Abstract. This article analyzes the contemporary Russian historiography on the sources of Ukrainian nationalism. Consideration of its genesis takes into account three periods: the era of feudalism, the 19th century, and the 20th century. Most researchers tend to believe that Ukrainian national ideology originated in the 19th century. Some consider the authors of the “Ukrainian project” to be the Poles, who sought to revive the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which had disappeared from the map of Europe in the 18th century, while others believe it was the authorities of the anti-Russian Austria-Hungary.
Introduction
Articles continue to be published today in which the authors try to identify the sources and essence of Ukrainian nationalism and their connection with modernity. The acute resonance of the Ukrainian theme in Russia is responsible for the wide range of opinions in domestic historiography about the sources of Ukrainian nationalism. So far, however, there is no agreed-upon definition of nationalism or a unified approach to studying it. This is connected, first and foremost, with the fact that nationalism is a multisided phenomenon, and it is impossible to define it in full accordance with its essence. Most researchers consider Ukrainian nationalism in a constructivist paradigm, in which Ukrainians are presented as a separate ethnic group, identified on the basis of cultural self-identification in relation to other nationalities.
Prerequisites of Ukrainian Nationalism
Some researchers look for the sources of Ukrainian nationalism in the history of Ancient Rus and mediaeval Russia. Aleksey Gusev has discerned its roots in the history of pre-Mongol Rus when prince Andrey Bogoliubsky (1157-1174) having captured Kiev in 1169, from the researcher’s point of view, demarcated the northern and southern Rus [4, p. 73]. After this, according to the researcher, the residence of the elder Russian prince in “the mother of Russian cities” was abolished, and Kiev became a provincial city [Ibid.]. In fact, however, there was no clear border between northern and southern Rus. There was no national question in Kievan Rus and, therefore, no concept of Ukrainian nationalism. Eastern Slavs lived within the framework of a single ethnic community and used the Old Slavonic language as their common tongue. The search for deep roots of Ukrainian nationalism is connected, in our opinion, with the aggravation of Russian-Ukraine relations, and the conclusions about its ancient sources do not hold water.
However, Gusev is not the only scholar searching for the roots of Ukrainian nationalism in the history of Ancient Rus. His opinion is shared by Dmitry Belashchenko and Anna Tsymbalova who are convinced that the sources of Ukrainian nationalism are “related to the period of feudal fragmentation of the Ancient Russian state and cultural-religious oppression of Orthodox population in Rzeczpospolita” [1, p. 70]. Sergey Zhiltsov, likewise, believes that “the sources of Ukrainian nationalism go many centuries back …” [20, p. 26].
Some scholars have pointed out that during feudalism the lands in the west of contemporary Ukraine covered a very special way of development. Late in the 12th century, under prince Roman Mstislavich of Volhynia (1170-1205) there appeared the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia. In 1203, he captured Kiev and assumed the title of Great Prince; his Principality became one of the biggest in Europe. In 1240, however, it was ravaged by Mongols and Tatars, and in the 14th century its lands became part of Poland (Galicia) and Lithuania (Volhynia). Belashchenko and Tsymbalova have pointed out that these specifics of historical development and geographic location contributed to the separation of the western territories of contemporary Ukraine and an establishment of their “close cultural, religious and political ties with Western states” [1, p. 71]. The authors did not explain in which way and how the southern Russian lands were connected with Europe.
From our point of view, we should begin with Rzeczpospolita, Russia’s closest neighbor. It is widely known that the ties between those who lived on the southern Russian lands and Poland and Lithuania can be better described as imposing Catholicism by force and as cruel discrimination of the Russian population. As Viktor Kutepov and Sergey Rybakov have written, in the 16th and 17th centuries in Rzeczpospolita record-keeping in Russian was banned, churches and monasteries were taken away from Orthodox communities, Orthodox services were banned, and Russian schools and houses were attacked [9, p. 22]. This means that remote sources of Ukrainian nationalism can be detected in Polish oppression, among other things, even if it is inappropriate to talk about this phenomenon in the Middle Ages. The contemporary concept of nation appeared only in the latter half of the 18th century while close ties between the Malorussian lands and the West were established later – in the late 18th–19th centuries after the partitions of Poland.
