BY PUBLISHING the article “The Use of Nuclear Weapons Could Protect Humanity from a Global Catastrophe”1 just under a year ago, I, along with some colleagues, helped initiate a global discussion2 on the role of nuclear weapons in preventing global war. Gradually, the concept of “strategic parasitism” – the belief held by most elites and societies, especially in the West, that peace is eternal and does not require effort to maintain, and that nonnuclear wars can be waged with impunity – began to recede into the past.
That article, along with a series of three subsequent articles and several interviews,3 achieved another goal: to challenge the Western-imposed belief that Russia would almost never use nuclear weapons under any conceivable circumstances. That myth was propagated to facilitate NATO’s aggressive war against Russia using Ukrainian cannon fodder.
Since this discussion began, Americans, at least in the public space, have become much more cautious. First they stopped asserting that Russia would almost never use nuclear weapons. Then the audacious, bluffing voices claiming that Russia would face a massive conventional retaliatory strike in response to the limited use of nuclear weapons quieted down. The adversary was made aware that such a strike would prompt an even more powerful nuclear response against NATO forces actively supporting the Kiev regime, and, if necessary, against overseas American bases, resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands of military personnel. Americans began to seriously discuss the dangers of escalation.
In April 2024, leading US media began publishing articles about the dangers of nuclear war.4 Apparently, there are still people in the US who have not completely lost their sanity. They started speaking out. The failure of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ counteroffensive and the successes of our military sparked discussions about the likelihood, if not the inevitability, of the defeat of the Ukrainian regime that has been acting as a mercenary for the West. Talks of a truce, a freeze, and negotiations emerged to avoid the total collapse of this regime, with the intent of rearming it for another attempt to weaken Russia. Discussions of “negotiations” are an obvious trap. They are unnecessary and even harmful. However, if negotiations must be held, they should only be about the conditions for Kiev’s surrender and the subsequent demilitarization and denazification of the regions that may remain Ukrainian, as well as the return of NATO’s military infrastructure to the 1997 borders.
The elites of the US’s European allies, who have lost not only strategic thinking but also, it seems, their sanity and the vestiges of Enlightenment values due to the blessings of eight decades of peace, continue to chatter about various forms of escalation, even threatening Russia. At the same time, they are unwilling or unable – due to intellectual degradation – to recognize that such escalation will inevitably lead to their defeat, accompanied by massive casualties and possibly the collapse of what remains of European civilization, which they themselves are shamelessly destroying by nonmilitary means, promoting and imposing post-European and posthuman values.
Discussion of the role of nuclear weapons in the modern world is necessary in Russian policy in order to end the war that NATO has unleashed in connection with Ukraine and to prevent the world from sliding into an “age of wars” and an increasingly likely World War III.5
Work on the concept of nuclear deterrence and the related concept of geopolitical containment will also be conducted within the recently established Institute for Global Military Economics and Strategy at the National Research University-Higher School of Economics. The institute is directed by distinguished naval commander Adm. Sergey Avakyants, with prominent Russian international relations scholar Dmitry Trenin serving as academic supervisor.
This work is just beginning. In a few months, reports on the development and modernization of deterrence theory, especially its Russian component, will be presented to the country’s leadership and then to the expert community. In the future, we will discuss ways to modernize the theory with colleagues from leading countries of the World Majority (especially nuclear and nuclear threshold states), as well as with some leading experts from Western countries, primarily the US, when permitted (currently, contacts are essentially prohibited).
Time is of the essence. The discussion, which plays an extremely useful role in preventing the outbreak of thermonuclear war or, at worst, its escalation into a general war ending on terms unfavorable for our country, urgently needs to progress. I present to the thinking and reading public an outline of a text on the function of deterrence, which I have prepared for discussion as part of the work on the forthcoming report. Eight years ago, in an attempt to provoke a discussion, I offered my classification of the functions of nuclear deterrence.6 I now present an updated version, taking into account the experience gained.
Many books have been written about the functions of nuclear deterrence. Here is my classification, which differs from most commonly accepted ones.
