From Republic.ru, Dec. 31, 2024, https://republic.ru/posts/114662. Condensed text:

Editors’ Note. – Today, Republic is publishing a New Year’s post with contributions from independent Russian journalists. We asked our colleagues two questions: What were the most memorable events in 2024, and what positive and negative changes for Russia and the world do you expect from 2025? We are publishing the answers from those who responded to our request.

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Oleg Kashin.

1) I was recently asked this question during a broadcast. I answered, then they asked: But what about [the] Crocus [City Hall terrorist attack; see Vol. 76, No. 13, pp. 3‑14 – Trans.]? I felt ashamed, because I was the one who kept repeating all year how strange it was that the largest-scale terrorist attack had been forgotten (and indeed, it never entered public memory at the same level as Nord-Ost (the terrorist attack in Dubrovka. – Ed.) [see Vol. 54, No. 43, pp. 1‑3] or Beslan [see Vol. 56, No. 36, pp. 1‑16]). Turns out I forgot it too. So to you I’ll respond: The most important event of the year was the mass killing at Crocus City Hall and the widespread indifference toward it, which equally proves the success of media manipulations by the creators of “pops and smoke” [euphemistic descriptions of explosions in Russian state media – Trans.] and the objective devaluation of human life both in the context of war and in general.

2) My hope is for peace, and even though it is no longer trendy to expect Trump to force Russia and Ukraine to stop the war, one can hope. And my fear follows from this same thing: The state will, as it always does, dump the rage not used in the war onto citizens’ heads, probably with new repressions and capital punishment at some point. I don’t see any cause for optimism on that.

Dmitry Kolezev.

The most important events of the past year. Here’s the list I came up with (in chronological order):

The death in prison of Aleksei Navalny [see Vol. 76, No. 7, pp. 3‑4] (even after his death, he remains on the Rosfinmonitoring [Federal Financial Monitoring Service] list of “terrorists and extremists” – Ed.): The Russian opposition lost its most vibrant leader, and the Kremlin – its most dangerous and charismatic domestic opponent. In the moment, it seemed as though, following Navalny’s murder, anger and rage would triumph over apathy among his supporters. But in the long term, in my opinion, Navalny’s death has had a dampening effect on the Russian opposition. The Anticorruption Foundation (which has been declared an extremist organization and banned in Russia – Ed.) quickly found itself in crisis due to a lack of leadership, which its competitors rushed to take advantage of.

The Crocus terrorist attack: This tragedy marked the return of “big” Islamic terrorist attacks to Russia and demonstrated the inability of the Federal Security Service [FSB] to combat actual threats (I believe this is largely a consequence of their shift in focus toward political investigations and repressions). The government responded with a massive antimigrant campaign: Kremlin-aligned media and politicians began stoking chauvinistic sentiments, and the State Duma adopted a package of “antimigrant” laws [see Vol. 76, No. 41, pp. 13‑14], some of which experts say border on Nazism. Meanwhile, the weakening economy could really use a supply of labor.

[Former defense minister Sergei] Shoigu’s dismissal and purges in the Defense Ministry: The dismissal of Shoigu from the post of defense minister was, in effect, the Kremlin’s belated admission that the “special military operation” had failed and morphed into a difficult, multiyear war. Shoigu himself managed to stay out of jail and retain some of his sway, becoming [Russian] Security Council secretary. However, he lost a lot in terms of corruption opportunities, and his political influence was radically reduced (he was unable to even get his deputy appointed as a senator). Shoigu’s deputies and close associates found themselves targeted by criminal investigations. One of the main corruption clans was weakened significantly. These and other criminal cases against major officials managed to siphon off part of the public’s discontent and weariness from the war: The people were thrown a few boyar heads to distract them a bit.

Nuclear threats and Oreshnik [Hazel Tree missiles]: All year, the Kremlin has continued to use the threat of nuclear attack as a way to blackmail Western countries. This culminated in exercises “to study the practical preparation and application of nonstrategic nuclear weapons,” new (unsuccessful) tests of Sarmat missiles, and changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine [see Vol. 76, No. 47, pp. 3‑7]. Granted, after Trump won the [US presidential] election, Putin effectively stopped making global nuclear threats, shifting to more local threats to European countries, using a nonnuclear version of the Oreshnik missile [see Vol. 76, No. 48, pp. 3‑6]. I suspect this was done so that Trump would not think Putin was pointing a loaded gun at America.