Some academics have detected the prerequisites of Ukrainian identity formation during the epoch of the Hetmanate. Indeed, from Gusev’s thorough reasoning it follows that there was no state formation in the 17th century in Eastern Europe that could be defined as predecessor of contemporary Ukraine [4, p. 73]. This fully corresponds to the reality. The Cossacks of that time were divided into Registered and Zaporozhian. The former served the king of Rzeczpospolita and enjoyed privileges to which the Zaporozhian Cossacks had no access. The administrative functions were performed by a small number of top figures of these groups of Cossacks. The main difference between the Cossacks and the Poles was devotion of the former to Orthodoxy. Cossacks joined Russia by the decision of the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654 and a ceremonial pledge of allegiance by Cossacks to the Orthodox Tsar. “Ethnic and national aspects were never stressed,” as Gusev states [Ibid.]. There is also no doubt that the Hetmanate as part of Russia was only an autonomy of the army of Zaporozhian Cossacks and not a prototype of the contemporary Ukrainian state. And the Zaporozhian Sich was nothing more than a collective name for several administrative centers of the lower Dnieper Cossacks in the 16th–18th centuries rather than an independent state.
Another researcher Boris Safronov insists that the Ukrainian national movement began from Bogdan Khmelnytsky (1595-1657) [16, p. 11]. He is convinced that the political program of Khmelnytsky contained certain elements of the future Ukrainian nationalist ideology; he counterposed the Cossacks to the Poles; after their military victories, “Cossacks were perceived as a new national community based on historical traditions and specifics of everyday life” [16, p. 11]. This point, however, is highly doubtful. Khmelnytsky indeed counterposed the Cossacks to the Poles but in his March Articles of 1654 kept in the Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine (in Kiev) he called his Motherland and his people a “Russian world” [12]. These materials make it impossible to admit that Khmelnytsky’s program contained the beginnings of Ukrainian nationalism. More than that: it is impossible to agree with the opinion of Kutepov and Rybakov who believe that in the final analysis Khmelnytsky opted for Orthodox Russia but not Poland or the Ottoman Empire in conformity with the scale of worldview values of the time [9, p. 21].
In 1654, the Treaty of Pereiaslav was signed according to which the Cossack lands were attached to the Muscovite state under the name “Little Russia” (or Malorussia). It should be said that certain contemporary authors [19; 9] incorrectly use the terms “Ukraine” and “Ukrainians” as applied to the Cossack lands and Cossacks of the 17th century. From our point of view this cannot be allowed since at that time there were neither the toponym “Ukraine” nor ethnonym “Ukrainians.” Kutepov and Rybakov, however, believe that in the 17th century reunification of Eastern Ukraine (!) with Russia took place [9, p. 20]. Meanwhile, it is enough to turn to the classics of Russian historiography to borrow the absolutely adequate in this case terminology: remarkable Russian historian Vassily Klyuchevsky wrote about Malorussia and the Malorussian (not Ukrainian!) question [8, p. 109]. Sergey Pavlov has brought us into the history of the term “Ukraina”: he has pointed out that since ancient times the concept “Ukraina” was a synonym of the word “okraina” (fringe), which means border regions. In Russia, the word “ukraina” was applied to any border region, even in Siberia, while in Poland – to the Kiev, Bracław and Podolian Voivodeships [14, p. 161].
It is commonly believed that the Cossack factor noticeably affected the formation of national identity of Malorussians. For example, Gusev insists that “the national idea of Malorussia of the 17th to early 19th centuries was not a Ukrainian idea at all, it was a Cossack idea…” [4, p. 73]. Cossacks formulated it to confirm their right to freedom. Cossack influence can be detected in the Istoria Rusov, ili Maloy Rossii (The History of the Ruthenians, or Little Russia) probably written in the late 18th century. In this work, the history of Ukraine was, for the first time, presented as a history of a state on its own right with an independent historical mission. A. Safronov, meanwhile, has written that The History of the Ruthenians was a falsified history of the Ukrainian people that, however, “became a program document of Ukrainian nationalists” [16, p. 12].
The History of the Ruthenians ends with the year 1769, therefore, it was written during the rule of Catherine II. The question of authorship of this work is believed to be debatable. Safronov believes that it was a Malorussian author Grigory Poletika [Ibid.]. Gusev offers an identical point of view [4, p. 74]. Archbishop George (Konissky) is mentioned as another author of this work, but many historians disagree with this. For example, Sergey Shokin has pointed out that this work was first published by Polish historian W. Maciejowski (author’s bold type – O. B.) in the book Pamiętniki o dziejach piśmiennictwa i prawa Słowian (Monuments of Ancient Writings and the Law of Slavs) [17, p. 91]. Indeed, Wacław Aleksander Maciejowski was the first to publish History of the Ruthenians, yet, at the same time, he was a propagandist of the idea of common Slavic unity.