Deterrence I or Strategic Intimidation: The ability to convince a potential adversary that any nuclear strike on your territory will inevitably result in a retaliatory strike causing “unacceptable damage.” The assessment of what constitutes unacceptable damage is subjective and depends on the country, population, territory, political system, level and quality of elites, and public sentiment. In the US, according to declassified documents, even a single retaliatory nuclear strike was considered unacceptable as early as the 1950s.
The sociopsychological situation has changed over time. Nearly eight decades of relative peace have fostered “strategic parasitism” – the waning fear of war, including nuclear war. Generational change has lowered the “pain threshold.” We no longer know what constitutes unacceptable damage for the adversary or other nuclear powers. The intellectual and moral deterioration of the Western liberal-globalist elites,7 their declining sense of responsibility to their societies and humanity as a whole, spurred by the desperation that their 500-year dominance in the world system is collapsing, also contributes to the lowering of the “pain threshold.” This issue requires further study.
To support this primary function of nuclear weapons, scholars and practitioners proposed the idea of the inevitability of escalation in any nuclear war to a global level, as well as the theory of “nuclear winter” – the cooling of the Earth resulting from a nuclear exchange, making it uninhabitable for humans. These theories are unproven. Fortunately, they have not been tested in practice. The sense of self-preservation and God’s Will have so far prevailed.
The assertion of the inevitability of any nuclear conflict escalating to a global thermonuclear war contradicts common sense. It almost certainly contradicts operational plans. This claim is losing credibility. Moreover, due to the virtualization of the consciousness of the masses and even elites, the fear of nuclear apocalypse has diminished.
The Americans have avoided actions that could lead to a direct confrontation with Russia. They have escalated support for the Ukrainian junta, and we have allowed it to a certain extent. However, we currently hold escalation dominance due to new weapons.
While this primary type of deterrence has worked, including during the war in Ukraine, it is becoming less effective.
Deterrence II: Explicitly or implicitly, Deterrence I presumed the inadmissibility of any war between nuclear powers because it theoretically carried a high, if not inevitable, risk of escalation to a nuclear level. But this function is partially ceasing to work. Direct military confrontation between nuclear powers is still considered extremely dangerous. Previously, proxy conflicts (Korea, Vietnam, the Middle East) occurred outside the vital interests of nuclear powers. Now, the unthinkable has happened: A major war (in Ukraine) has been unleashed in the underbelly of a great nuclear power.
The theory of inevitable escalation was concocted by the Americans and partially by the British and adopted by us for noble purposes – to prevent any direct confrontation.
Under these circumstances, the proposition that “a nuclear war cannot be won and should not be fought” works for those forces that seek to use their military-economic superiority to wage wars with only conventional weapons. Currently, this is primarily the US.
Restoring this deterrence function will help prevent any war, not only altering the situation around Ukraine but also maintaining global peace. Large wars, especially those between nuclear powers, must be excluded from international practice. Otherwise, the world, which is in a drawn-out process of dismantling the old and searching for and constructing a new international system and balance, is doomed to an “age of wars,” which will ultimately and very likely escalate into a general war.
Theory and practice require adjustment, if not a complete revision of old theories.
Deterrence III or Extended Deterrence: Under this doctrine, the US guaranteed a nuclear umbrella to its allies, claiming readiness to strike the aggressor should NATO ([or its partners, like] Japan, South Korea) lose a war using conventional armed forces. That promise was pure bluff.
The US never intended to use nuclear weapons against the USSR to protect its allies, fearing an inevitable retaliatory strike on its own soil. However, Soviet strategists believed in this possibility and, fearing a repeat of June 22, 1941, and anticipating a war involving the enemy’s use of nuclear weapons, prepared to advance if absolutely necessary. They prepared their conventional armed forces for war with nuclear weapons, engaging in an arms race of both nuclear and conventional weapons, which eventually undermined the country.
Currently, American extended deterrence (Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty) is widely used to maintain NATO unity.
