Modern Methods of Aerospace and Air Defense of Facilities and Prospective Development Trends

Journal Title: Military Thought

Issue Edition: Vol. 28, No. 1

Author: A.P. Korabelnikov


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Modern Methods of Aerospace and

Air Defense of Facilities and

Prospective Development Trends

 

Col. A.P. KORABELNIKOV (Ret.),

Doctor of Military Sciences

 

Abstract. This paper offers a classification of modern methods of aerospace

defense of facilities, generalizes methods of immediate air defense of

assets at the tactical level, and substantiates some promising lines in their

further development.

keywords: aerospace adversary, aerospace defense, air defense, methods

of aerospace and air defense, prospective improvement trends in methods

of aerospace and air defense of facilities.

Looking at contemporary methods of aerospace and air defense (ASD/AD),

it is necessary to fall back on a number of important methodological provisions.

n One. The AD of facilities has ceased to be the mere destruction of piloted

aircraft in the vicinity of the facility, but is now a fight against the aerospace

adversary throughout its actions area. Therefore to view facility AD

separatly from the fight against the aerospace adversary, let alone to factor

it out of the equation, would be wrong methodologically.

n Two. The AD of each facility cannot succeed unless there is successful

struggle against the aerospace adversary as a whole.

n Three. If AD methods are tied to every specific defense object, then the

methods of fighting the aerospace adversary are conditioned by the goals

and tasks of the latter, and only after that by the facilities constituting the

content of the adversary’s mission.

n Four. The methods of immediate AD of facilities can be regarded separately,

without being singled out among the methods of fighting the aerospace

adversary, and then only at the tactical level, with regard to the unit

(subunit) tasked with defending the said facility.

n Five. Combating the aerospace adversary should be done both by means

of attack and aerospace defense.

Tentatively one can single out four groups of air and aerospace defense

methods.

n The first group of ASD/AD methods consists in destroying the adversary

troops, forces and assets of aerospace attack (ASA) in the areas of their

deployment, preparation for combat, control, and infrastructure. Historically,

this group of methods was devised as a strategic method of Soviet

air defense on the eve of the Great Patriotic War (GPW) and at the same

time, as a method of fighting the air forces of threatening states. On the

strength of the latter, this group of methods was handed over for development

and execution to the U.S.S.R. Red Army Air Force.

However, it has to be said that today not only the Air Force of the RF

AF Aerospace Forces (ASF) possess the right kind of potential to employ

this group of methods. The same can now be said of all the Armed Forces

services and arms of the Russian Federation. Given the fact that in military

districts the troops and forces of the Air Force and Air Defense, the

navy, Missile Troops, and Artillery are under a single command, implementing

this group of methods to fight the aerospace adversary can be

organized at the level of military districts, which is being done within the

framework of the strategic operation (SO) at a theater of operations

(TOO). However, one should understand that it is only too probable that

the ASD tasks will get dissolved in those of the SO at the TOO, and will

be seen as neither the most urgent, nor the most important.

n The second group of ASD/AD methods consists in destroying the ASA

troops, forces, and assets in the area where these are carrying out their

combat assignments. This group of methods historically started to evolve

and get tested on the eve of the Great Patriotic War; it was implemented

by means of setting up AA defenses around facilities. At present, the said

group of methods is implemented by means of organizing surface-to-air

missile (SAM) defense of facilities within the range of the adversary’s

piloted aircraft.

This group of methods is oriented toward destroying piloted aircraft,

which, to use its weapons, will have to enter the firing range of the surface-

to-air missile forces (SAM Forces). Analysis of progress in the

adversary ASA forces and assets shows that before long this kind of aircraft

will not be found within the SAM Forces firing range; there will

only be cruise missiles (CM), which can be destroyed by this group of

Destroying the adversary’s troops, forces, and assets of aerospace attack

(ASA) in the areas of their deployment, preparation for combat actions,

control, and infrastructure. Historically, this group of methods was

devised as a strategic method of Soviet antiaircraft defense on the eve

of the Great Patriotic War.

methods, but they will have to undergo considerable modification; the

other variety will be guided air bombs (GAB), which were not meant to

be destroyed by this group of methods from the first. On top of everything,

this group of methods relies on antiaircraft SAM defense, which

makes it unfit for fighting operational-tactical ballistic missiles (OTBM).