The History of the Ruthenians mentioned, for the first time, a separate ethnicity of Malorussian Cossacks: Cossacks descend from Khazars. At the same time, documents unknown to science are cited, most likely fictitious. There is an attempt at “ageing” the history of the Hetmanate by a couple of centuries and present its joining Lithuania as unification of two states. It is absolutely clear that the author of this work wanted to point at a special historical route of the Cossacks and their “noble” status. However, as Gusev has written, the greater part of Cossacks proceeded from Russian fugitive peasants [4, p. 74].
Russian researchers recognize the influence of the Polish element on the formation of Ukrainophilism which really existed. For example, Shokin wrote about Polish writer Jan Potocki (1761-1815) as one of the fathers of the “Ukrainian project” [20, p. 90]. In his book Fragments historiques et geographiques sur la Scythie, la Sarmatie et les slaves (1795 or 1796) Potocki wrote that Ukrainians were a people separate from the Russians and of an independent origin.
In the last third of the 18th century, Russia took part in the partitions of Poland; it included into its territory practically all lands of contemporary Ukraine with the exception of Galicia and Transcarpathia. The local political elite the ideas of which were based on Polish traditions had the biggest influence on the attached territories. As Belashchenko and Tsymbalova have pointed out, Ukrainophilism in Russia was one of the repercussions of this [1, p. 70]. Shokin, on the other hand, believes that the “Ukrainian project” appeared at the turn of the 18th–19th century as an answer of the Polish szlachta (nobility) of the Russian Empire to the partitions of Poland [17, p. 90]. This is absolutely fair since this project was intended to help revive the Polish state in its old borders.
Formation of the Ukrainian National Idea in the 19th Century
The Ukrainian national idea was being formed throughout the 19th century under pressure of the situation and latest trends. Thanks to the popular at that epoch movement of “romantic nationalism,” trends of Ukrainophilism were developing in the milieu of St. Petersburg and Moscow intelligentsia. At the same time, “Ukrainophilism” was based on Russophobia which was reflected both in fiction, scholarly and close to scholarly works.
Certain contemporary researchers have justly pointed out that there is no evidence that Ukrainian identity existed before the 19th century [6; 14, p. 159]. Gusev, on his side, has asserted that the 19th century was an epoch of the emergence of the “folklore-cultural” trend in the Ukrainian national idea [4, p. 74]. Indeed, it was precisely in that century that the Ukrainian literary tongue appeared which, however, was not used by common people.
What was the initial meaning of Ukrainian nationalism? Safronov has correctly written that in the early 19th century it was formed at the theoretical level [16, p. 13]. The idea of the exclusive nature of the Ukrainian nation was promoted, among other sources, in fiction – in works of Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861) and Panteleimon Kulish (1819-1897). Safronov believes that it was Shevchenko who “formulated axiological orientation and the routes along which national ideals could be realized” [16, p. 13]. In his works, he created an image of independent Ukraine; he was convinced that Moscow had cheated Kiev when signing the Treaty of Pereiaslav and that the union was not equal.
This suggests a question about other works brimming with nationalistic ideas. E. Lezina and Ya. Silantyeva insist that the foundations of the theory of Ukrainian nationalism can be found in Kniga bytiya ukrainskogo naroda (The Book of Genesis of the Ukrainian People) (1846) written by Nikolay Kostomarov and Nikolay Gulak [11, p. 222]. Both authors belonged to the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius, a secret organization that appeared in Kiev in 1846-1847. It paid particular attention to scholarly studies of Ukrainian history, language and folklore. Belashchenko and Tsymbalova believe that it was “a stage in the development of Ukrainian nationalism” [1, p. 71]. Shokin deemed it necessary to stress that it was in the documents of the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius that the word “Ukraine” as the country’s name had appeared for the first time while its population had been defined as a people on its own right (“brothers Ukrainians,” “people of Ukraine who lived on both banks of the Dnieper,” etc.) [17, p. 94]. Deliberations of contemporary scholars about the “Ukraine” ethnonym gain more weight thanks to the conclusion of Natalya Laktionova who stated that in the 19th century the name “Ukraine,” or “Malorussia,” to be more exact, had been a geographic rather than an ethnographic term [10, p. 27].