The conflict over Wildberries [see Vol. 76, No. 41, pp. 16‑17]: The family feud over this online retail giant was the biggest example of a corporate raid in recent decades. Due to the scale of the asset, the husband-and-wife fight for control over the family business morphed into a struggle between the powerful groupings around Ramzan Kadyrov (Chechnya) and Suleiman Kerimov (Dagestan and Ingushetia). The specter of a new war in the Caucasus began to loom behind this “dispute between commercial entities.” Kadyrov, whose people have long been secretly making a living getting involved in business conflicts, openly sided with one of the parties this time and publicly threatened to declare a blood feud against his opponents. The conflict culminated in a bloody shootout in central Moscow. By the end of the year, Ramzan Kadyrov was also openly opposing influential law-enforcement officials at the federal level: [Internal Affairs Minister] Vladimir Kolokoltsev and [Investigative Committee head] Aleksandr Bastrykin. This story teases what might await Russia after the collapse of this regime, which has not bothered to set up strong institutions.

Exchange of political prisoners: For the first time since the Soviet era, Moscow had a large-scale prisoner exchange with Western countries, exchanging not only foreigners convicted of espionage but also its own citizens who were repressed for political reasons [see Vol. 76, No. 30‑31, pp. 3‑7]. Several prominent political figures – including Ilya Yashin, Vladimir Kara-Murza and Andrei Pivovarov – are now free and in exile. Deprived of Aleksei Navalny, a portion of the Russian opposition is looking closely at them as potential leaders (particularly Yashin). And another portion is trying to do everything it can to keep them from becoming such leaders. The exchange also demonstrated that such an action is possible in principle. We may see another exchange in the first quarter of 2025, but for now those are only rumors.

YouTube throttling: The reduction of YouTube speed that began in July [see Vol. 76, No. 33, pp. 12‑13] turned into an almost complete ban by the end of the year. According to Google data, YouTube traffic in Russia has fallen to about a third of what it was. However, the slowdown hit entertainment channels the hardest, while political channels suffered much less. The fight for YouTube is not over yet, and it could lead to undesirable consequences for the regime, such as a manifold increase in the popularity of VPNs and other methods for bypassing bans. Nevertheless, this is very bad news for Russian independent media. It is telling that in surveys a significant number of Russians name the throttling of YouTube as one of their concerns. I think most people are less concerned about not having the ability to watch alternatives to state propaganda than they are about losing access to the world’s largest media library.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces occupation of part of Kursk Province: Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Province [see Vol. 76, No. 32, pp. 3‑8] came as a shock to Russia’s military command, government and society. The war, which was “practically won” (as the Kremlin saw it) once again did not go according to plan. In military and strategic terms, Russia’s losses proved minor, but the political and symbolic consequences were quite significant. To liberate Kursk Province, Russia had to call in soldiers from North Korea [see Vol. 76, No. 47, pp. 19‑20], while the crisis of authority in the region forced the Kremlin to rush to replace the governor, who had just recently won an “election” [see Vol. 76, No. 49, p. 15]. Despite all the efforts and North Korea’s assistance, a portion of Kursk Province remains occupied by the enemy to this day, which demonstrates Russia’s inability to control its own borders. . . .

The worsening economy: By the end of the third year of war and severe sanctions, the apocalyptic forecasts made by Russian opposition economists had begun to partially come true: The ruble exchange rate went down, the Central Bank [interest] rate went up, and inflation became a problem. The regime had to stop giving veterans of the war in Ukraine discounted mortgages and astronomical payouts for getting wounded. Occasionally, localized shortages of basic staples, such as eggs or butter, would crop up. In the new year, Russians can expect tax and fee hikes and further price increases. The liquid part of the National Welfare Fund is shrinking rapidly. Some believe that 2025 will be the last year that Russia is able to wage war without economic problems becoming obvious to the general population.

Trump’s victory: Donald Trump’s and the Republicans’ triumph in the US elections may be the most significant event of the year, one that may define the future for many conflicts around the globe. In addition to forcing Russia and Ukraine to negotiate in early 2025, Trump and his team are expected to make a “final decision” on Iran, wage a new trade or even hybrid war with China (although this is not as clear-cut), and decrease the US’s role in NATO and Europe, which could give the Kremlin a free hand. By the end of the year, Trump was also having ideas about Greenland, the Panama Canal and Canada. His fantasies are unlikely to all come true, but the next four years will definitely not be boring.