It is reliably known that since the mid-1950s, when the USSR gained the credible ability to retaliate with nuclear strikes on US territory, the US has not considered using nuclear weapons against Soviet territory or even in defense of its allies. During exercises simulating military actions in Europe (a Soviet offensive), a theoretical scenario of using nuclear weapons against advancing Warsaw Pact forces was played out to instill confidence in allies about nuclear guarantees. However, that scenario was absolutely unacceptable to German leaders (Chancellors Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl personally spoke about this, and this is known from the [scholarly] literature) as it would involve strikes on German territory that would leave thousands (hundreds of thousands, millions) of Germans dead. The chancellors refused to lead the exercises. Extended deterrence was and remains a bluff. Charles De Gaulle spoke directly about this, and British allies were aware of it. This is precisely why the French and British – despite US opposition – created their own nuclear forces.
To strengthen it in the 1970s, it was the Europeans, not the Americans, who initiated the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles in Europe. These de facto strategic systems linked Europe and the US. At the time, pro-Atlantic forces and the US military-industrial complex agreed, especially since the USSR provided a convenient pretext with the (incidental and unnecessary) deployment of SS-20 Pioneer intermediate-range missiles. But as soon as the opportunity arose, the Americans withdrew the missiles.
In recent decades, some American military figures (reportedly, Ash Carter, defense secretary in the Barack Obama administration,) attempted to revive this doctrine, sending signals that in the event of a Russian invasion of the Baltic states and nuclear strikes against them, the US might use tactical nuclear weapons. Knowing Ash Carter, an educated and level-headed expert, I am confident that this was blatant bluffing. I am unsure if these signals even reached us. As far as I know, these signals were not repeated. In America, Carter was mocked by his colleagues from Harvard and MIT as a “paper strategist.”
Moreover, anyone who takes the time to read Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty will realize that it does not provide any automatic guarantees. By studying declassified congressional hearings and records of discussions in the White House and the Senate regarding this article, it becomes clear that American neo-isolationist senators (led by Senator Robert Taft) conditioned their support for the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty on the absence of automatic guarantees. However, in the USSR/Russia, this article has never been questioned, which is astonishing. One might speculate that in the USSR, where the military-industrial complex dictated policy, there was no desire to reduce the perceived threat of NATO. During the Soviet era, there was also the consideration that this article restrained the arms race in Europe. Why we continue to pretend that this is relevant now is unclear – likely due to inertial thinking or ignorance. We do not need to exacerbate threats; they are already abundant.
According to official statements, Russia also asserts that our nuclear weapons can be used in response to an attack on our allies. However, the text of the nuclear weapons use doctrine primarily addresses retaliation for a nuclear attack on Russian territory and its use when the very existence of the state is threatened. Would we tolerate and sacrifice tens of thousands of our own and Belarusian soldiers if, say, Poland and Lithuania attacked fraternal Belarus? These border states and their patrons should have no doubt that in such a case, they would face almost automatic nuclear annihilation. The fraternal Belarusian people and other allies must be assured of their security. The current doctrine contains positive ambiguities; some of its provisions can be interpreted, under scrutiny, as nuclear guarantees. However, clarity is needed. In any case, the decision to use nuclear weapons would be made by the Russian president and military command.
Russian extended deterrence ceased to function during the country’s decline – from the late 1980s to the early 2000s. During this period, NATO, which had previously been a defensive alliance, carried out several blatant aggressive operations – against Russia-friendly Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Libya, destabilizing entire regions.
During NATO’s brutal bombings of former Yugoslavia (Serbia), the threat of the use of nuclear weapons to defend the Serbs was considered but, as I understand, rejected due to Russia’s weakness in other areas and the growing incapacity of the then Russian president.
Deterrence IV: Preventing war by demonstrating the country’s readiness to use nuclear weapons in the event of any attack on its territory that uses only conventional forces. This approach is likely also adhered to by most other nuclear states: France, Great Britain, India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea.
