https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1678/text (Retrieved on October 17, 2020.)

25. Richard Haass and David Sacks, American Support for Taiwan Must Be Unambiguous, Foreign Affairs. September 2, 2020. URL: https://regnum.ru/news/polit/3052096.html (Retrieved on September 6, 2020.)

26. Dire Straits: “Should American Support for Taiwan Be Ambiguous?” Foreign Affairs. September-October 2020. URL: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-09-24/dire-straits?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=twofa&utm_campaign=The%20Transfor-mation%20of%20Diplomacy&utm_content=20200925&utm_term=FA%20This%20Week%20-%20112017 (Retrieved on October 1, 2020.)

27. US Office of the Secretary of Defense. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020. Annual report to Congress. URL: https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHFNA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF (Retrieved on September 10, 2020.)

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29. US Office of the Secretary of Defense. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020. Annual report to Congress. URL: https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHFNA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF (Retrieved on September 10, 2020.)

30. US Office of the Secretary of Defense. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020. Annual report to Congress. URL: https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHFNA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF (Retrieved on September 10, 2020.)

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32. Statement by official PRC Foreign Ministry representative Ma Zhaoxu on September 21, 2011. Xinhua News Agency report, September 22, 2011.

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34. Hearing on Evaluating US Policy on Taiwan on the 35th Anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act: Written Testimony of Randall Schriver, April 3, 2014. US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea: Written Testimony of Ian Easton, June 5, 2014, pp. 67-73. URL: http: www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/HearingTranscript_June5,2014.pdf (Retrieved on August 20, 2020.) Stokes, Mark and Hsiao, Russell. Why the US Military Need Taiwan. The Diplomat, April 13, 2012. URL: http://thediplomat.com/2012/04/why-u-s-military-needs-taiwan/1/ (Retrieved on August 20, 2020); Minnick and Wendell, US Might Tap into Taiwan Early Warning Radar. Defense News, May 8, 2014. URL: http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140508/ DEFREG03/305080026/US-Might-Tap-Into-Taiwan-Early-Warning-Radar (Retrieved on August 20, 2020.)