Gusev has defined as a “program document” of Ukrainian historical separatism Nikolay Kostomarov’s book Dve Russkie narodnosti (Two Russian Nationalities) (1885) [4, p. 74]. In his book he, for the first time, divided Russians into Great Russian and South Russian nationalities. It should be said that the idea of the Ukrainian cultural specifics had not been politically tainted until the time when Polish researchers became interested in this problem range. Poles needed a domestic conflict in the Russian Empire to restore Poland within the 1772 borders which included Ukraine of the Right-Bank of the Dnieper. Belashchenko and Tsymbalova stressed that it was the Poles who had tried to spread across the Russian Empire their ideas about two different, Russian and Ukrainian, nations [1, p. 70]. The Ukrainian factor, however, did not help the Poles during the failed revolt of 1830-1831. More than that: deliberations about a separate Ukrainian nation contradicted Uvarov’s “theory of official nationality” according to which Russians were believed to be a “triune” nation consisting of Great Russians, Malorussians and Belorussians.
Several academics have specified who made the biggest contribution to the development of Ukrainian nationalism. Lezina and Silantyeva, for example, point at Polish historian Franciszek Duchiński (1816-1893) who wrote that the Russian people was not Slavic, but a representative of the “Turanian tribe” as Mongols while the ethnonym “Russians” belonged to Malorussians [11, p. 222]. Belashchenko and Tsymbalova, in their turn, wrote that his ideas had been popular. They have also pointed out that the Polish historian looked at Russians as descendants of Asian nomads who spoke a distorted Church Slavonic language [1, p. 72].
Shokin has counted Polish public figure Tadeusz Czacki (1761-1815) among the fathers of the “Ukrainian project” [20, p. 90]. In his work On the Name of ‘Ukraine’ and the Appearance of Cossacks (1801) he suggested that Ukrainians were not a Slavic people; they stemmed from the nomadic horde of Ukres who had allegedly moved to the Dnieper area from behind the Volga in the 7th century.
Thus, many researchers clearly identified the time when the Ukrainian national idea had appeared and named its creators. To which time does the appearance of the Ukrainian national movement refer? According to A. Egorov, to the early 19th century [2, p. 21]. He has pointed out that at first it was not political while its essence was reflected in historical and philological studies. In the 1840s, however, it was politicized by connection with the activities of the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius [Ibid.].
This suggests another question: on which territories did Ukrainian nationalism appear? Belashchenko and Tsymbalova believe that this happened on the territories of the Russian and Austrian (later Austro-Hungarian) Empires [1, p. 70]. There is another and more categorical opinion. Vladimir Gurba, for example, insists that Ukrainian nationalism appeared late in the 19th and early 20th centuries in Galicia that was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as an anti-Russian project of Austro-Hungarian authorities. In his opinion, it was a confessional project based on Uniatism and made “possible the growth of extremism and hatred of Russia and Russians as enemies of Ukrainian independence, of Jews and Poles as promoters of the policy of suppression of Ukrainians…” [3, p. 26].
This means that certain researchers look at either Poles or Austro-Hungarian authorities as responsible for the emergence of the Ukrainian question. Both points of view are supported by historical facts. But there are also specialists who do not belittle the importance of the Malorussian factor in the development of Ukrainian nationalism. For example, Zhiltsov believes that scientist, publicist writer and public figure Mikhail Dragomanov (1841-1895) was one of these ideologists. Dragomanov wanted separation of Ukraine from Russia because, as he expected, it should achieve the status equal to that of the leading European powers. One of his scientific conclusion was that “on the whole, under the rule of Russia Ukrainians lost more than what they acquired” [20, p. 26].
Russian authorities indeed caused problems to Malorussians, in particular, in printing books in Ukrainian. During the Polish uprising of 1863-1864, for example, the Poles tried once more to draw Ukrainians to their side. The Russian government learned about it and responded with issuing the Valuev Circular in 1863 and the Ems Ukaz in 1876 which banned bringing books in Ukrainian from abroad and, in the final count, book-printing in the “Malorussian dialect.” As a result, part of the most active Ukrainian nationalists had to emigrate to Galicia and seek support from the West. Belashchenko and Tsymbalyuk have pointed out that Ukrainian nationalism was spreading “from above” among political elites of Western states rather than “from below” – among common Malorussians [1, p. 71].