This type of deterrence is irrelevant for the US: No one can realistically threaten the Americans with an invasion or the massive use of nonnuclear weapons on their territory. But it is extremely relevant for Russia in the context of Western efforts to lead in escalation, supplying Kiev with increasingly long-range weapons that have been used to strike Russian cities and strategic infrastructure. This also applies to the Poles, Romanians, Czechs, etc., and even to the French and British, who possess nuclear weapons. They are unlikely, with their small territories, political systems, and nuclear forces, to be willing to engage in a strategic duel with Russia. Otherwise, they would not have supplied [Kiev] with long-range weapons, and the Ukrainian puppets would have been tied hand and foot. Notably, the Americans, who have retained remnants of strategic thinking, no longer supply such assets, hiding behind the backs of their increasingly foolish and historically forgetful allies.
Deterrence V: Under a sound policy, nuclear weapons can deter a conventional arms race. The maintenance and buildup of nuclear arsenals are often associated with an arms race. This was largely the case during the Cold War, when Washington and Moscow built up nuclear arms in a largely irrational and thoughtless manner, disregarding any normal logic or reasonable strategic calculations, capable of destroying all life on the planet five or 10 times over. However, even then, reliance on nuclear weapons allowed the more rational and responsible West, especially in Europe, to spend less money on conventional arms. The US and especially its European and other allies received a “nuclear peace dividend” long before the potential for a “peace dividend” associated with the end of the last Cold War. This “nuclear peace dividend” was significantly linked to the consumer boom in Europe and the US.
In the USSR, this deterrence function was neither understood nor utilized. Influenced by the June 22, 1941, syndrome and lacking “bottom-up” pressure, due to the merging of the political and military leadership with the military-industrial complex (the phenomenon of Marshal Ustinov), the USSR simultaneously engaged in a race for both nuclear and conventional arms. The exact figures for Soviet military expenditures are unknown. However, according to various estimates, they were much higher than 15% of GDP. Combined with “assistance to fraternal countries” and “socialist-leaning countries” in the third world, as well as subsidies to most allied republics, they became an unbearable burden. It is surprising that the USSR lasted as long as it did.
Currently, the last two types of expenditure of Russia’s national wealth are less relevant. But the danger of sliding into a race for conventional (cyber, space, bio) weapons is more than relevant.
In the future, this function will become even more relevant as new great powers emerge on the world stage. The multifactor arms race must be blocked by emphasizing that it cannot be won. The most useful function of this type of deterrence is that it makes the pursuit of superiority in other areas – conventional armed forces, missile defense forces, long-range precision nonnuclear systems, space weapons, and biological weapons – essentially pointless and significantly more expensive. This is proven by the recent experience of the US, which in the 1990s and early 2000s made a huge leap, spending trillions, surpassing almost all other nations combined, only to find after a series of defeats that such superiority offers little in the modern world, partly due to the impossibility or unwillingness to escalate to the nuclear level.
The fact that nuclear weapons make it possible to spend less on conventional armed forces is one reason for the existence of a powerful antinuclear lobby in the US: While partially fueled by idealists-pacifists and those who understand the danger of using nuclear weapons, it is largely driven by the interests of the military-industrial complex sectors that produce conventional weapons. Additionally, there are those in the “deep state” who hope to translate economic power into political advantage through an arms race. Finally, infantry generals and marshals historically dislike nuclear weapons because they render their plans meaningless and their demands extraneous. That was particularly the case in the USSR.
In Russian-Chinese relations, the nuclear factor precludes any theoretical attempts to achieve nonnuclear superiority (in the foreseeable future, relations are excellent) and, accordingly, Russian fears of such a possibility. It is objectively one of the factors for the long-term maintenance of friendly relations between the two countries, reducing mutual suspicions.
Russia’s recent weakening of active reliance on nuclear deterrence objectively opens the door for a conventional arms race, benefiting primarily countries with large demographic and economic potentials (NATO). The threshold for using nuclear weapons should be lowered to prevent a race in other types of weapons. It is necessary to block the arms race initiated by the US in both biological weapons and space-based weapons. But most importantly, it is vital to block the race in the latest conventional arms. The “drone revolution” could make normal life extremely dangerous, creating yet another mechanism that makes wars increasingly deadly, blurring the line between war and peace.
