From Republic.ru, June 26, 2024, https://republic.ru/posts/112862. Condensed:

Editors’ Note. – . . . It seems that in recent months, [Russian President] Vladimir Putin’s luck has started to run out: Sanctions pressure on the Russian economy keeps mounting, the West continues to provide military aid to Ukraine and has allowed its weapons to be used to strike targets on Russian soil. Meanwhile, Putin was forced to travel to Pyongyang to meet with [North Korean leader] Kim Jong-un and ask him for support. FSB [Federal Security Service] Gen. Yevgeny Savostyanov, Ret., who once worked in the presidential administration, told Republic.ru about the danger that Western military aid [for Ukraine] poses to Vladimir Putin’s regime; whether Russia has money to continue the war; and whether the Russian government can count on its allies in the East.

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Question. – Recently, Vladimir Putin returned from a trip to North Korea [see Vol. 76, No 24‑25, pp. 7-11], where he had to ask for assistance to continue the war with Ukraine. Western weapons are being widely used to hit targets on Russian territory, [including in] the Crimea, and Putin once again has to threaten to use nuclear weapons. It seems that right now he is in a very unfavorable position. What is your take on the situation?

Answer. – It seems to me that Vladimir Putin is in a real panic right now. Imagine his state of mind. Go back two months: He was absolutely sure that he was calling all the shots, ruling the roost, that everything was going according to plan, [and that] everything was going well for him. The Americans were not providing money or weapons to Ukraine – and so neither would the Europeans. How long would Ukraine hold out without US money and US weapons? Furthermore, people in Russia could see that Ukraine’s strike capability was declining and so were less afraid to sign contracts [to serve in the Army] [and were] more willing to go [to fight in Ukraine], understanding that risks on the battlefield were significantly lower. In other words, roughly speaking, Putin was sure that he would finally break Ukraine before the end of the year.

However, it so happens that in this war, as in many other wars, the pendulum is swinging from one side to the other and sometimes quite unexpectedly. And then events took a truly cinematic turn. Mike Johnson, the speaker of the US House of Representatives, used to be quite [a] comfortable [partner] for [former US president Donald] Trump – essentially his policy enabler. [Johnson] looked set to block the Ukraine, Taiwan and Israel aid package in Congress. However, Johnson is a very religious man, and at some point, he realized that what he was doing was in conflict with his deep-seated belief that he had grown up on – something that he believes in and is teaching his children. He realized that something’s got to give. You see, this is an absolutely cinematic, artistic transformation of a person. The cinema reflects such storylines [and] follows personality changes in crisis [or in] revelation. And so Johnson went against everyone – Trump, [US President Joe] Biden, Putin [and Chinese President] Xi [Jinping] – with his decision [see Vol. 76, No. 17, pp. 3-6]. He did not get permission from any one of them – it was his own choice. And suddenly Putin, who thought that he was fully in control [and] that everything was going well for him, within weeks found himself in a new reality when money started flowing to Ukraine – far more money than had been pledged.

Q. – You mean along with European aid?

A. – Yes, US money, European money and the decision to transfer proceeds from Russia’s [frozen] assets to Ukraine [see Vol. 76, No. 21, p. 17]. Putin’s situation changed overnight. Because as soon as the Ukrainians learned that they would get weapons, they began to use their contingency supplies. Then new supplies started coming in. As for Putin, he sent everything he had to the battlefield – both quantitatively and qualitatively. Russia does not have anything more sophisticated to use on the battlefield than what it has been using for the past six months. By contrast, Ukraine began to receive qualitatively new types of weapons: missiles with ranges of up to 200 kilometers, aircraft, antidrone guns [and] new supplies of air defense systems. And it turns out that Putin’s expectation to finally break Ukraine this year has to come to grips with an entirely different reality: The war will drag on. Of course, some tactical successes may be achieved, but that won’t fundamentally change anything. Also, consider the conditions under which Russia must keep fighting? [It is] a situation where Ukraine gets qualitatively new weapons and begins to inflict far greater losses on Russia, including in deep within Russian territory.

I am sure that now Putin will have to pay far more money to persuade a person to sign a contract and go to fight in Ukraine. But there is no money even now.