Obviously, this group of methods has to be either modified, or, better still,

used in combination with other methods.

n The third group of ASD/AD methods was developed on the eve and in the

course of the GPW. It reached the highest point of development after the

Great Patriotic War on the basis of organizing Soviet AD on combinedarms

principles involving various arms (pursuit aviation, SAM troops,

radio-engineering troops), in cooperation with the Air Force, and also the

AD troops and forces of the Ground Forces (GF), and the navy. This group

of methods consists in destroying the adversary’s ASA forces and assets at

the distant approaches to facilities all along their flight routes to the boundary

of own firing range, and can be classified in the following way.

According to the action sequence of ASD troops and forces (destruction

of the aerospace adversary), namely, simultaneous engagement in fighting

(simultaneous destruction of the aerospace adversary); consecutive engagement

in fighting (consecutive destruction of the aerospace adversary).

According to the degree of concentration and distribution of ASD

troops/forces efforts when destroying the aerospace adversary: with regard

to missions, sectors, lines, echelons, and tactical groups of the aerospace

adversary under attack.

According to the degree of centralizing command and control (C2) of

the ASD troops/forces when destroying the aerospace adversary: destruction

of the aerospace adversary under centralized control of the ASD

troops/forces, semi-autonomous actions by the ASD troops/forces

(destruction of the aerospace adversary by ASD troops/forces coordinated

from the relevant command post chiefly involving own information);

independent (autonomous) combat actions by the ASD troops/forces.

According to the spatial position of the adversary aerospace forces

and assets being destroyed: destruction of the aerospace adversary before

the launching (dropping) range of destruction assets (CM, GAB, etc.);

destruction of launched (dropped) means of destruction in flight (CM,

GAB, etc.) outside the range of their launching (dropping).

According to the operation disposition of aerospace defense forces:

destruction of the aerospace adversary by means of facility, range, zonal,

territorial AD (ASD); destruction of the aerospace adversary by conducting

AD (ASD) as various combinations of the methods mentioned above;

destruction of the aerospace adversary with a one-, two- or multiechelon

AD (ASD) formation.

According to the nature of the maneuver employed: destruction of the

aerospace adversary by means of positional, maneuver AS (ASD), a com-

bination of maneuver and positional AD (ASD); destruction of the aerospace

adversary after (or during) maneuvering by ASD troops and forces

along the combat contact line or from the depth (advance or preemptive

maneuvering, situation-conditioned maneuvering); destruction of the aerospace

adversary by organizing ambush acts. Each of the said methods can

be based on troop/force, fire maneuvering, or a combination of the two.

n The third group of methods was built up mostly for air defense, and does

not display the full set of solutions for missile attack warning, outer space

monitoring, and antimissile defense (AMD). The reason is that these

methods, on the strength of a high degree of automation in solving corresponding

problems, are in fact the methods of action by automated means

and not by troops/forces.

n The fourth group of ASD/AD methods was developed by scientists at the

Marshal G.K. Zhukov Military Aerospace Defense Academy in Tver

(MADA); these aim at fighting not the troops/forces of the aerospace

adversary, but at combating the adversary’s means of destruction used,

launched, or dropped at the near approaches and within the airspace of the

defended facilities by means of relevant ASD/AD forces placed inside the

facilities and maneuvering therein. The fourth group of methods was

developed with regard both to ballistic missiles (the said methods form

part of the tactical AMD methods), and to guided, self-homing and program-

flying aerodynamic assets (these methods form part of the intrafacility

maneuver AD methods). When developing the fourth group of

methods, it was proved that introduction of SAM systems and SAM batteries

had to and could be placed within defended facilities.