The foreign policy factor played an important role in what was going on in Ukraine. For example, Lezina and Silantyeva paid attention to the confrontation in the 19th century of two poles: “pan-Germanic” (Germany, Austria-Hungary) and pan-Slavic (Russia, Serbia). Russia wanted to unite all Slavic peoples under its aegis while Austria-Hungary tried to oppose it. There is no doubt that Lezina ans Silantyeva were right when they wrote that the Ukrainian lands as part of the Russian Empire had been a trump card of the West in its struggle against Russia [1, p. 222]. Safronov has confirmed this with the following fact: Germany and Austria-Hungary strove to use the outbursts of ethnic self-awareness in the Malorussian regions of the Russian Empire which took place in the 1880s to achieve their political aims [16, p. 11].
The Toponym “Ukraina” and Ukrainian Nationalism in the 20th Century
At first, the Ukrainian national idea was promoted for the sake of national self-awareness but late in the 19th and early 20th centuries it acquired a political dimension, viz. state independence. Ideological rhetoric, according to Sergey Kandybovich and Tatyana Razina, was gradually growing increasingly xenophobic [6].
Early in the 20th century, nationalist propaganda intended to pull down the Russian Empire was spreading from Austrian Galicia to Malorussia. Austria-Hungary and Germany used the Ukrainian card as a weapon in their struggle against Russia. As Sergey Pavlov has written, before World War One Imperial Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow, philosopher Eduard von Hartmann and writer Paul Rohrbach were building up projects designed to take the south-western Ukrainian regions from the Russian Empire [14, p. 161]. They planned to call them “Ukraina” yet the project failed. No matter what, Germans helped Ukrainian nationalists financially, they were engaged in nationalist propaganda on the territory of the Russian Empire. In Galicia, people were forced under pain of death “to declare themselves Ukrainians” [14, p. 162].
This has produced a question about local ideologists of Ukrainian nationalism of the first half of the 20th century. Tamara Guzenkova has written that early in the 20th century political and public figure Mykola Mikhnovsky (1873-1924) made an important contribution to the substantiation of Ukrainian nationalism [5, p. 33]. Independent Ukraine (1900) and Ten Commandments of UNP1 (1904) were his most prominent works. The following is his most prominent statement: “Ukraine is for Ukrainians! So we should drive alien oppressors away from all corners of Ukraine” (quoted from [5, p. 34]). His figure is highly popular among people in power in Ukraine and the right-radical part of Ukrainian society.
The set of opinions promoted by the ideologists of the All-Russian National Union (VNS), a party of Russian nationalists of the early 20th century is especially interesting. Pyotr Stukalov turned to them to clarify the attitudes of Russian political elite to the phenomenon of Ukrainian nationalism [18]. The VNS theoreticians elaborated a conception of constructive national policy the realization of which would have ensured Russia’s development as a Russian national state. They did not discuss Ukrainian nationalism as a real social and political force, they pointed at an absence of the traditions of Ukrainian statehood and believed that the idea of an independent Ukrainian state could not be realized as unfounded. More than that: the VNS leaders believed that Ukrainian nationalism had no wide social base, “it was a movement ‘at the top’ with the absolutely disinterested common people” [18, p. 365].
It should be said that prior to the 20th century, Ukrainian nationalism was not in demand, since, as Gusev has rightly pointed out, “Ukrainian people did not think that they were special as opposed to the people of Velikorossiya (Great Russia – O. B.)” [4, p. 75]. In his article, he quoted an excerpt from the memoirs of a future minister of labor of the Ukrainian People’s Republic Valentin Sadovsky, in which it was said that in 1904 in Kiev Russian had been heard everywhere [Ibid.]. Gusev believes that the language of the Ukrainian village differed from Russian, yet it was not a Ukrainian literary tongue [ibid.]. It seems that this is correct since today in Ukraine villagers use the so called surzhyk, a mix of Ukrainian and Russian.
Out of all publications discussed so far only the article by Laktionova gives a clear understanding when the toponym “Ukraina,” the ethnonym “Ukrainians” and the term “Ukranian language” were legally confirmed [19, pp. 28-29]. In July 1917, a decision of the Provisional Government “On the Formation of General Secretariat as the supreme body to govern the local affairs in Ukraine” was adopted. The document said, in part, that a special region called “Ukraina” was being formed as part of the Russian state the population of which would be called “Ukrainians” and its language “Ukrainian” in state acts.
Many researchers have admitted that the state Ukraine was created by Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin. Gusev has pointed out, however, that the first Ukrainian state – the Ukrainian People’s Republic (1918) – did not survive even a year [4, p. 75]. Later, the UPR was restored yet very soon liquidated.
