Letter From the Editors

Since wartime began, the Russian-language press has frequently used the word tyl for strategic national resources (including people) in areas outside combat zones Depending on context, this is often rendered in English as some variation of “home front,” “base” or “logistics”; the most literal one-word equivalent is “rear,” although we rarely use it, among other reasons, because of its potential as a double entendre.

Well, in this issue we did use “rear,” and unexpectedly, it referred to Moldova. After a parade of Western officials came through Chisinau in the run-up to elections in October, Moldova’s ex-ambassador Anatol Taranu told NG that “The West really wants Sandu to remain president and maintain Ukraine’s rear support,” which others speculated could include providing military supply lines. In Izvestia, analyst Natalya Kharitonova fleshes out the political side of this alleged plan, detailing the Moldovan court decisions that have disqualified Moscow-linked blocs from the elections.

In essence, Russian official opinion is pushing the concept of Ukraine’s strategic rear beyond the country’s borders, potentially making Chisinau a cobelligerent. And if that is not troubling enough, in the context of the UAF’s ongoing incursion into Kursk Province, which had earlier been a part of Russia’s tyl rather than a frontline area, the Kremlin is presenting a view of enemy logistics that spans beyond Moldova over continents and oceans, even into space.

The SVR, for example, told Izvestia that “According to our information, the UAF operation in Kursk Province was prepared with the participation of US, British and Polish special services. The units involved in it underwent combat training at centers in the UK and Germany. Military advisers from NATO states are helping to manage the UAF units. . . . The alliance’s countries are providing the Ukrainians with satellite reconnaissance data about the location of Russian troops.”

Meanwhile, the Kremlin is not shy about expanding its own strategic rear, albeit under the slogan of “building a multipolar world.” This week, Putin was in Baku to visit Ilkham Aliyev and his wife/Vice-President Mehriban, who “hugged and kissed” their guest at their country estate. Commentators disagreed on whether this relationship will warrant the term “alliance,” but we know that the leaders are now on the same page regarding hydrocarbon transshipments (once a bone of contention) and the North-South Transit Corridor. When complete, the latter project will provide a reliable overland route between Russia and Iran, Russia’s key drone supplier.

In commentary regarding China, Russia is more often called a tyl or “resource base” for its strategically important neighbor than the other way around. During premier Li Qiang’s visit to Moscow this week, however, scholar Yekaterina Zaklyazminskaya writes, the key issue was facilitating payments for goods moving into Russia, which, we recall from Putin’s May visit to Beijing, particularly concerns electronics. Unfortunately, she says, even a specially chartered bank would have trouble circumventing sanctions, but “opportunities for barter trade have been thoroughly studied since the beginning of the year.”

With policies like barter exchange back on the table, it makes sense that many commentators are looking back in time to see how things will shake out on the Russian home front, now that it has been violated. Aleksandr Zhelenin writes that the Kursk offensive shows “Putin is in the same situation today as Nicholas II was in late 1916: He cannot win, and he cannot agree to peace, either.” Abbas Gallyamov echoes this sentiment, claiming Russians are asking “If you don’t know how to wage a war, why did you start it in the first place?”

Yabloko politician Sergei Mitrokhin channels his inner Lenin while recalling his role in seizing the Moscow City Duma during the August Putsch despite Yeltsin being “terribly far from the people.” As we watch how events unfold today on the Russian home front, we should note how Mitrokhin says the detached Yeltsin “was only lucky in that the State Committee for the State of Emergency was even weaker.” This might explain why Putin is always watching his rear.