The fourth group of methods is not only most promising, but also

very much in demand at the moment. The reason is this. nowadays, the

aerospace adversary can address operational tasks by using only guided

and automatic high-precision destruction means, without sending its

forces into the range of the ASD troops/forces. Hence a very important

conclusion for organizing struggle against the aerospace adversary.

Whereas previously the ASD operational control unit had to organize

combat actions merely against the forces of aerospace attack, now it also

has to take up organization of struggle with the assets of the latter, above

all with cruise missiles, operational-tactical ballistic missiles, and

unmanned flying vehicles (UFV), and eventually also with hypersonic

flying vehicles (HSFV). In other words, the efforts to organize struggle

The methods of destroying ASA troops, forces, and assets in the area

of their combat assignments historically started to evolve and get tested

on the eve of the Great Patriotic War; they were implemented by means

of setting up AA defenses around facilities.

against CM, OTBM and UFV get shifted from the tactical level of control

over ASD formations, units and subunits to the operational one for troop

and forces associations intended for combating aerospace adversary. In its

own right, struggle against CM, OTBM, and UFV, and eventually also

HSFV, in terms of content should be of the combined-arms nature, and not

service-related, given the weapons of ASD units and subunits employed.

As we can see, the tactics of fighting and combat actions by ASD/AD

troops/forces make inroads into the theory and practice of operational art with its

methods and techniques, when solving operational problems of fighting the aerospace

adversary. This is a fundamentally new premise both for operational art

and for ASD/AD tactics. Its essence is in the following. Operational art in terms

of its inherent purpose remains a theory and practice of resolutely changing the

situation in aerospace in one’s favor, but gets its content enriched with working

methods of tactical staffs, tactical methods and techniques of destroying the aerospace

adversary’s assets, such as HSFV, CM, OTBM, GAB, UFV. In their turn,

the ASD tactics, while still a theory and practice of physical destruction of the

aerospace adversary’s forces and assets (HSFV, CM, OTBM, GAB, UFV), on

top of the tactical methods and techniques of employing AD/ASD troop/force

units and subunits, acquires an extra filling with combined-arms methods of

organizing and conducting combat actions against the said assets. Formerly,

these combined-arms methods constituted the content of the theory and practice

of operational art, first by the AD Troops, then by the Air Force, then by the ASD

Forces, and finally, by the ASD forces and assets as a whole.

Using ASD Forces to fight HSFV, CM, OTBM, GAB, and UFV should consist

in the following. Tactical methods of using FA by the range limit and by the

area, methods of maneuver AD and intrafacility maneuver AD, methods of fighting

HSFV, CM carriers, and UFV in flight, methods of tactical AMD, methods of

sectoral operations in missile-threatened sectors, methods of using AD forces from

ambushes, barrier and range methods of using AD forces should be organized at

the operational level of ASD control, and translated into practice by the tactical

ASD unit. In turn, combat against HSFV, CM, OTBM, GAB, and UFV cannot and

should not be a fight only by Pursuit Aviation units and subunits and AD

troops/forces, but should also have a combined-arms nature, starting from the sites

of deployment (storage), preparation (assembly), command and control, and ending

with each point target of attack by every listed asset of the aerospace adversary.

The efforts to organize struggle against CM, OTBM and UFV get shifted

from the tactical level of control over ASD formations, units, and subunits

to the operational level for troop and force formations intended for

combating the aerospace adversary. Eventually, in terms of content,

this should acquire a combined-arms nature, given the weapons of ASD

units and subunits employed.

