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Modern Methods of Aerospace and
Air Defense of Facilities and
Prospective Development Trends
Col. A.P. KORABELNIKOV (Ret.),
Doctor of Military Sciences
Abstract. This paper offers a classification of modern methods of aerospace
defense of facilities, generalizes methods of immediate air defense of
assets at the tactical level, and substantiates some promising lines in their
keywords: aerospace adversary, aerospace defense, air defense, methods
of aerospace and air defense, prospective improvement trends in methods
of aerospace and air defense of facilities.
Looking at contemporary methods of aerospace and air defense (ASD/AD),
it is necessary to fall back on a number of important methodological provisions.
n One. The AD of facilities has ceased to be the mere destruction of piloted
aircraft in the vicinity of the facility, but is now a fight against the aerospace
adversary throughout its actions area. Therefore to view facility AD
separatly from the fight against the aerospace adversary, let alone to factor
it out of the equation, would be wrong methodologically.
n Two. The AD of each facility cannot succeed unless there is successful
struggle against the aerospace adversary as a whole.
n Three. If AD methods are tied to every specific defense object, then the
methods of fighting the aerospace adversary are conditioned by the goals
and tasks of the latter, and only after that by the facilities constituting the
content of the adversary’s mission.
n Four. The methods of immediate AD of facilities can be regarded separately,
without being singled out among the methods of fighting the aerospace
adversary, and then only at the tactical level, with regard to the unit
(subunit) tasked with defending the said facility.
n Five. Combating the aerospace adversary should be done both by means
of attack and aerospace defense.
Tentatively one can single out four groups of air and aerospace defense
n The first group of ASD/AD methods consists in destroying the adversary
troops, forces and assets of aerospace attack (ASA) in the areas of their
deployment, preparation for combat, control, and infrastructure. Historically,
this group of methods was devised as a strategic method of Soviet
air defense on the eve of the Great Patriotic War (GPW) and at the same
time, as a method of fighting the air forces of threatening states. On the
strength of the latter, this group of methods was handed over for development
and execution to the U.S.S.R. Red Army Air Force.
However, it has to be said that today not only the Air Force of the RF
AF Aerospace Forces (ASF) possess the right kind of potential to employ
this group of methods. The same can now be said of all the Armed Forces
services and arms of the Russian Federation. Given the fact that in military
districts the troops and forces of the Air Force and Air Defense, the
navy, Missile Troops, and Artillery are under a single command, implementing
this group of methods to fight the aerospace adversary can be
organized at the level of military districts, which is being done within the
framework of the strategic operation (SO) at a theater of operations
(TOO). However, one should understand that it is only too probable that
the ASD tasks will get dissolved in those of the SO at the TOO, and will
be seen as neither the most urgent, nor the most important.
n The second group of ASD/AD methods consists in destroying the ASA
troops, forces, and assets in the area where these are carrying out their
combat assignments. This group of methods historically started to evolve
and get tested on the eve of the Great Patriotic War; it was implemented
by means of setting up AA defenses around facilities. At present, the said
group of methods is implemented by means of organizing surface-to-air
missile (SAM) defense of facilities within the range of the adversary’s
This group of methods is oriented toward destroying piloted aircraft,
which, to use its weapons, will have to enter the firing range of the surface-
to-air missile forces (SAM Forces). Analysis of progress in the
adversary ASA forces and assets shows that before long this kind of aircraft
will not be found within the SAM Forces firing range; there will
only be cruise missiles (CM), which can be destroyed by this group of
Destroying the adversary’s troops, forces, and assets of aerospace attack
(ASA) in the areas of their deployment, preparation for combat actions,
control, and infrastructure. Historically, this group of methods was
devised as a strategic method of Soviet antiaircraft defense on the eve
of the Great Patriotic War.
methods, but they will have to undergo considerable modification; the
other variety will be guided air bombs (GAB), which were not meant to
be destroyed by this group of methods from the first. On top of everything,
this group of methods relies on antiaircraft SAM defense, which
makes it unfit for fighting operational-tactical ballistic missiles (OTBM).
Obviously, this group of methods has to be either modified, or, better still,
used in combination with other methods.
n The third group of ASD/AD methods was developed on the eve and in the
course of the GPW. It reached the highest point of development after the
Great Patriotic War on the basis of organizing Soviet AD on combinedarms
principles involving various arms (pursuit aviation, SAM troops,
radio-engineering troops), in cooperation with the Air Force, and also the
AD troops and forces of the Ground Forces (GF), and the navy. This group
of methods consists in destroying the adversary’s ASA forces and assets at
the distant approaches to facilities all along their flight routes to the boundary
of own firing range, and can be classified in the following way.
