From Republic.ru, Nov. 27, 2024, https://republic.ru/posts/114351. Condensed text:

Editors’ Note. – On the 1,000th day of the war, Ukraine used Western long-range weapons for the first time. . . . Military analyst Kirill Mikhailov tells us what consequences to expect from Ukraine’s permission to strike Russian rear areas with Western weapons, and how the Kremlin will have to respond.

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Question. – Following the Oreshnik strike on Dnepropetrovsk in response to Ukraine’s authorization to use long-range Western weapons, Putin said the “regional conflict” in Ukraine had acquired “elements of a global nature.” Do you believe that this is really the case?Has the war reached a new level?

Answer. – De facto nothing has really changed, except that another type of long-range weaponry has been employed. And it is significantly less effective for the money – in its conventional use, of course – than the same Iskanders. Yes, the Oreshnik is extremely difficult to intercept. But as we saw from satellite images, albeit in low resolution, the huge Yuzhmash plant that was hit was virtually unharmed. If I understand correctly, the impact was actually caused by the casing, since there were no explosions on the ground. This missile probably just doesn’t have a conventional high-explosive warhead – it simply hasn’t been developed. Which is logical, because such nuclear carrier missiles are never used for such purposes – just to strike, just to throw a ton and a half of explosives in there. It’s pretty stupid, because this missile – it’s pretty inaccurate. It does not need accuracy, since it is supposed to be used as a nuclear weapon.

Roughly speaking, a strike by three Iskanders with the same warhead mass would be much more effective. So basically this is purely a demonstration. And when Putin says that the confrontation has become more global, you have to understand that it’s all about nuclear deterrence strategy. In other words, Russia basically, like any country that possesses nuclear weapons, primarily uses them to deter potential adversaries from doing things that the country’s leadership does not like. In this case, Russia is trying to reestablish nuclear deterrence, which concerns Western aid to Ukraine. And it has to be said, it’s working pretty well, considering all the delays in deliveries and so on. But not as well as the Kremlin would like.

The authorization of strikes with long-range Western missiles is the most recent failure of the deterrence strategy. And now Moscow is trying to restore it somehow.

Several different things have already been done for this purpose, starting with deploying nuclear weapons in Belarus and changing the nuclear doctrine. Basically, these are all links in a chain, and using the Oreshnik is likewise meant to make everyone believe that Russia is quite serious about the use of weapons.

The problem is that it doesn’t work that well. Why not?

Because everyone knows, including Western intelligence, that even in a much more critical situation in the fall of 2022, when the Russian Army was on the verge of disaster, Vladimir Putin did not use nuclear weapons and decided instead to go ahead with the highly unpopular mobilization [see Vol. 74, No. 38, pp. 3-6], which he had delayed for the previous six months, even though its necessity was obvious not only to comrade Strelkov [i.e., jailed former Donetsk people’s republic defense minister Igor Girkin – Trans.]. And if even at that time they resorted to an unpopular measure instead of nuclear weapons, then now Russia, being in a much better situation than it was in the fall of 2022, will most likely not resort to the use of nuclear weapons either. Hardly anyone in the West believes this or takes it seriously.

The question lies in the fact that the new [US president-elect Donald] Trump administration may have more impressionable people, [like businessman] Elon Musk, on whom this could work. . . .

Q. – How critical is the decision to let Ukraine pound missiles deep into Russia for Moscow overall?

A. – Tactically speaking, this alone will not turn the tide on the front. First, because of the insufficient number of such missiles. Second, because of the fact that it’s just another weapon that gives certain capabilities. Let’s remember what happened after Ukraine was allowed to use HIMARS MLRS against Russian territory. It is a very effective weapon for hitting various targets in the enemy’s close rear. As a result, drone operators, artillery crews and logistics units on Russian territory have become quite uncomfortable. This led to it not being possible to revive the offensive on Kharkov, which was already stopped at that time, despite all attempts. And, for example, the continued inability to dislodge the UAF from Kursk Province. Thus, authorizing the use of HIMARS had some effect but was not decisive.

It’s the same here. Now Russia-based command posts, railroad hubs, ammunition depots and other logistics hubs have become extremely uncomfortable. Russia will be forced to divert additional resources to defend itself against this threat, which, to put it bluntly, does not work great. Let us recall the Western report about the very first use of ATACMS – against the grouping headquarters in Kursk Province – which said that two out of eight missiles were shot down. That is, Russia knows how to fight such offensive weapons, but Russian air defenses do not guarantee protection. Therefore, they will have to engage in additional defense, spend additional resources to find and try to destroy enemy HIMARS launchers, [and] try to do something about Ukrainian carriers of Storm Shadow missiles, i.e., Su-24s. And Russia has been trying for over a year to strike the Starokonstantinov airfield, where Ukrainian planes that use the Storm Shadow are based. But, as we can see, this did not lead to any degradation of capabilities in terms of Storm Shadow launches.