The switchover of the aerospace adversary from concentrated use of forces

to a concentrated use of assets within the ASD range, apart from changes in operational

art and tactics, also conditions the need to change the very paradigm of

understanding the fight against aerospace attack assets. Against aerospace attack

assets, one should organize and conduct combat actions likewise by assets, and

not by forces only. Fighting automatic and remote-controlled ASA assets should

also involve automatic autonomous or remote-controlled high-capacity mobile

ASD assets and systems.

Such is the sum of ASD methods known today. Doubtless, it will continue to

expand thanks to both practitioners and theorists.

Let us now move from methods of fighting the aerospace adversary to

the methods of immediate AD of facilities in tactical formations and units.

The ASD/AD basis in tactical formations and units is its facility-related disposition

and conduct. There one can single out methods of destroying the forces

and assets of the aerospace adversary, and those of ASD/AD disposition. The primary

and principal ones there were and are methods of destroying ASA forces

and assets. This is a most important methodological point. Unless the methods of

destroying the adversary ASA forces and assets are furthered, it is impossible to

develop the methods of ASD/AD disposition. The connection here is direct and

defining. There is also an inverse connection: the needs of ASD/AD disposition

necessitate improvement in the methods of destroying the aerospace adversary’s

forces and assets.

I propose starting analysis of the said pair of method groups with the methods

of destroying the forces and assets of the aerospace adversary. Also, I

would like to make this reservation; I will not examine here the methods of

destroying the aerospace adversary’s forces and assets on the ground, because

this would be outside the scope of this article.

At present, the methods of destroying the forces and assets of aerospace

adversary in flight include methods of firing at them, or, as they are known alternatively,

firing methods. It should be specified that these methods have been reliably

worked out and technically raised to the level of automatic and semiautomatic

high-precision weapons working on the principles of reconnoiter-fire-hit,

reconnoiter-fire-forget, switch-on-automaton-forget, and described in the rules

of firing and explanatory notes to those for each of ASD weapons item. In other

words, the methods of firing examined in the firing rules are precisely the basis

of AD tactics for a facility.

Tentatively, the firing or fire methods can be divided into two subgroups:

methods of aimed firing; methods of setting and conducting defensive fire. Both

subgroups, in terms of forces and assets, can be implemented as single-shot and

group-shot methods.

The methods of aimed fire in the wake of the GPW developed more intensely

and variably on the basis of armaments improvement. In their turn, the methods

of setting and conducting defensive fire in the Soviet AF AD Troops stag-

Modern Methods of ASD/AD Facilities Development 35

nated, and in the SAM Forces they were unjustly consigned to oblivion. At the

same time, in army air defense this type of fire, far from being overlooked, was

steadily developed, and with the advent of Shilka, a self-propelled AA gun, and

now also of the Pantsir missile SAM system, defensive fire underwent further

advancement on a fundamentally different aiming basis. As for the navy, defensive

fire there (even by large-caliber artillery systems) is a major component of

fighting against antiship missiles at low and ultralow altitudes.

The subgroup of aimed fire methods consists of the following: methods of firing

rocket salvo; methods of single shots, methods of firing from the far, near

limit of the hitting range, methods of firing within the guaranteed hitting range,

methods of consecutive firing from the far and near limits of the hitting range

thanks to the depth of the hitting range, methods of simultaneous firing at target

(targets), methods of firing with concentrated fire, methods of firing with dispersed

(distributed) fire; methods of firing at low, ultralow, medium, high, and

stratospheric altitudes; methods of firing at high-velocity targets and those flying

at hypersonic speeds; methods of firing at maneuvering targets; methods of firing

at targets in duty zones; methods of firing at cruise missiles;

– methods of firing at shipborne and tactical aircraft, at strategic bombers;

methods of firing at noise jamming; methods of firing at ballistic missiles;

methods of firing amidst jamming; methods of firing at spacecraft; methods

of firing for self-defense; group strike with guided surface-to-air missiles

(SAM); single strike with a guided SAM.