According to the action sequence of ASD troops and forces (destruction
of the aerospace adversary), namely, simultaneous engagement in fighting
(simultaneous destruction of the aerospace adversary); consecutive engagement
in fighting (consecutive destruction of the aerospace adversary).
According to the degree of concentration and distribution of ASD
troops/forces efforts when destroying the aerospace adversary: with regard
to missions, sectors, lines, echelons, and tactical groups of the aerospace
adversary under attack.
According to the degree of centralizing command and control (C2) of
the ASD troops/forces when destroying the aerospace adversary: destruction
of the aerospace adversary under centralized control of the ASD
troops/forces, semi-autonomous actions by the ASD troops/forces
(destruction of the aerospace adversary by ASD troops/forces coordinated
from the relevant command post chiefly involving own information);
independent (autonomous) combat actions by the ASD troops/forces.
According to the spatial position of the adversary aerospace forces
and assets being destroyed: destruction of the aerospace adversary before
the launching (dropping) range of destruction assets (CM, GAB, etc.);
destruction of launched (dropped) means of destruction in flight (CM,
GAB, etc.) outside the range of their launching (dropping).
According to the operation disposition of aerospace defense forces:
destruction of the aerospace adversary by means of facility, range, zonal,
territorial AD (ASD); destruction of the aerospace adversary by conducting
AD (ASD) as various combinations of the methods mentioned above;
destruction of the aerospace adversary with a one-, two- or multiechelon
AD (ASD) formation.
According to the nature of the maneuver employed: destruction of the
aerospace adversary by means of positional, maneuver AS (ASD), a com-
bination of maneuver and positional AD (ASD); destruction of the aerospace
adversary after (or during) maneuvering by ASD troops and forces
along the combat contact line or from the depth (advance or preemptive
maneuvering, situation-conditioned maneuvering); destruction of the aerospace
adversary by organizing ambush acts. Each of the said methods can
be based on troop/force, fire maneuvering, or a combination of the two.
n The third group of methods was built up mostly for air defense, and does
not display the full set of solutions for missile attack warning, outer space
monitoring, and antimissile defense (AMD). The reason is that these
methods, on the strength of a high degree of automation in solving corresponding
problems, are in fact the methods of action by automated means
and not by troops/forces.
n The fourth group of ASD/AD methods was developed by scientists at the
Marshal G.K. Zhukov Military Aerospace Defense Academy in Tver
(MADA); these aim at fighting not the troops/forces of the aerospace
adversary, but at combating the adversary’s means of destruction used,
launched, or dropped at the near approaches and within the airspace of the
defended facilities by means of relevant ASD/AD forces placed inside the
facilities and maneuvering therein. The fourth group of methods was
developed with regard both to ballistic missiles (the said methods form
part of the tactical AMD methods), and to guided, self-homing and program-
flying aerodynamic assets (these methods form part of the intrafacility
maneuver AD methods). When developing the fourth group of
methods, it was proved that introduction of SAM systems and SAM batteries
had to and could be placed within defended facilities.
The fourth group of methods is not only most promising, but also
very much in demand at the moment. The reason is this. nowadays, the
aerospace adversary can address operational tasks by using only guided
and automatic high-precision destruction means, without sending its
forces into the range of the ASD troops/forces. Hence a very important
conclusion for organizing struggle against the aerospace adversary.
Whereas previously the ASD operational control unit had to organize
combat actions merely against the forces of aerospace attack, now it also
has to take up organization of struggle with the assets of the latter, above
all with cruise missiles, operational-tactical ballistic missiles, and
unmanned flying vehicles (UFV), and eventually also with hypersonic
flying vehicles (HSFV). In other words, the efforts to organize struggle
The methods of destroying ASA troops, forces, and assets in the area
of their combat assignments historically started to evolve and get tested
on the eve of the Great Patriotic War; they were implemented by means
of setting up AA defenses around facilities.
against CM, OTBM and UFV get shifted from the tactical level of control
over ASD formations, units and subunits to the operational one for troop
and forces associations intended for combating aerospace adversary. In its
own right, struggle against CM, OTBM, and UFV, and eventually also
HSFV, in terms of content should be of the combined-arms nature, and not
service-related, given the weapons of ASD units and subunits employed.