Q. – Is the loss of Western markets a factor here? [Russia] also has other markets, right?

A. – The only money Russia used to make from foreign trade was essentially Chinese. There was also trade with India, but those transactions are too abstruse. For example, Russia failed to collect $40 billion in profits from its oil sales to India, and instead used the money to invest in Indian stocks. As far as Russia’s interests are concerned, it is difficult to imagine anything more absurd. On the other hand – as we know from the news of the past few days – Russian oil exports to India have surged, with Russia emerging as the No. 1 [oil] supplier [to India], but for two reasons. The first is that China has sharply reduced oil imports from Russia, and the second is that Russia had to sharply cut prices on oil sales. As we know, the yuan is practically the only liquid asset in Russia’s gold and foreign exchange reserves. All investments, if any, are denominated in yuan. At present, investment in other economies is the last thing China is interested in: It is getting none itself. In other words, economically, Russia’s prospects are not very good.

[The Russian government] could try to bleed its taxpayers dry, but that would not work, and the budget would end up in the red.

It turns out that Putin has big problems: He cannot end the war quickly and there is no money for a long, drawn-out war.

If China supports [Russia], then it could keep going a little longer, but in the current situation, everything might come crashing down in an instant. It is necessary to fight for a long time, but there are not enough artillery systems or shells for that, so Putin has to go cap in hand to North Korea to sign a treaty with a provision on mutual assistance in case of aggression against either country. Incidentally, until now, North Korea had only one such treaty – with China. And China also had only one such treaty – with North Korea. They have never had other such partners. . . .

Q. – Why would China need that?

A. – Like Putin, Xi is a person who is obsessed with certain ideas. He is a “neo-Maoist” who is already sacrificing China’s economic interests to his concepts of China’s “global dominance” and “return to the sources of Communist ideas.” Incidentally, an interesting process is currently under way. Rich Chinese are fleeing Singapore for Hong Kong, since Singapore is beginning to put the squeeze on them, similarly to how Russian billionaires are being squeezed in the West. What’s more, this year the US is expected to see the biggest-ever influx of Chinese millionaires. They are all fleeing because they are really scared of Xi Jinping’s policy. And [Xi] needs an ally, since he cannot stand up to the US [and] the West on his own.

Xi Jinping needs Russia as a strategic base, as a political partner in international relations, and finally as a party that is willing to do the dirty work on China’s orders. . . .

Q. – After his visit to North Korea, Putin again started scaring the West with nuclear weapons and even said that he was ready to revise the nuclear doctrine. Russia’s current nuclear doctrine allows for the use of nuclear weapons in case of an existential threat to the state. Is he bluffing again?

A. – A lot has already happened: strikes on Moscow, the Kremlin [and] oil refineries across Russia. There were strikes on the Crimea Bridge and even on missile attack early warning stations. So what? It is one thing to make threats, but quite another to make a decision after which you will disappear. So, no – actually, I suggest [we] never touch on the nuclear issue. After all, it always comes up in connection with blackmail: If you don’t do something that I want, I will drop a nuclear bomb. Now, supposing you give in to that blackmail. In a while, they will tell you: Give me something else or I will drop a nuclear bomb. And then again and again – until you finally stop. So it is better to stop immediately and never give way. This is why I always tell everyone: Let the generals think about what will happen under this or that scenario for the use of nuclear weapons. But as for us, let’s forget this topic; let’s forbid ourselves to even talk about it. Because this is always a form of blackmail.

Note that before the aforementioned US decision to provide military aid to Ukraine, all talk in Russia about the use of nuclear weapons had died down. Nobody seriously talked about that – maybe just one or two persons kept raving about it. There is no need to watch news from the battlefront – just watch the frequency of references to nuclear weapons. So, when things are going well on the battlefield for Russia, there is no such talk. But when [Russia] starts making nuclear threats, this means that something isn’t well on the front.

Q. – Meanwhile, Russian propaganda is doing all it can to split Ukraine and trigger a new maidan [reference to the 2014 uprising in Ukraine on Independence Square – Trans.] there. But during the two years of war, Ukraine has really grown tired of [Russian propaganda].