The subgroup of methods of setting and conducting defensive fire comprises

methods of setting and conducting defensive fire (fire concentration, fire dispersion)

by the altitude and by the sector, within a space limited by the range, altitude,

and firing angle (concentration of fire, dispersion of fire); methods of setting

and conducting aimed defensive fire by means of anticipating discovery of

the place and time of fire zone creation within a limited space; by single assets

(individual units); by a combination of assets (several units); in the flight zone of

piloted and unmanned aircraft before their combat mission range; over the

defended facility.

The group of methods of ASD/AD forces and assets disposition comprises

disposition methods for defending a single facility (as an area) without structuring

it into point objects; disposition methods for defending a facility as a combination

of point objects dissimilar in terms of importance, with their importance

changing in time; disposition methods combining defense of the facility as an

The basis of ASD/AD in tactical formations and units is its facility-related

construction and conduct. Unless the methods of destroying the enemy

ASA forces and assets are furthered, it is impossible to develop

the methods of constructing ASD/AD.

area and as a sum of point objects; methods of conducting mobile surface-to-air

missile defense of a single facility; methods of conducting maneuver AD of a

group facility, group of facilities; methods of conducting maneuver intrafacility

AD of the facility as a sum of point objects; methods of defending the facility on

perimeter defense principle, with equal strength; methods of facility defense on

perimeter defense principle with an unequal distribution of efforts; methods of

zonal disposition of facility SAM defense; methods of defending the facility

against attacks at low and ultralow altitudes; methods of defending the facility by

the sector (main, reserve, important); methods of facility defense in missilethreatened

segments; methods of facility defense in missile-threatened sectors;

methods of facility defense before the range limits of adversary’s combat assignment

fulfillment; methods of facility defense at the line of range limit of adversary

combat assignment fulfillment; methods of facility defense disposition at

maximum angles and parameters of fire; methods of facility defense disposition

with spanning areas of destruction by SAM systems (SAM batteries); methods

of disposition and conducting echeloned SAM (antiaircraft) defense of facility;

methods of disposition and conducting AD of major area facilities of national

importance; methods of SAM defense of point objects; methods of AD of stationary

and mobile assets (by patrol accompaniment anticipatory approach to the

covering range); methods of disposition and conducting nonstrategic AD; methods

of using SAM systems (batteries), AA missile-gun complexes into the

defended facility; methods of adapting SAM defense built for hitting aerodynamic

targets; methods of combining within the same defense antiaircraft and

antimissile SAM defense to combat ballistic and aeroballistic targets; methods of

disposition and conducting mixed cluster lines defense; methods of creating a

SAM missile barrier; methods of disposition and conducting SAM missile

defense from ambush; methods of independently conducting SAM missile

defense; methods of mutual cover and self-defense; methods of organizing and

conducting AD by local SAM groupings. Such is the arsenal of facility ASD/AD

at the moment.

The stimulus for improving facility ASD/AD is the development of ASA

troops, forces, and assets of the prospective adversary, which, in turn, is oriented

not only and not so much to flying toward the targets to be hit, as to fighting

for facilities with the troops, forces, and assets of aerospace and air defense, and

also to combining methods of flying toward hitting targets and methods of fighting

for the latter. And for over fifty years now, the aerial adversary, when attacking,

solves the same inventory of tactical problems: blinding the reconnaissance

system of the aerial adversary by physically destroying its elements and by jamming;

disorganizing control over AD forces; physically destroying and jamming

the system of SAM defense at facilities; destroying fighter and other aircraft on

airfields and in the air, and also their infrastructure. To this end, the adversary is

constantly looking for, discovering, creating, and making use of weaknesses in

ASD/AD.