In the 1920s and early 1930s, a course at korenization (indigenization) was unfolding of which Ukrainization was part. After the Civil War, the territory of the Soviet Ukraine became wider at the expense of new regions unrelated to the Ukrainian culture [1, p. 72]. The stress on “Ukrainianship” was highly debatable and was resolutely criticized even among members of the nomenclature. Gusev has revealed a sad fact: Soviet power paid pensions to Ukrainian writers and their families that had emigrated abroad, including the family of Ivan Franko [4, p. 75]. At the same time, some of the Ukrainian nationalists were able to return to the territory of Soviet Ukraine, for example historian Mikhail Hrushevsky (1866-1934), author of History of Ukraine–Rus’, in which Kievan Rus was presented as a form of the Ukrainian statehood. He traced the history of Ukrainians to the Slavic tribes of Antes and ascribed to the Russians “considerable influence of the Finno-Ugric component” [5, p. 33].
Prerequisites of the formation of contemporary Ukrainian nationalism are partly rooted in the policy of Ukrainization. Gusev rightly believes that the process of Ukrainization allowed to codify Ukrainian written language, set up an educational system based on the Ukrainian language and formulate the Ukrainian statehood albeit within the frames of the USSR [4, p. 75]. He looks at Ukraine as a successor of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic since it was precisely in the Soviet period that the requirements of Ukrainian intelligentsia for the statehood were realized [Ibid.].
Aleksandr Ostashevsky insists that the theoretical foundations of Ukrainian nationalism were laid down after World War One [13, p. 34] and points at philosopher and statesman Dmitry Dontsov (1883-1973) as the main ideologist of Ukrainian nationalism. Zhiltsov agrees with him; he has focused on Dontsov’s statement that a national idea should be “amoral,” that is, not fitting the commonly accepted values and the thesis of the eternal struggle between nations (races) [20, p. 28]. His ideas were laid in the foundation of the political platform of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). After the Great Patriotic War, Stepan Bandera repeated the words of Dontsov: “Not only the regime – either Tsarist or Bolshevik – was our enemy but the Muscovite nation per se” (quoted from [20, p. 28]).
Zhiltsov pointed at historian and philosopher Vyacheslav Lypynsky (1882-1931) as another ideologist of Ukrainian nationalism. The latter believed that the state created a nation, not vice versa. Therefore, the people (“an ethnographic mass”) should be organized with the help of the state. Zhiltsov demonstrated the scheme of actions compiled by Lypynsky: Polish szlachta with the help of state structures should organize, by the use of force, the “passive Ukrainian ethnographic mass” [20, p. 27].
Ukrainian nationalism relied on corresponding organizations that appeared in the 1920s: the Ukrainian Military Organization (UMO), the Group of Ukrainian National Youth, the League of Ukrainian Nationalists (which included the Union of Ukrainian Fascists) and the Union of Ukrainian Nationalist Youth. In 1929, they united into the OUN. Vladimir Kiknadze is looking for the sources of Ukrainian nationalism in the activities of the latter which in the early 1930s “declared its aim – setting up an independent state” [7].
Not only Kiknadze, however, sees the sources of Ukrainian nationalism in the epoch when it was developed enough. For example, Nikolay Rabotyazhev is convinced that Ukrainian nationalism was born in Eastern Poland in 1920-1930s and was politically embodied in the OUN [15, p. 518]. The strategic aims of Ukrainian nationalism were formulated by the First OUN Congress back in 1929: “building of a united Ukrainian state on all Ukrainian ethnographic territories” [13, p. 38]. The OUN identified the borders of future Ukraine: it was expected to include parts of the territories of Poland, Czechia, Belorussia, Russia, Moldavia, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia; and in the south of Russia, the borders were supposed to extend all the way to Chechnya [13, p. 39]. More than that, as Ostashevsky wrote in 1940, the imagined, by the OUN members, ethnographic space of Ukraine had changed and become even bigger [15, p. 39].
If we turn to the sources of contemporary Ukrainian nationalism, then we will find that Zhiltsov has studied the question and found the sources in the second half of the 1980s, when political changes had begun in the Soviet Union [20, p. 21]. At first, the movement of Ukrainian nationalists was aimed at reviving historical heritage; but in 1988, they demonstrated a great interest to the idea of setting up a people’s front in Ukraine like those that had been established in the Baltic republics. The Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine was adopted in July 1990. In 1991, the West Ukrainian political elite, assisted by the Ukrainian diaspora and Western countries, widened the influence of the Ukrainian nationalist ideology on the territory of Ukraine. Everything that followed led to the events whose consequences we feel to this day.