A. – Of course, the war is brutal, and the first, the most selfless [people] have gone to a better world. Many of those who are going [to the front] are fighting because of the [mobilization] law than from pure enthusiasm. But Ukraine is fighting. Even when it was getting nothing from the West, it was holding the front line with its teeth. Now it will fight better, striking deeper [into enemy territory and] inflicting heavier losses on Russia. The appearance of missiles with ranges of 200 km shows that there are no communication lines in southern Russia that Ukraine would be unable to disrupt right now. This is a serious problem for the entire southern grouping of Russian forces, especially in the Black Sea sector.

I know that economic assistance to Ukraine is being provided and even exceeds many expectations and demands. . . .

The war is ongoing, and the pendulum will swing from one side to the other and back again. Now the critical moment for Ukraine is past and the Russian Army is about to face big problems. However, this does not mean that this is going to be the last swing of the military pendulum – it could move again. The war is dragging on. At the same time, it is becoming increasingly clear that this war is absolutely senseless. It has already brought huge economic, human, moral and political losses to Russia. Nothing good has come from this war for Russia. Actually, it is a way of covering Putin’s personal failure. He unleashed [the war] in 2022 in the hope of achieving his goals within three weeks between two Olympic Games. When that plan fell through, he did not admit his guilt or his responsibility, and did not step down but decided: “Let tens and hundreds of thousands of people burn [in the flames of war], as long as I am not held to account.”

Q. – But will Russian society ultimately hold him to account? How and when could that happen?

A. – Exactly a year ago, we saw that Putin had absolutely no support [and] [Yevgeny] Prigozhin’s “march” [i.e., mutiny; see Vol. 75, No. 26, pp. 3-17 – Trans.] showed that no one had come out in support of Putin. There was not a single high-profile public event, [and] not a single [political] party tried to take its followers into the streets. What’s more, we saw that even the Army didn’t take Putin’s side.

Such is the harsh reality: He has become the king who relies only on force. [He] is strong as long as [he] can buy off the public.

Moscow is still beautifully illuminated; there are plenty of cars on the streets, except that now perhaps there are more Chinese models. Cinemas and exhibitions are working, [and] stores are well stocked with goods. But prices started rising, [and] people are gradually becoming poorer.

The US Congress’s decision to support Ukraine was disastrous for Putin also because he had not estimated the manpower need for such a long term. Again, I think that the process of recruiting [Russian] citizens to fight in Ukraine will now slow down. Simply because the contingent of people who do not cherish life and who are willing to do just about anything for money is dwindling. At the same time, losses will increase, as will the understanding that it is very easy to lay down one’s life in the war. So far, the winners, so to speak, are residents of one-industry towns that have landed big military contracts and where wages have risen sharply. So far, the winners are residents of remote villages, who are getting paid good money to fight [in Ukraine]. . . .

However, it seems to me that the combination of these two factors – falling living standards and difficulties on the front (I am not even talking about defeat) – may compel Putin to change the paradigm or force his inner circle to understand that salvation lies in a change of leadership. Because each member of his inner circle simply must understand: Everything that Putin is doing is to Russia’s detriment.

Q. – Do you believe [members of] Putin’s inner circle are concerned about these problems?

A. – Let’s not get snooty and think that others do not see [this]. Everyone around Putin realizes that the situation is reaching an impasse, [and] nothing good lies ahead. He may remain in power and live like Kim Jong-un, [Kim’s father] Kim Jong-il or grandfather Kim Il-sung. He will have enough caviar and balyk [cured fillet of sturgeon], while the people are starving: After all, North Koreans have to pick up whatever crumbs they can get. Here, you have to hand it to Putin’s consistency: Of course, he is not just going for broke, but he is burning his bridges behind him. The decision to include five Ukrainian regions in the [Russian] Constitution [see Vol. 74, No. 39, pp. 3-6] makes his game impossible to reverse. However, anyone who replaces him will immediately do so – immediately stop the “special military operation” [and] conduct demobilization. Those in his inner circle realize that it would be very difficult for him to do so.