The standard set of ASD weaknesses includes the attitude to defense on the

whole and to ASD in particular as a supporting, enforced type of activity that is

not intentional; stationary-passive defensive thinking; letting the adversary take

the initiative in the choice of sectors and targets of attack, the time of attacking;

territorial and spatial gaps in ASD/AD; limited throughput, discrepancy between

the achieved density of ASD/AD fire and the potential density of attack by the

troops, forces, and assets of the aerospace adversary; limitations in the destruction

of maneuvering forces and assets; limitations in the destruction of aerospace

adversary forces and assets at low, ultralow, high, and stratospheric altitudes, in

near and deep space; limitations in the flight velocity of aerospace adversary

forces and assets being destroyed; time limitations of ASD/AD assets response;

limitations in armament mobility and employment maneuverability of ASD/AD

troops, forces, and weapons; accessibility for reconnaissance of ASD/AD troops,

forces, and assets.

The aerospace adversary formerly used these weaknesses consistently as

military affairs progressed, chiefly in the tactics of employing its ASA forces and

assets. nowadays, it seeks to make use of them all at once, both while creating

new ASA weapons, and in the art of their employment. A typical case in point is

the US prompt global strike concept. Thus, trying to achieve promptness and

globality, the Americans yet again stake their hopes on the altitude and speed

weaknesses of the ASD/AD in making hypersonic attack weapons. When

employing cruise missiles, they make use of the methodological gap in their

throughput capacity and low fire density. Thus on April 7, 2017 in Syria, Americans

displayed their ability to achieve a density of fire in CM attack of several

units per minute.

Let us take a closer look at the trends that condition further development of

facility ASD/AD methods.

The first one consists in the assumption that the adversary ASA forces will

not act in the same manner as we did when defending our facilities in their

absolute importance in disregard of the change dynamics in the latter. The aerial

adversary is not omnipotent, it cannot attack all the facilities simultaneously, and

its actions follow the law of correspondence: the targets of action correspond to

the tasks of actions, and these, in turn, are matched by the objects of actions.

The targets for each attack by the aerial adversary are chosen on the basis of

their relative pragmatic value rather than their absolute importance within the

system of objects whose destruction would ensure attaining the goal and solving

specific strategic, operational, and tactical problems. In other words, we try to

The stimulus for improving facility ASD/AD is development of ASA troops,

forces, and assets of the prospective adversary, which is oriented not so

much to flying toward the targets to be hit, as to fighting for facilities

against the troops, forces, and assets of aerospace and air defense.

defend everything, but the adversary will act only on those targets that are

prompted by each consecutive objective at the given moment.

In the said circumstances positional AD of facilities as mono-objects in

approximated boundaries in the form of area, in their fixed importance with an

emphasis mostly on destroying air weapon carriers and CM is insufficient. Positional

AD must be supplemented with maneuver AD. The latter is organized and

implemented by divining the objectives and tasks of the aerial adversary, and then

by maneuvering AD troops and forces in accordance with its objectives and tasks.

n Hence the conclusion that the first improvement line for facility

ASD/AD methods is to develop methods of maneuver AD and move on

from that to maneuver ASD.

The second trend consists in the fact that the adversary, when attacking

facilities, has opted for using the means instead of the forces within

the ASD firing range. Having precision-guided weapons at its disposal,

the aerial adversary has no need to strike at such defended facilities as

areas. The adversary structures each target of attack into point objects in

accordance with every next purpose of the attack. After that it will strike

within this area facility at point objects in accordance with the next objective

of combat actions.

n The second improvement line for facility ASD/AD methods is to work

out and implement intrafacility maneuver AD.

That is organized by introducing medium- and long-range SAM systems

into the facility (so as to repulse OTM attacks), and short-range

SAM stations (close action) to protect point objects within the area facility

from attacks by cruise missiles and guided air bombs (GABs). This

helps combine organization of both antiaircraft and antimissile defense by

limited surface-to-air missile forces. Moreover, resorting to intrafacility

maneuver AD, it becomes possible to effectively defend larger area facilities

of national importance with a limited number of forces.