Conclusion
As we have seen, many works of Russian researchers dealing with the sources of Ukrainian nationalism appeared in 2013-2023. The majority of the researchers believe that Ukrainian nationalism took shape ideologically in the 19th century; this was reflected in a certain number of historical works and works of fiction. They, with few exceptions, do not look for the prerequisites of Ukrainian nationalism in the history of Ancient Rus or the epoch of Hetmanate. Not all of them mention the falsified history of the Ukrainian people – The History of the Ruthenians, written at the time of Catherine II.
Some authors have rightly pointed out that in the 19th century Ukrainian lands were a trump card in the struggle waged by the West against Russia. Many specialists agreed that the authors of the “Ukrainian project” with highly negative repercussions for Russia and Russians in the 20th–21st centuries were Poles, who wanted to revive pre-partitioned Rzeczpospolita. Different names are mentioned: F. Duchiński, J. Potocki, T. Czacki, while W. Maciejowski is considered to be the initiator of publishing the notorious History of the Ruthenians. Some scholars also believe that the powers of Austria-Hungary might be involved in building up the Ukrainian problem.
The greater parts of researchers have come to a conclusion that Ukraine is an artificially created state in which nationalist ideas were invariably created by the ruling circles. In the 19th and 20th centuries, Ukrainian nationalism was imposed on Malorussians “from above” by the Galician political elite, which lived under an influence of the West. Until the early 19th century, there were neither Ukrainian national identity nor any corresponding movement. It was only in 1917 that the toponym “Ukraine,” ethnonym “Ukrainians” and the term “Ukrainian language” were legally confirmed. The Ukrainian state was formed in the first third of the 20th century thanks to the Bolsheviks, yet the period of independence of the UNR was very short. From the moment of the appearance of the USSR, the state of Ukrainians existed as a republic of the Soviet Union among other republics.
Some researchers associate the emergence of the Ukrainian nationalist ideology with the activities of the OUN and the ideologists of Ukrainian nationalism of the first half of the 20th century. It seems, however, that those scholars who are looking for the sources of the Ukrainian national idea in the 19th century are absolutely right. Still, they cannot point at the only basic work of that time which contains the foundations of Ukrainian ideology. For some of them, this is Kniga bytiya ukrainskogo naroda (The Book of Genesis of the Ukrainian People) by Nikolay Kostomarov and Nikolay Gulak, for others, Kostomarov’s Dve Russkie narodnosti. Moreover, there is no agreement in the academic community on the causes of politicization of the Ukrainian national movement: some point at Polish researchers as one of the causes, others, at the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius and its activities.
References:
1. Belashchenko D. A., Tsymbalova A. E. Features of the Emergence and Development of the Ukrainian National Movement in the Mid-19th – Late 20th Centuries. Nauchnyye vedomosti Belgorodskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seriya Istoriya. Politologiya (= Scientific bulletin of Belgorod State University. Series: History. Political science). 2018. Vol. 45. No. 1, pp. 69-76. (In Russian.)
2. Egorov A. N. Tolerance and Nationalism (Based on the Polemics on the “Ukrainian Question” in Russia at the Beginning of the 20th Century). Problems of Tolerance: History and Modernity: Materials of the International Scientific Conference. Cherepovets: Cherepovets State Univ., 2015, pp. 21-24. (In Russian.)
3. Gurba V. N. Terrorism in the Context of the History and Practice of Ukrainian Nationalism. Vestnik Yuzhno-Rossiyskogo gosudarstvennogo tekhnicheskogo universiteta. Seriya Sotsialno-ekonomicheskiye nauki (= Bulletin of the South Russian State Technical University. Series Socio-economic sciences). 2022. Vol. 15. No. 2, pp. 24-33. (In Russian.)
4. Gusev A. Origins of Ukrainian Nationalism. Rodina. 2013. No. 1 (31), pp. 73-75. (In Russian.)
5. Guzenkova T. S. From “Non-Russia” to “Anti-Russia”: Radical Nationalism as a Factor in Ukrainian Politics. Svobodnaya mysl (= Free thought). 2022. No. 3 (1693), pp. 31-46. (In Russian.)