Deterrence VI: Ensuring the democratization of international relations. Without the deterrent role of nuclear weapons, which limits the massive use of military force in general, it is unlikely that “new” powers, primarily China, would have been allowed to rise, let alone so quickly. They could have finished off Russia during its years of weakness.
From the 1940s to the 1960s, at the cost of enormous efforts and sacrifices (recall the famine of the late 1940s, the underconsumption of subsequent decades), we established strategic parity (not in the sense of numerical equality – parity in this context is a provisional and partly even harmful concept – but in the sense of the ability to respond at any level).
While looking out for our own security, we simultaneously carried out a mission of global-historical dimensions: We undermined the military superiority underpinning five centuries of European-Western dominance. On this foundation rested the various forms of Western dominance that supported one another – political, economic, cultural – allowing the West to impose its will, interests, views, and laws. This dominance enabled Europe and the West to not only suppress other peoples and civilizations but, most importantly, to extract colonial and then neocolonial rent, which was used to make strides in science, culture, and military affairs. Until the 15th-16th centuries, the overwhelming majority of the world’s GDP was produced outside Europe, where most technological inventions were also made. Thanks to technological progress in arms production and the development of more effective warfare tactics (due to endless wars on the crowded subcontinent), Europe gained military superiority over other civilizations beginning in the 17th century, often surpassing them in scientific and cultural development.8
By eliminating this foundation, we paved the way for the anticolonial and then anti-neocolonial liberation of the world from the Western yoke. We halted this deterrence function during our shameful failure in the 1990s. But from the 2000s onward, we resumed it.
After the failures of the US and the West in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria, and of Israel in Gaza; the onset of a major economic crisis in 2008; and of course, the unfolding defeat in Ukraine, combined with the powerful rise of China (which would have been impossible without strategic cover from Russia), a new, likely final round of liberation of the World Majority from Western yoke is unfolding.
The fury with which the West has attacked Russia, seeking to inflict a strategic defeat on it and largely remove it from the game, is connected with its loss of the 500-year-old ability to extract rent from the rest of the world and the desire to restore its perception of military superiority.
Deterrence VII: One of the most important, albeit almost unstudied, functions of nuclear deterrence is its civilizing influence. The presence of nuclear weapons with their inherent theoretical capacity to destroy countries and continents, if not all of humanity, has changed mindsets and “civilized” the ruling elites of nuclear countries, making them more responsible. Those with views that could lead to nuclear confrontation were either weeded out or not allowed into areas related to national security. This can be seen quite clearly in the evolution of the American ruling elite and its views.
The last relatively radical American politician to run for president was Senator Barry Goldwater from Arizona (“the bomber”). He was talented and quite popular, but the American ruling elite, the “deep state,” simply ousted him in the 1964 election.
A similar evolution was observed in the Soviet leadership, though it is harder to trace. However, elements of nuclear adventurism (the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962) were an important reason for Nikita Khrushchev’s ouster.
It is highly likely that signals from Moscow that the Soviet leadership had concluded that there was an extremely high probability of a US attack due to the fierce anti-Soviet rhetoric of Ronald Reagan and his entourage led to a significant change in the US administration’s military-political wing in the mid- to late-1980s. Super hawks were removed by the “deep state,” and much more moderate figures were brought into leadership.
In recent years, the impact of this deterrence function has weakened significantly due to “strategic parasitism,” which the prominent Russian international relations scholar Timofey Bordachev has termed “strategic frivolity”9 in describing the current state of Western elites. There is also clear intent to eliminate the restraining, civilizing role of the nuclear factor in order to free their hands for nonnuclear aggressions. This trend was noticeable in the US, where the dangers of a conventional war escalating into a nuclear one, and the dangers of nuclear war itself, were downplayed. For instance, US President Joe Biden and his secretary of state, Antony Blinken, have asserted that nuclear war is less dangerous than global warming. After Russia began reminding them of the possibility of a nuclear response to aggression in Ukraine, Americans, both at the highest and expert levels, quieted down. As mentioned earlier, research and articles on the dangers of escalation for the US started to appear. However, Europeans, who have completely lost their capacity for strategic thinking, if not thinking altogether, continue to be unrestrained. It is evident that this vital “civilizing” function of nuclear deterrence needs to be “refreshed.”