And finally, using SAM-and-gun missile battery of the Pantsir-1S type

as part of the intrafacility maneuver, AD helps counter the density of

adversary fire already achieved and conceivable in the future, both by CM

and by other means of destruction, including GAB. The thing is that with

a high density of fire by ASA assets the adversary will enter the facility AD

system as a whole, while point objects within the defended facility will be

attacked with a piece (one or two) set of assets, which is up to a single

Pantsir-1S type AD assets. Moreover, at the end section of attack against a

The targets for each attack by the aerial adversary are chosen on the basis

of their relative pragmatic value, rather than their absolute importance

within the system of objects whose destruction would ensure attaining

the goal and solving specific strategic, operational, and tactical problems.

point object any means of air destruction used will follow known trajectories

with known movement parameters. To destroy similar assets it is

enough to know the time and place of preemption, for which a gun system

will suffice instead of a missile-gun one. Hence smaller, more maneuverable,

and cheaper weapons. Besides, forecasting and identifying point

assets well in advance inside the area facility make for having the Pantsir-

1S type SAM-and-gun missile battery in the form of a platform kept and

serviced in peacetime in parks and in depots, and during immediate threat

of aggression installed on the roofs of the pinpoint objects themselves.

n The third development line for facility ASD/AD methods is to further

methods of setting and conducting defensive fire at the means of the aerospace

adversary in the area of the defended facilities. The advantages of

defensive fire are its high density, simplicity of use, availability for the

troops even at present, given further development of suitable means of the

Pantsir-1S type, and also relative cheapness and smallness of the firing

assets.

The methods of making defensive fire have to be furthered both as firing

methods and those of constructing SAM defense. In the former case,

defensive fire should be perfected by making it more localized in the preemptive

thrust of the destruction area, and also thanks to less time spent on

setting fire. Besides, there is a chance of switching to automatic defensive

fire setting and conduct, down to active-dynamic protection principles used

in armored vehicles. In the latter case, it is necessary to develop the methods

of disposition and defending point objects, methods of disposition to create

defensive fire on missile-threatened sites, to organize SAM barriers on

the CM flight routes, and to cover missile-threatened sectors, etc.

The third trend is most promising, as it helps remove all ASD/AD limitations

in terms of throughput capacity, time of response, and fire density.

n The fourth development trend for facility ASD/AD methods is to

devise new methods of concentrating ASD/AD forces and assets, and of

improving the existing ones. Here it is necessary to improve the existing

ways of maneuvering and look for new ones.

Originally and to this day, maneuvering has been the prerogative of the higher

control levels with regard to those directly engaged in defending the facility.

On the strength of this, in conditions of struggle against the highly maneuverable

aerial adversary the maneuver appears excessively centralized and has to be

made less so. This will help, on the one hand, bring maneuver closer to real time

By resorting to intrafacility maneuvering of AD, it is now possible to efficiently

defend larger area facilities of national importance with a limited

number of forces.

struggle against the aerospace adversary, with the existing maneuver methods

acquiring new content, and on the other, reducing the degree of maneuver centralization

will create the necessary prerequisites for the appearance of new

methods and types of maneuver.

Maneuvering to achieve the objectives of its employment should be made on

time. Under conditions of fight against the aerospace adversary, this means that

the move should first of all be anticipatory. Then and then only will the maneuver

be timely enough. The preemptive nature per se and methods of achieving

that, including by means of maneuvering, help concentrate ASD troops, forces,

and assets according to the situation. Therefore, the methods of prognosticating

actions by the aerospace adversary against the defended facilities should be

devised before any other.

The list of improvement lines for ASD/AD methods given here is conditioned

by the prospective aerospace adversary. On the strength of this, the said

improvement lines, while helping eliminate ASD/AD weaknesses, are still far

from exhaustive. As new adversary’s ASAW appear, there will be other trends in

improving facility ASD/AD methods.

 

Translated by Margarita Kvartskhava

 

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