Even more resources will now have to be expended on this threat, and this is important in the context of a war of attrition. Because a war of attrition is not about maneuvers, not about tank wedges and not about military skill; it’s about resources. And when more resources are spent on covering air defense in the border area, there will be less air defense in the occupied territory of Ukraine.

When they’re trying harder to hit the carriers of Western missiles, something else will not be hit, and the Ukrainian rear will be able to breathe a little freer.

Accordingly, this is another pebble on the Ukrainian scale in the war of attrition, and it will have a certain impact on the situation. . . .

Q. – How comparable are Russia’s long-range weapons capabilities to Ukraine’s now?

A. – Russia has very high superiority in long-range weapons. It is in order to even slightly level this superiority that the Ukrainian authorities have been so actively seeking permission to strike Russian territory. But achieving that parity is quite hard. Because Russia, for example, has Iskander ballistic missiles that can only be shot down by Patriot systems modified for the latest PAC-3 [missiles]. There are not so many of them – I think there are seven systems for all of Ukraine, and they shoot down such missiles at a fairly limited range. Just recently they were talking about shooting down Iskanders in Odessa. But mostly what is shot down is what flies at Kiev.

From what we have seen in recent days from the Ukrainian side, [long-range attacks have been] a strike on an ammunition depot in Bryansk Province, a strike on the command post of the Kursk grouping of forces, a strike in the area of an S-400 [air defense] complex and a strike on an airfield. The choice of targets of an operational-strategic nature speaks precisely to the limitations of such weapons. Roughly speaking, if Russia can afford to use an Iskander to strike some absolutely localized thing, even Ukrainian troops holding positions under the ruins of the Antonovka bridge – there was a case when an Iskander flew there, for example – Ukraine does not have such opportunities.

Q. – You talked about the additional resources that Russia will have to mobilize to cope with the new challenges. Information about the presence of North Korean soldiers in Kursk Province is emerging [see Vol. 76, No. 43, pp. 16-17]. Are they really there? How many are there, what are they supposed to be doing, and what is this information supported by?

A. – The fact of a North Korean military presence on Russian territory, I think, is already undeniable. Enough open source videos have been posted to prove their presence. South Korean intelligence, which at one time revealed munitions transfers, is also reporting on what’s going on. Ukrainian military officials are writing this. The only thing is that there is probably no mass use of North Korean troops yet. In that case, there would probably be prisoners, and we aren’t seeing them yet. The question of why they have not been used en masse so far should be asked of the Russian commanders. Again, the problem with a war of attrition is the lack of personnel. The tactics of constant infantry assaults used by Russia, which in many cases are applied in a frankly inefficient manner, without adequate reconnaissance, fire support and drone escorts, lead to heavy losses. More forces and more troops are needed to achieve the amount of progress that has been seen on the front in recent months. And even a reasonably effective contract recruitment system is likely to fail to meet this challenge. Because it is not only the Ukrainian side that complains about the lack of personnel.

For the exact purposes to which the Russian Army uses its personnel, they are insufficient even in vastly superior quantities. So I think the North Koreans are part of that story. Well, the other part of the story is the opportunity for the North Korean regime to gain invaluable experience in modern warfare. . . . Plus, of course, all the perks that North Korea gets from Russia: rice, oil, technology.

But, again, if you look at the geopolitical component, I think it’s advantageous for the North Korean regime to have more than one patron, and not to rely solely on China, which is rather cool toward its neighbors, for international support. And Russia is now in a more aid-dependent state.

Russia needs everything from North Korea: troops, artillery, shells, tanks, whatever it can get. This cooperation is much more favorable for the DPRK than with China. And this cooperation gives Russia an opportunity to create another hotbed of tension, this time on the Korean Peninsula, which will distract the attention of the West.

When Putin talks about a global conflict, it’s a bit off the mark. There is a real war that Russia is waging against Ukraine, and there is a global conflict with Western countries that Russia is seeking to expand. I mean these acts of sabotage in Europe, the transfer of weapons to the Houthis and so on. If anyone is expanding the conflict, it is Putin himself. Because from the point of view of Western countries, the war in Ukraine is a local story that they want to finish on Ukrainian terms, of course, but without expanding the conflict globally. The only person trying to expand this war into a global conflict is Putin. And he is trying to expand it with such asymmetric actions because Russia is not ready to fight NATO in Europe and the Middle East, since all resources are now going to the Ukrainian front. That is why Putin is employing such hybrid methods of expanding the conflict into a global one. That’s what I was going to say about his statement on global conflict.

Q. – Will Putin succeed in accomplishing this?

A. – First, it disperses attention, it spreads resources. Let’s see how this looks in the story with the DPRK. If the DPRK has new technology, [and] an army that has gained experience in modern warfare, it will require much more attention from the West and from South Korea. This will limit South Korea’s ability to send arms to Ukraine, which is now being talked about, because it will need them for itself. In that respect, it probably works to some extent. But some kind of global defeat of Western countries is probably not something Putin can inflict. Creating new hotbeds of tension, though, to increase fatigue from all this conflict – yes, he probably can.