From the function of deterrence as a civilizing factor follows Deterrence VIII, or Self-Deterrence. Understanding the danger of conflict escalation has compelled and continues to compel leaders of nuclear states to rule out the consideration of actions that could escalate to the nuclear level or to a general nuclear conflict. Objectively, all parties in the nuclear equation are indirectly interested in being “restrained” as well.
During the Gorbachev-Reagan period of nuclear abolitionism, when there was a push for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, opponents of complete disarmament (myself included) from both the Russian and, reportedly, the American sides argued against it, guided in part by the practicality of preserving the self-deterrence function. This function is still a factor. The Americans, as we know, are extremely cautious about deploying more destructive and long-range weaponry in Ukraine. The self-deterrence function must be revived and supported by stimulating international discussions about the role of nuclear weapons in national strategies and global politics. This should involve the increasing number of new nuclear states, with whom we should primarily develop a new theory of deterrence.
The self-deterrence function also rests on moral imperatives. It is unimaginably terrifying to give the order to use the “weapon of God,” which was likely given to us by the hands of Oppenheimer, Fermi, Kurchatov, Sakharov, and their colleagues to save humanity, which had insanely launched two world wars within a single generation.
However, this function can also be harmful. Currently, by exploiting our reliance on it, Americans and their satellites lead in escalation, crossing or allowing their Kiev puppets to cross any conceivable red lines. This has reached the point of bombing Russian cities. We need to understand this function, but not let it deprive us of the resolve and ability to dominate escalation. We must realize that if the adversary does not understand that we are prepared, in the extreme case – albeit with moral losses – to use nuclear weapons, its function of saving humanity (especially its increasingly irrational Western parts) will fail. The fading sense of self-preservation must be revived. In the Old Testament, the Almighty gave us advice. He unleashed a fiery rain – analogous to a limited nuclear strike – on the residents of Sodom and Gomorrah, who had gone mad with permissiveness and depravity.
Naturally, we do not even want to think about using nuclear weapons. But if we abandon them out of moral concerns, we will doom ourselves and the world to a much worse fate – World Armageddon.
Deterrence IX or Geopolitical Containment. This involves the territorial, ideological, and economic limitation of the adversary’s expansion, ideally pushing it back (“roll back,” in the American Cold War lexicon). Containment is a comprehensive strategy that involves military (including nuclear), economic, and ideological tools. This concept was practically absent in Soviet foreign policy theory and in Russian theory. When we were “contained,” we spoke of peaceful coexistence, for which we paid the price.
Meanwhile, this theory has been the cornerstone of the operational strategy of the US and the West, not only during the Cold War but also after its formal end in the 1990s. NATO and EU expansion and the “color revolutions” in the countries of the former USSR were part of this strategy. Our failure to understand this cost us dearly. We lost territories and markets. We allowed this largely due to economic and domestic political weakness, but also because of illusions and sheer stupidity, not understanding the nature of the imperialist powers’ policies, which require constant expansion into new markets, including territorial ones. Amid shrinking opportunities elsewhere, we refrained from leveraging the nuclear element of our overall power. I remember our domestic debates in the 1990s. Calls to at least passively activate nuclear deterrence were indignantly rejected, and proponents were accused of “old thinking,” just as predictions that NATO expansion, which could have been limited merely by activating deterrence, would inevitably lead to a major war in Europe. And it did.
* * *
NATURALLY, when describing the mostly positive functions of deterrence, one cannot forget the monstrous, still unexplored consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, without the credible threat of which deterrence does not work. The use of nuclear weapons and the unleashing of nuclear war are not only dangerous in their unpredictability but, I repeat, can cause us enormous moral damage. Conventional weapons can be far more deadly (more people died in Tokyo and Dresden than in Hiroshima and Nagasaki). But nuclear weapons carry a special moral significance, surrounded by apocalyptic horror. That is why I call them the “weapon of God.” Nuclear weapons can be used to win a war quite easily. But it would pave the way for further use, lifting the nuclear taboo.