As we can see, the tactics of fighting and combat actions by ASD/AD
troops/forces make inroads into the theory and practice of operational art with its
methods and techniques, when solving operational problems of fighting the aerospace
adversary. This is a fundamentally new premise both for operational art
and for ASD/AD tactics. Its essence is in the following. Operational art in terms
of its inherent purpose remains a theory and practice of resolutely changing the
situation in aerospace in one’s favor, but gets its content enriched with working
methods of tactical staffs, tactical methods and techniques of destroying the aerospace
adversary’s assets, such as HSFV, CM, OTBM, GAB, UFV. In their turn,
the ASD tactics, while still a theory and practice of physical destruction of the
aerospace adversary’s forces and assets (HSFV, CM, OTBM, GAB, UFV), on
top of the tactical methods and techniques of employing AD/ASD troop/force
units and subunits, acquires an extra filling with combined-arms methods of
organizing and conducting combat actions against the said assets. Formerly,
these combined-arms methods constituted the content of the theory and practice
of operational art, first by the AD Troops, then by the Air Force, then by the ASD
Forces, and finally, by the ASD forces and assets as a whole.
Using ASD Forces to fight HSFV, CM, OTBM, GAB, and UFV should consist
in the following. Tactical methods of using FA by the range limit and by the
area, methods of maneuver AD and intrafacility maneuver AD, methods of fighting
HSFV, CM carriers, and UFV in flight, methods of tactical AMD, methods of
sectoral operations in missile-threatened sectors, methods of using AD forces from
ambushes, barrier and range methods of using AD forces should be organized at
the operational level of ASD control, and translated into practice by the tactical
ASD unit. In turn, combat against HSFV, CM, OTBM, GAB, and UFV cannot and
should not be a fight only by Pursuit Aviation units and subunits and AD
troops/forces, but should also have a combined-arms nature, starting from the sites
of deployment (storage), preparation (assembly), command and control, and ending
with each point target of attack by every listed asset of the aerospace adversary.
The efforts to organize struggle against CM, OTBM and UFV get shifted
from the tactical level of control over ASD formations, units, and subunits
to the operational level for troop and force formations intended for
combating the aerospace adversary. Eventually, in terms of content,
this should acquire a combined-arms nature, given the weapons of ASD
units and subunits employed.
The switchover of the aerospace adversary from concentrated use of forces
to a concentrated use of assets within the ASD range, apart from changes in operational
art and tactics, also conditions the need to change the very paradigm of
understanding the fight against aerospace attack assets. Against aerospace attack
assets, one should organize and conduct combat actions likewise by assets, and
not by forces only. Fighting automatic and remote-controlled ASA assets should
also involve automatic autonomous or remote-controlled high-capacity mobile
ASD assets and systems.
Such is the sum of ASD methods known today. Doubtless, it will continue to
expand thanks to both practitioners and theorists.
Let us now move from methods of fighting the aerospace adversary to
the methods of immediate AD of facilities in tactical formations and units.
The ASD/AD basis in tactical formations and units is its facility-related disposition
and conduct. There one can single out methods of destroying the forces
and assets of the aerospace adversary, and those of ASD/AD disposition. The primary
and principal ones there were and are methods of destroying ASA forces
and assets. This is a most important methodological point. Unless the methods of
destroying the adversary ASA forces and assets are furthered, it is impossible to
develop the methods of ASD/AD disposition. The connection here is direct and
defining. There is also an inverse connection: the needs of ASD/AD disposition
necessitate improvement in the methods of destroying the aerospace adversary’s
forces and assets.
I propose starting analysis of the said pair of method groups with the methods
of destroying the forces and assets of the aerospace adversary. Also, I
would like to make this reservation; I will not examine here the methods of
destroying the aerospace adversary’s forces and assets on the ground, because
this would be outside the scope of this article.
At present, the methods of destroying the forces and assets of aerospace
adversary in flight include methods of firing at them, or, as they are known alternatively,
firing methods. It should be specified that these methods have been reliably
worked out and technically raised to the level of automatic and semiautomatic
high-precision weapons working on the principles of reconnoiter-fire-hit,
reconnoiter-fire-forget, switch-on-automaton-forget, and described in the rules
of firing and explanatory notes to those for each of ASD weapons item. In other
words, the methods of firing examined in the firing rules are precisely the basis
of AD tactics for a facility.