Q. – Putin and [members of] his inner circle have begun to publicly showcase their children and relatives, bring them out, as was the case at the recent economic forum in St. Petersburg, [and] hand out official positions to them. For the first time, both of Putin’s daughters spoke at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) [see Vol. 76, No. 23, pp. 3-7], and his niece landed the post of deputy defense minister [see Vol. 76, No. 24-25, pp. 12-13]. Is Russian public opinion being groomed for the possibility of power in the country being handed over to the offspring of Putin’s elite?

A. – Any lifelong ruler sooner or later faces the problem of succession. Putin has long set Russia back centuries. We could talk about various things in various areas, but institutionally, he took Russia back to the late 18th century, establishing practically an absolutist regime. He is confronted with an ontological question: What next? Whom to hand over power to? Because, again, any lifelong ruler sooner or later has to consider the option of dynastic succession of power. . . .

Putin has the same need – i.e., to transfer power to somebody through lineage.

I say in half-jest that yes, he has brought out his daughters, but then the question that comes up is that at least one of them should marry some big-shot silovik [politician or government official with backgrounds in defense, security and law enforcement –Trans.]. For instance, [Aleksei] Dyumin [secretary of the State Council, former deputy defense minister, governor of Tula Province and Putin’s former bodyguard – Trans.] is a man in favor [with the Kremlin] who is quickly moving up the political career ladder, and one of [Putin’s] daughters should be married off to him. The problem is also exemplified by [Belarussian President Aleksandr] Lukashenko, who is grooming his [youngest] son Kolenka [diminutive-affectionate form of Nikolai – Trans.] to be his successor, taking him to meetings with Putin [and] to Victory Day Parades. Xi Jinping does not have this [problem] yet, since he became a dictator five years ago, when, at the most recent congress of the Chinese Communist Party, he got rid of the last holdovers from the previous era and established himself as an absolute leader – importantly, not only a material one, but also ideological and spiritual [the congress was actually in 2022; see Vol. 74, No. 42, pp. 7-10 – Trans.]. So far, that is not enough, but he is also younger. However, in the end, the logic of any lifelong ruler always confronts him with the problem of the dynastic succession of power.

Q. – But will the successors have any legitimacy?

A. – Does Putin have such legitimacy? Since 2020, when he mutilated the Constitution to suit himself, coerced the Constitutional Court to approve it [and] put the questions [i.e., constitutional amendments] to a referendum to be voted on as a package [see Vol. 72, No. 27-28, pp. 3-7], he has had no legitimacy. I am not even talking about the fact that he has killed all of his main rivals – [Boris] Nemtsov [see Vol. 67, No. 9-10, pp. 3-5], [Aleksei] Navalny [see Vol. 76, No. 7, pp. 3-4] and even Prigozhin [see Vol. 75, No. 34-35, pp. 3-7]  – who might have run [for president]. And those that he did not kill – less high-profile figures – he sent to prison. However, I cannot say for certain what exactly will happen. How power will be transferred – during Putin’s lifetime or after; by Putin’s will or against his will; under external pressure or without it; as a result of major military defeats or without them. In reality, there are so many variables here that we can only consider various scenarios. If Putin manages to keep the situation under control, then of course, it will be a dynastic transfer of power. However, we don’t know whether he will be able to keep the process under control, because – to reiterate – we saw that he has essentially no support. No one thumped his chest and staged a rally in his defense.

Q. – And now everyone can see that Putin, who just a few years ago was meeting with world leaders on an equal footing, is forced to seek help from rogue states, such as North Korea.

A. – There is a remarkable video clip – a reminder of the 2010 Victory Day Parade and March, when Scottish guards and French, Polish and US troops marched on Red Square. I have always said that we must not for a minute forget that it was then that political repressions began, primarily against the media, but the first eight years of Putin’s rule were the most favorable for the Russian people. And we need to understand that had he not succumbed to the temptation of returning to power, he would definitely have gone down in history as Russia’s best ruler. And what we are seeing now may in a sense speak to the personal tragedy of a man who has succumbed to temptation – who, instead of going down in history with a big plus is now going down with an absolute minus. . . .