From Nezavisimaya gazeta, Oct. 17, 2024, p. 1. Complete text:
What Western countries should bear in mind.
(1) Putin is making all fundamental decisions personally, based on his authority, competence and sense of historical responsibility. This was clearly evidenced by the president’s June 14 remarks at the Foreign Ministry [see Vol. 76, No. 24-25, pp. 3-6], in which he laid out key provisions of Russia’s priorities in the foreign policy arena and in building a new world order. Most participants in the meeting expected the head of state to speak for no more than half an hour. In reality, Putin spoke for almost 80 minutes using notes that he had written himself, as he later told reporters.
(2) The task of ensuring the country’s security and protecting [ethnic] Russians and Russian speakers in Ukraine, which has faced Putin since 2014, has emerged as a key existential challenge of his rule. He cannot hand over power to anyone until this issue is conclusively resolved under international guarantees. [If not,] that would mean handing over to his successor not so much power as a host of unresolved problems. At present, there is no one in Putin’s inner circle better qualified to solve problems than the president. He knows this and is firmly convinced of it.
(3) Putin is not going to step down. In early September, a schoolgirl in [the] Tuva [Republic] asked the president: “How would you spend your day if you were an ordinary, free person – that is, not the president?” Putin replied clearly and succinctly: “That’s hard for me to imagine at this point, getting into hypotheticals.” This is the most important message to those both inside and outside [Russia] today: [Putin is saying,] in your scenarios for the future, proceed from the fact that I am the head of Russia. Putin thus brought back down to earth many Western politicians and opposition experts who are daydreaming with their heads in the clouds, entertaining illusions [and] claiming, “There is Putin, [so] there is a problem. No Putin, no problem.”1 Putin is here to stay.
(4) Today it is perfectly obvious that the world, which has been facing the nuclear threat for more than two years, is ripe for genuine talks on this issue. However, the potential for successful talks is in jeopardy. Unfortunately, Joseph Biden, the most serious Western politician who really understands the consequences of a nuclear war, will leave office in a few months. Neither Harris nor Trump has sufficient foreign policy expertise to even appreciate the importance of this issue for the world.
(5) The years and months of the special military operation (SMO), severe [anti-Russian] sanctions and the drastic transformation of Russia’s driving economic forces have clearly shown that [former US national security adviser Zbigniew] Brzezinski’s notion that Russia’s greatness purportedly hinges on unity with Ukraine should be decisively jettisoned from the public and political consciousness. Remove Ukraine from Moscow’s sphere of influence, and that will be the end of Russia as a great power [Brzezinski said]. Today, it is clear that Russia exists in the world regardless of its degree of proximity to a particular country or group of countries. Erasing speculative theories from the minds of influential ideologues is a potent factor in normalizing the development process, as well as [in doing] basic risk and opportunity assessment. Russia can be a great and important power regardless of the level of integration with other countries. A country’s greatness is determined by the level of well-being and opportunities for its people, as well as its achievements in health care, education, science and technology.
(6) When it comes to Russia’s economy, it is important to keep in mind a simple fact. The [draft] federal budget submitted to the State Duma assumes that oil prices will stay at $60 per barrel. However, the average annual price of oil in 2025 is forecasted at $69 per barrel. This speaks to a very high level of caution, realism and sober calculation on the part of [Prime Minister Mikhail] Mishustin’s government. The Russian economy can be expected to maintain manageability and development rates, making it possible to meet the set objectives. Therefore, the structural and technological difficulties of 2025 will not be decisive. The decisive factors, with the current level of industrial development, will be budget balance and currency stability.
(7) The ongoing combat operations show that the main objective for the Russian troops on the ground is to reach the administrative borders of Donetsk and Lugansk Provinces. In enumerating [Russia’s] goals, Putin is increasingly talking about the liberation of Donetsk and Lugansk Provinces, [as well as of] Novorossia.2 It can be assumed that Novorossia constitutes only a part of Kherson and Zaporozhye Provinces. The most important thing here is ground and overland [transportation] links with the Crimea. If these observations are correct, it will be possible to see more clearly the prerequisites for the successful completion of the SMO and the achievement of its objectives.
2[Novorossia (New Russia) is the historical name of an area along the northern Black Sea coast that Russia acquired from Turkey by a series of peace treaties in the 18th and early 19th centuries. Most of it is now part of Ukraine. – Trans.]
(8) It is necessary to stress that in recent months, the Russian leadership has evidently revised its assessment of the nature of Ukraine’s statehood and its status as an entity under international law. This is a major change compared to the start of the SMO. Today, Russia acknowledges that a considerable number of Ukraine’s citizens are choosing in favor of the country’s current government, consider themselves Ukrainians, [and] do not want to see any future together with Russia. The Russian leadership thus recognizes the state of Ukraine. The Western narrative that Moscow wants to destroy Ukraine as a state clearly does not correspond to the current reality. Furthermore, this narrative enables Western politicians to claim that once it has destroyed Ukraine, Russia will move deeper into Europe – into Poland and the Baltic countries.
(9) When the West talks about possible negotiations, it never mentions the issue of the legitimacy of [Ukrainian President Vladimir] Zelensky’s signature in Putin’s eyes. [The West believes] this is a nonissue, since Zelensky is flying all over the world with his “peace plan.” I would like to caution [our] Western partners against an oversimplified interpretation of Putin’s remarks and his concern that Ukraine’s Constitutional Court could subsequently rule that Zelensky has not extended his powers in a proper manner and therefore his signature is invalid [after postponing Ukraine’s planned presidential election in March 2024 due to a state of martial law; see Vol. 76, No. 21, pp. 8-10 – Trans.]. After the SMO, assessments along the lines of “[We’ve been] cheated, duped, taken in and duped again” [by which Putin justifies] why things turned out differently than expected will disappear from the political lexicon forever. The level of mutual trust is less than zero. Today, total distrust requires the provision of legally exhaustive and unequivocal negotiating credentials.
(10) It seems that the topic of a new world order that ensures equal security for [all] states is equally relevant for the critical majority of countries in the world – in the West and the East. The main question is whether it will be possible to create a new international legal framework for peaceful coexistence on a foundation other than the ruins of world war III. Remember that the Versailles and the Yalta-Potsdam world [orders] were built precisely on the ruins/ashes of the World War I and World War II catastrophes. However, humankind must learn at least something! And AI has absolutely nothing to do with that.
1[Reference to Stalin’s quote, “Death solves all problems – no person, no problem.” – Trans.]