Tentatively, the firing or fire methods can be divided into two subgroups:
methods of aimed firing; methods of setting and conducting defensive fire. Both
subgroups, in terms of forces and assets, can be implemented as single-shot and
The methods of aimed fire in the wake of the GPW developed more intensely
and variably on the basis of armaments improvement. In their turn, the methods
of setting and conducting defensive fire in the Soviet AF AD Troops stag-
Modern Methods of ASD/AD Facilities Development 35
nated, and in the SAM Forces they were unjustly consigned to oblivion. At the
same time, in army air defense this type of fire, far from being overlooked, was
steadily developed, and with the advent of Shilka, a self-propelled AA gun, and
now also of the Pantsir missile SAM system, defensive fire underwent further
advancement on a fundamentally different aiming basis. As for the navy, defensive
fire there (even by large-caliber artillery systems) is a major component of
fighting against antiship missiles at low and ultralow altitudes.
The subgroup of aimed fire methods consists of the following: methods of firing
rocket salvo; methods of single shots, methods of firing from the far, near
limit of the hitting range, methods of firing within the guaranteed hitting range,
methods of consecutive firing from the far and near limits of the hitting range
thanks to the depth of the hitting range, methods of simultaneous firing at target
(targets), methods of firing with concentrated fire, methods of firing with dispersed
(distributed) fire; methods of firing at low, ultralow, medium, high, and
stratospheric altitudes; methods of firing at high-velocity targets and those flying
at hypersonic speeds; methods of firing at maneuvering targets; methods of firing
at targets in duty zones; methods of firing at cruise missiles;
– methods of firing at shipborne and tactical aircraft, at strategic bombers;
methods of firing at noise jamming; methods of firing at ballistic missiles;
methods of firing amidst jamming; methods of firing at spacecraft; methods
of firing for self-defense; group strike with guided surface-to-air missiles
(SAM); single strike with a guided SAM.
The subgroup of methods of setting and conducting defensive fire comprises
methods of setting and conducting defensive fire (fire concentration, fire dispersion)
by the altitude and by the sector, within a space limited by the range, altitude,
and firing angle (concentration of fire, dispersion of fire); methods of setting
and conducting aimed defensive fire by means of anticipating discovery of
the place and time of fire zone creation within a limited space; by single assets
(individual units); by a combination of assets (several units); in the flight zone of
piloted and unmanned aircraft before their combat mission range; over the
The group of methods of ASD/AD forces and assets disposition comprises
disposition methods for defending a single facility (as an area) without structuring
it into point objects; disposition methods for defending a facility as a combination
of point objects dissimilar in terms of importance, with their importance
changing in time; disposition methods combining defense of the facility as an
The basis of ASD/AD in tactical formations and units is its facility-related
construction and conduct. Unless the methods of destroying the enemy
ASA forces and assets are furthered, it is impossible to develop
the methods of constructing ASD/AD.
area and as a sum of point objects; methods of conducting mobile surface-to-air
missile defense of a single facility; methods of conducting maneuver AD of a
group facility, group of facilities; methods of conducting maneuver intrafacility
AD of the facility as a sum of point objects; methods of defending the facility on
perimeter defense principle, with equal strength; methods of facility defense on
perimeter defense principle with an unequal distribution of efforts; methods of
zonal disposition of facility SAM defense; methods of defending the facility
against attacks at low and ultralow altitudes; methods of defending the facility by
the sector (main, reserve, important); methods of facility defense in missilethreatened
segments; methods of facility defense in missile-threatened sectors;
methods of facility defense before the range limits of adversary’s combat assignment
fulfillment; methods of facility defense at the line of range limit of adversary
combat assignment fulfillment; methods of facility defense disposition at
maximum angles and parameters of fire; methods of facility defense disposition
with spanning areas of destruction by SAM systems (SAM batteries); methods
of disposition and conducting echeloned SAM (antiaircraft) defense of facility;
methods of disposition and conducting AD of major area facilities of national
importance; methods of SAM defense of point objects; methods of AD of stationary
and mobile assets (by patrol accompaniment anticipatory approach to the
covering range); methods of disposition and conducting nonstrategic AD; methods
of using SAM systems (batteries), AA missile-gun complexes into the
defended facility; methods of adapting SAM defense built for hitting aerodynamic
targets; methods of combining within the same defense antiaircraft and
antimissile SAM defense to combat ballistic and aeroballistic targets; methods of
disposition and conducting mixed cluster lines defense; methods of creating a
SAM missile barrier; methods of disposition and conducting SAM missile
defense from ambush; methods of independently conducting SAM missile
defense; methods of mutual cover and self-defense; methods of organizing and
conducting AD by local SAM groupings. Such is the arsenal of facility ASD/AD
at the moment.