Q. – In his Nov. 21 address, Putin said Ukraine did not get its way when it struck Bryansk and Kursk Provinces with Western missiles. If we believe him, the command staff is unhurt, and there is no serious damage. Is this deliberate disinformation? And what do we know about the damage?

A. – I don’t think it’s deliberate disinformation. I think it comes from the reports that are sent upstairs. Putin probably doesn’t know what’s really going on [at the front]. And he believes that five out of six missiles were shot down, when in fact two out of eight were actually shot down. The Americans are to be trusted on this issue because they have surveillance systems for missile launches. They are able to detect the launch of even a single anti-aircraft missile. In fact, why is America sure that [Malaysian Airlines Flight] MH17 was shot down from territory controlled by the Donetsk people’s republic in 2014 [see Vol. 66, No. 37, pp. 3-6]? Because they saw the launch, and that was a much smaller missile.

As for direct damage in Bryansk Province, it is difficult to obtain information from open sources – everything hinges on elementary weather conditions. All the Ukrainian OSINT teams are now complaining that they can’t see what happened to the arsenal because of the cloud cover. All the pictures that appear are clouded over. As for Kursk [Province], it’s hard to rely on anything because it’s an underground command center. We still haven’t seen what happened there, for the same reason. . . .

Even if no one in the high command died, the death of a large number of headquarters personnel would inevitably disrupt its operations. This will make it more difficult for Russia to try to dislodge the UAF from Kursk Province. If the arsenal in Bryansk Province did not have a large-scale effect, as in Toropets, then the strike on the command center in Kursk was a serious thing, if we believe the published data. And this is where Putin is likely to be grossly misleading.

The Kremlin’s attempts to demonstrate a new level of escalation, including launching the Oreshnik, do suggest that the threat has been taken extremely seriously. Perhaps it is not only because of the potential threat, but also because of the actual consequences.

Q. – What should civilians in Russian regions expect from the permission [obtained by Ukraine] to hit Russia with long-range Western missiles?

A. – In general, we can note the trend that Ukrainian strikes on military and infrastructure facilities involve fewer civilian casualties than Russian strikes. We don’t see similar examples from the Ukrainian side of when Russia strikes some factory and happens to kill 20 civilians, or simply shoots at God knows what on the basis of some intelligence that there is supposedly a headquarters, a Ukrainian position or building supposedly occupied by the UAF. Of course, this is war, and in war civilians always suffer. But there is no additional threat specifically from these missiles. Given that the targets Ukraine will be striking are large and valuable and military ones, which after all are not often located in places where civilians congregate. On the other hand, strikes on these arsenals result in the scattering and detonation of munitions, which is already dangerous to civilians. So just living next to military installations is certainly not an enviable position.

Q. – Now Russia will have to move all these military facilities, arsenals and headquarters even further to the rear?

A. – That’s practically impossible. Russian logistics, Russian management are still extremely centralized. It is extremely difficult to distribute, to move – it would require somewhat more expense than the damage that could be done by such strikes. Also, it doesn’t offer complete protection. Because there are Ukrainian long-range drones that are not bound by any restrictions. There are Ukrainian missiles that are already in use – the Neptune antiship missiles with increased range. Zelensky has threatened to produce 3,000 missiles in 2025, which are also expected to be unrestricted. So a very costly restructuring of the entire army’s management and supply system without a guarantee that this will protect it does not look like a wise move.

Since the discussion of ATACMS strikes on airfields began, Russia has relocated most of its combat aviation from those airfields. But they are still used for refueling; there are still helicopters there. It proved physically impossible to clear these airfields completely. An ATACMS strike on an airfield was recently reported, and it’s likely that something was damaged there too.

Q. – Could such retaliatory steps by the West incline Russia toward deescalation, toward some kind of peace plan, or are they still more likely to make Russia act even more aggressively?

A. – I don’t think the Russian strategy will change significantly. Russia is employing every possible conventional means at its disposal and is trying to seek them from allies – Iran, the DPRK and so on. I don’t think it will have a global impact. The Russian strategy is to bring Ukraine to strategic defeat through a war of attrition. The fact that permission was given for Russia to be hit with missiles that have been used for more than a year will not lead to radical changes – not on the battlefield or in terms of Russian strategy.

How else can Russia respond? There is likely to be more hybrid action in various countries.

As for the conflict itself, the only thing Russia has left is the use of nuclear weapons, which is still extremely far away. You can be sure of that. Now that Russia is in a much better situation than it was in the fall of 2022, this is unlikely. Most likely, Russia will try to end the conflict on its own terms under the current situation. Given the fact that Russian troops are advancing and the way the Kremlin sees the situation based on embellished reports, I think the Kremlin regime leadership is confident that its strategy will yield results.