6. Kandybovich S. L., Razina T. V. Psychological Origins of Ukrainian Nationalism. Mirovyye tsivilizatsii (= World civilizations). 2022. Vol. 7. No. 2, pp. 1-11. (In Russian.) Available at: https://wcj.world/PDF/09PSMZ222.pdf.
7. Kiknadze V. G. Ukrainian Nationalism: From Origins to Denazification during a Special Military Operation of the Russian Army. Nauka. Obshchestvo. Oborona (= Science. Society. Defense). 2022. Vol. 10. No. 3 (32). (In Russian.) Available at: https://doi.org/10.24412/2311-1763-2022-3-17-17.
8. Klyuchevsky V. O. Writings. Vol. 3: Russian History Course. Part 3. Ed. by V. L. Yanin. Afterword and comments of V. A. Aleksandrov, V. G. Zimina. Moscow: Mysl, 1988. (In Russian.)
9. Kutepov V. A., Rybakov S. V. What did Hetman Khmelnytsky Achieve? Omskiy nauchnyy vestnik (= Omsk Scientific Bulletin). 2015. No. 3 (139), pp. 20-24. (In Russian.)
10. Laktionova N. Ya. Anti-Russian Specificity of Ukrainian Nationalism. Obozrevatel (= The Observer). 2021. No. 10 (381), pp. 26-39. (In Russian.)
11. Lezina E. P., Silantyeva Ya. V. Origins of Ukrainian Nationalism. Tatishchev Readings: Current Problems of Science and Practice. Materials of the XII International Scientific and Practical Conference. Tolyatti Volzhsky Univ. after V. N. Tatischev, 2015. Part 2, pp. 222-228. (In Russian.)
12. March Articles of Bogdan Khmelnytsky in 1654. Central State Archive of Ukraine, Kiyv. F. 222. Op. 1. Spr. 291. Ll. 16-20. (In Russian.) Available at: https://ic.pics.livejournal.com/kramatorsk33/73798490/235120/235120_original.jpg.
13. Ostashevsky A. V. The Ideology of Ukrainian Nationalism: An Artificial State. Kuban Historical Readings: Materials of the XI International Scientific and Practical Conference. Ed. by N. Kuruskanov, B. Ulezko. Krasnodar: Krasnodar Center for Scientific and Technological Information, 2020, pp. 33-42. (In Russian.)
14. Pavlov S. B. The Phenomenon of Ukrainian Nationalism in the History of Russia. Filosofiya khozyaystva (= Philosophy of economy). 2023. No. 1 (145), pp. 158-174. (In Russian.)
15. Rabotyazhev N. V. Right-wing radicalism in Ukraine: history and modernity. Problemy postsovetskogo prostranstva (= Problems of the post-Soviet space). 2020. Vol. 7. No. 4, pp. 516-531. (In Russian.)
16. Safronov B. V. Origins of Ukrainian Nationalism. Vestnik Severo-Vostochnogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Istoriya (= Bulletin of Northeastern State University. History). 2022. Vol. 3. No. 2, pp. 11-19. (In Russian.)
17. Shokin S. D. On the Origins of Ukrainian Nationalism: The Emergence of the National Idea (First Half of the 19th Century). Vestnik sotsialno-politicheskikh nauk (= Bulletin of Socio-Political Sciences). 2017. No. 16, pp. 89-95. (In Russian.)
18. Stukalov P. B. Ukrainian Nationalism in the Ideology of the All-Russian National Union. Current Problems in the Activities of UIS [Penal System] Departments: A Collection of Materials from the All-Russian Scientific and Practical Conference with International Participation. Saratov: Nauchnaya kniga, 2014, pp. 364-366. (In Russian.)
19. Zherebkin M. V. The Logic of Intentions and the Logic of Circumstances in the Actions of Hetman Bogdan Khmelnytsky. Uchyonyye zapiski. Elektronnyy nauchnyy zhurnal Kurskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta (= Scientific notes. Electronic scientific journal of Kursk State University). 2018. No. 2 (46). (In Russian.) Available at: https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/logika-namereniy-i-logika-obstoyatelstv-v-deystviyah-getmana-bogdana-hmelnitskogo/viewer.
20. Zhiltsov S. S. The Origins of Modern Ukrainian Nationalism. Vestnik Rossiyskogo universiteta druzhby narodov. Seriya Politologiya (= RUDN journal of political science). 2014. No. 4, pp. 21-36. (In Russian.)
NOTE:
- UNP – the Ukrainian National Party worked on the Ukrainian lands occupied by Romania in 1927-1938.