The stimulus for improving facility ASD/AD is the development of ASA
troops, forces, and assets of the prospective adversary, which, in turn, is oriented
not only and not so much to flying toward the targets to be hit, as to fighting
for facilities with the troops, forces, and assets of aerospace and air defense, and
also to combining methods of flying toward hitting targets and methods of fighting
for the latter. And for over fifty years now, the aerial adversary, when attacking,
solves the same inventory of tactical problems: blinding the reconnaissance
system of the aerial adversary by physically destroying its elements and by jamming;
disorganizing control over AD forces; physically destroying and jamming
the system of SAM defense at facilities; destroying fighter and other aircraft on
airfields and in the air, and also their infrastructure. To this end, the adversary is
constantly looking for, discovering, creating, and making use of weaknesses in
The standard set of ASD weaknesses includes the attitude to defense on the
whole and to ASD in particular as a supporting, enforced type of activity that is
not intentional; stationary-passive defensive thinking; letting the adversary take
the initiative in the choice of sectors and targets of attack, the time of attacking;
territorial and spatial gaps in ASD/AD; limited throughput, discrepancy between
the achieved density of ASD/AD fire and the potential density of attack by the
troops, forces, and assets of the aerospace adversary; limitations in the destruction
of maneuvering forces and assets; limitations in the destruction of aerospace
adversary forces and assets at low, ultralow, high, and stratospheric altitudes, in
near and deep space; limitations in the flight velocity of aerospace adversary
forces and assets being destroyed; time limitations of ASD/AD assets response;
limitations in armament mobility and employment maneuverability of ASD/AD
troops, forces, and weapons; accessibility for reconnaissance of ASD/AD troops,
forces, and assets.
The aerospace adversary formerly used these weaknesses consistently as
military affairs progressed, chiefly in the tactics of employing its ASA forces and
assets. nowadays, it seeks to make use of them all at once, both while creating
new ASA weapons, and in the art of their employment. A typical case in point is
the US prompt global strike concept. Thus, trying to achieve promptness and
globality, the Americans yet again stake their hopes on the altitude and speed
weaknesses of the ASD/AD in making hypersonic attack weapons. When
employing cruise missiles, they make use of the methodological gap in their
throughput capacity and low fire density. Thus on April 7, 2017 in Syria, Americans
displayed their ability to achieve a density of fire in CM attack of several
units per minute.
Let us take a closer look at the trends that condition further development of
facility ASD/AD methods.
The first one consists in the assumption that the adversary ASA forces will
not act in the same manner as we did when defending our facilities in their
absolute importance in disregard of the change dynamics in the latter. The aerial
adversary is not omnipotent, it cannot attack all the facilities simultaneously, and
its actions follow the law of correspondence: the targets of action correspond to
the tasks of actions, and these, in turn, are matched by the objects of actions.
The targets for each attack by the aerial adversary are chosen on the basis of
their relative pragmatic value rather than their absolute importance within the
system of objects whose destruction would ensure attaining the goal and solving
specific strategic, operational, and tactical problems. In other words, we try to
The stimulus for improving facility ASD/AD is development of ASA troops,
forces, and assets of the prospective adversary, which is oriented not so
much to flying toward the targets to be hit, as to fighting for facilities
against the troops, forces, and assets of aerospace and air defense.
defend everything, but the adversary will act only on those targets that are
prompted by each consecutive objective at the given moment.
In the said circumstances positional AD of facilities as mono-objects in
approximated boundaries in the form of area, in their fixed importance with an
emphasis mostly on destroying air weapon carriers and CM is insufficient. Positional
AD must be supplemented with maneuver AD. The latter is organized and
implemented by divining the objectives and tasks of the aerial adversary, and then
by maneuvering AD troops and forces in accordance with its objectives and tasks.
n Hence the conclusion that the first improvement line for facility
ASD/AD methods is to develop methods of maneuver AD and move on
from that to maneuver ASD.
The second trend consists in the fact that the adversary, when attacking
facilities, has opted for using the means instead of the forces within
the ASD firing range. Having precision-guided weapons at its disposal,
the aerial adversary has no need to strike at such defended facilities as
areas. The adversary structures each target of attack into point objects in
accordance with every next purpose of the attack. After that it will strike
within this area facility at point objects in accordance with the next objective
of combat actions.
n The second improvement line for facility ASD/AD methods is to work
out and implement intrafacility maneuver AD.