The fall of the Assad regime: What happened in Syria demonstrated that Russia has a severe lack of resources to “ensure security” anywhere far from its borders, especially given the hot war against Ukraine. This erodes its prestige among the authoritarian regimes that would like to preserve themselves with Moscow’s support. For now, the fate of the [Russian] bases in Hmeimim and Tartus has not been definitively decided, but there are many indications that it will ultimately be impossible to hold on to them. If that is the case, Russia will lose powerful and strategically important bases in the Mediterranean (and the only fully-fledged bases outside the former USSR). Moscow’s influence in the Middle East will fall, and Russia will become a less attractive partner for Iran and Turkey. The capacity for conducting operations in Africa will be drastically reduced. Russia may potentially attempt to partially replace the Syrian bases with Libyan ones, but that has its own difficulties.

Embraer plane shot down: The end of the year brought a new “baby black swan” for the Russian regime. It is highly likely that a Russian air defense system once again shot down a passenger airplane [see the second article under Other Post-Soviet States, below]. What’s worse than the tragic error itself is the reaction from the Russian authorities and propaganda: lying from the first hours following the disaster, muddying the trail on state TV, refusing to take responsibility quickly, and ignoring the disaster. If the Kremlin decides once again to act according to the maxim “bros don’t apologize,” it risks weakening its ties with Azerbaijan even further and worsening relations with Kazakhstan. An additional possible problem is that Chechen security forces were involved in the strike on the airplane, and Putin does not want to pick a fight with them. . . .

Yelizaveta Osetinskaya.

What were the most memorable events in 2024? The death (most likely unnatural) and funeral of Aleksei Navalny: The death demonstrated absolute vulnerability to the hellish repression machine, while the funeral proved that people do care after all.

Marking 1,000 days of war: The fact that we crossed this date means the war has become protracted and, in a sense, routine.

An event that lasted all year was that ChatGPT became the norm for ordinary people (not geeks), as the Internet once did.

The Paris Olympics: I was impressed by the incredibly lively opening ceremony in the pouring rain and by the fact that all the key events could be watched on a big screen in a nearby park. And it brought me joy to take part in “Marathon pour tous,” an amateur night marathon as part of the Olympics. It provided an outlet. . . .

Ilya Shepelin.

What were the most memorable events in 2024? Oof, to be honest, it was the terrible news that really stuck in my memory this year. Not because there was no good news – I think there was. But the bad events had a sort of grand scale to them: Navalny being put to death/murdered in jail, and Crocus, Russia’s biggest terrorist attack. An event like the war, while it has become something of a routine in the news, generates daily news stories involving numerous deaths. Not to mention the daily events within Russia involving the application of the repressive apparatus, which just keeps gaining steam – and that too is thanks to the war and the search for internal enemies who of course must be dealt with in such stormy times.

What do I expect from 2025? I recently saw a meme with Putin at New Year’s. Practically every year, he repeats the phrase “This year was not easy.” But in the meme, his speech was, “This year was actually easy! You’ll find out what a hard year is after Dec. 31.” And I think things can always be worse. There are professionals in this field who will always make that trend a reality. There could always be even more people dying in the war, and even more people could be put in jail for anything they say.

In arranging my life, I would assume that I should not count on positive shifts and should make plans on the assumption that bad changes are inevitable. I would proceed from middling-to-pessimistic predictions. At the same time, I would leave room for hope in my heart; you can’t live without it. But we should keep in mind that what we’re hoping for is a miracle, and miracles are less frequent in life than an endangered animal on a city street.

Here are the miracles that could come in the new year: an end to the hot phase of the war (this even has some chance of happening, but I’m afraid it’s far below 50%) or the end of President Putin’s regime (here the probability is just slightly above zero). We have to retain hope for a miracle. But we also have to understand that it is by no means a guaranteed outcome. If you believe too much that there is definitely a happy ending waiting for us in a month or a year, and it keeps not happening, you risk ending up in a deep pit of disappointment. . . .

Olga Mikitas.

For me, this year was a year of new emigration. Whereas in March 2022 we left for “wherever possible,” in June 2024 it was “where we see ourselves for the next five years.”

I’m not expecting anything anymore. I have mixed feelings: sadness, apathy, anger, hopelessness. I just live day to day, do my work, spend time with family and find joy in the little things.

Gleb Golod.

1) I will remember 2024 as a year when the world around us got even worse. Aleksei Navalny was killed; Vladimir Putin is alive and still ruling Russia, which continues to attack Ukraine. Russians have been put in jail for their words even more frequently. Donald Trump won the US election together with Elon Musk, and there’s no end in sight to the war in the Middle East. Dictatorships continue their victorious march, and the scope of their leaders’ impunity is still striking.

2) I don’t expect any positive changes in the new year. I just hope that it doesn’t become much worse. I suspect, however, that we will remember 2024 as a calm year that we should have spent preparing for 2025; it’s a pity we didn’t know what was in store for us. . . .