That is organized by introducing medium- and long-range SAM systems
into the facility (so as to repulse OTM attacks), and short-range
SAM stations (close action) to protect point objects within the area facility
from attacks by cruise missiles and guided air bombs (GABs). This
helps combine organization of both antiaircraft and antimissile defense by
limited surface-to-air missile forces. Moreover, resorting to intrafacility
maneuver AD, it becomes possible to effectively defend larger area facilities
of national importance with a limited number of forces.
And finally, using SAM-and-gun missile battery of the Pantsir-1S type
as part of the intrafacility maneuver, AD helps counter the density of
adversary fire already achieved and conceivable in the future, both by CM
and by other means of destruction, including GAB. The thing is that with
a high density of fire by ASA assets the adversary will enter the facility AD
system as a whole, while point objects within the defended facility will be
attacked with a piece (one or two) set of assets, which is up to a single
Pantsir-1S type AD assets. Moreover, at the end section of attack against a
The targets for each attack by the aerial adversary are chosen on the basis
of their relative pragmatic value, rather than their absolute importance
within the system of objects whose destruction would ensure attaining
the goal and solving specific strategic, operational, and tactical problems.
point object any means of air destruction used will follow known trajectories
with known movement parameters. To destroy similar assets it is
enough to know the time and place of preemption, for which a gun system
will suffice instead of a missile-gun one. Hence smaller, more maneuverable,
and cheaper weapons. Besides, forecasting and identifying point
assets well in advance inside the area facility make for having the Pantsir-
1S type SAM-and-gun missile battery in the form of a platform kept and
serviced in peacetime in parks and in depots, and during immediate threat
of aggression installed on the roofs of the pinpoint objects themselves.
n The third development line for facility ASD/AD methods is to further
methods of setting and conducting defensive fire at the means of the aerospace
adversary in the area of the defended facilities. The advantages of
defensive fire are its high density, simplicity of use, availability for the
troops even at present, given further development of suitable means of the
Pantsir-1S type, and also relative cheapness and smallness of the firing
The methods of making defensive fire have to be furthered both as firing
methods and those of constructing SAM defense. In the former case,
defensive fire should be perfected by making it more localized in the preemptive
thrust of the destruction area, and also thanks to less time spent on
setting fire. Besides, there is a chance of switching to automatic defensive
fire setting and conduct, down to active-dynamic protection principles used
in armored vehicles. In the latter case, it is necessary to develop the methods
of disposition and defending point objects, methods of disposition to create
defensive fire on missile-threatened sites, to organize SAM barriers on
the CM flight routes, and to cover missile-threatened sectors, etc.
The third trend is most promising, as it helps remove all ASD/AD limitations
in terms of throughput capacity, time of response, and fire density.
n The fourth development trend for facility ASD/AD methods is to
devise new methods of concentrating ASD/AD forces and assets, and of
improving the existing ones. Here it is necessary to improve the existing
ways of maneuvering and look for new ones.
Originally and to this day, maneuvering has been the prerogative of the higher
control levels with regard to those directly engaged in defending the facility.
On the strength of this, in conditions of struggle against the highly maneuverable
aerial adversary the maneuver appears excessively centralized and has to be
made less so. This will help, on the one hand, bring maneuver closer to real time
By resorting to intrafacility maneuvering of AD, it is now possible to efficiently
defend larger area facilities of national importance with a limited
number of forces.
struggle against the aerospace adversary, with the existing maneuver methods
acquiring new content, and on the other, reducing the degree of maneuver centralization
will create the necessary prerequisites for the appearance of new
methods and types of maneuver.
Maneuvering to achieve the objectives of its employment should be made on
time. Under conditions of fight against the aerospace adversary, this means that
the move should first of all be anticipatory. Then and then only will the maneuver
be timely enough. The preemptive nature per se and methods of achieving
that, including by means of maneuvering, help concentrate ASD troops, forces,
and assets according to the situation. Therefore, the methods of prognosticating
actions by the aerospace adversary against the defended facilities should be
devised before any other.
The list of improvement lines for ASD/AD methods given here is conditioned
by the prospective aerospace adversary. On the strength of this, the said
improvement lines, while helping eliminate ASD/AD weaknesses, are still far
from exhaustive. As new adversary’s ASAW appear, there will be other trends in
improving facility ASD/AD methods.
Translated by Margarita Kvartskhava
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