Without reviving the functions of nuclear deterrence described above, we may not win in Ukraine, or the cost of victory will be so high that it will be largely Pyrrhic. That is what the Westerners are aiming for. They have realized that they cannot defeat Russia. They want to weaken us economically and politically as much as possible.
And perhaps most importantly, restoring the aforementioned functions of nuclear deterrence is necessary to prevent the wave of conflicts from evolving into World War III.
Therefore, an optimal option is to use political methods, to climb the escalation ladder, to force the opponents who have gone too far to retreat, to understand that they are on the road to hell, and that if they do not retreat with dignity, they face defeat, possibly with the use of nuclear weapons against several countries that are actively supporting the Kiev terrorist-Nazi junta. But if not, if they do not come to their senses, we will need to act. This is demanded not only by our vital interests and the need to preserve the lives of our soldiers and officers, but also by our responsibility to human civilization and the historical mission of our nation. Our nation has long embraced the mission of saving humanity.
Ultimately, restoring the credibility of nuclear deterrence serves the interests of all countries and peoples, including those in the West whose elites have lost their sense of history, self-preservation, and responsibility even to their own people.
NOTES
1 see Karaganov S.A. “Primeneniye yadernogo oruzhiya mozhet uberech chelovechestvo ot globalnoy katastrofy,” https://karaganov.ru/primenenie-jadernogo-oruzhija-mozhet-uberech-chelovechestvo-ot-globalnoj-katastrofy
2 see Trenin D.V. Ukrainsky konflikt i yadernoye oruzhiye,” Rossiya v globalnoy politike. June 20, 2023, https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/ukraina-yadernoe-oruzhie; Trenin D.V. “Pereosmysleniye strategicheskoy stabilnosti,” Rossiya v globalnoy politike, March 21, 2024, https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/pereosmyslenie-stratstabilnosti
3 see, for example: “Vstrechnyy pal ili propal. Sergey Karaganov obyasnil tsel yadernoy ugrozy Zapadu,” Argumenty i fakty, July 10, 2023, https://aif.ru/politics/world/vstrechnyy_pal_ili_propal_sergey_karaganov_obyasnil_cel_yadernoy_ugrozy_zapadu; “Avtor idei udarit po NATO yadernym oruzhiyem Karaganov: ‘Prezident menya slyshit,’ ” Moskovsky komsomolets. October 9, 2023, https://www.mk.ru/politics/2023/10/09/avtor-idei-udarit-po-nato-yadernym-oruzhiem-karaganov-prezident-menya-slyshit.html; “Sergey Karaganov: Ya posodeystvoval otrezvleniyu i usileniyu yadernogo sderzhivaniya,” Daily Storm, December 27, 2023, https://dailystorm.ru/vlast/sergey-karaganov-ya-posodeystvoval-otrezvleniyu-i-usileniyu-yadernogo-sderzhivaniya
4 “We Need to Start Worrying About the Bomb,” The Boston Globe. April 9, 2024, https://www.bostonglobe.com/2024/04/09/opinion/nuclear-weapons-bomb-us-russia-china; “At the Brink,” The New York Times, March 7, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/03/07/opinion/nuclear-weapons-nytimes.html
5 see Karaganov S.A. “Vek voyn? Statya vtoraya. Chto delat,” Rossiya v globalnoy politike, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2024), pp. 37-52.
6 See Karaganov S.A. “O novom yadernom mire,” Rossiya v globalnoy politike, April 4, 2017, https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/o-novom-yadernom-mire
7 On this issue, see, for example, the article by the distinguished Western thinker (former British intelligence agent) Alastair Crooke: Crooke A. “The Fabric of Reality,” Al Mayadeen, April 12, 2024, https://english.almayadeen.net/articles/analysis/the-fabric-of-reality. The recently departed patriarch of the American strategic community, Henry Kissinger, wrote about this degradation. See the last chapter in his book Leadership: Six Studies in World Strategy. United Kingdom: Penguin Books Limited, 2022.
8 On the undermining of the military foundation from under five centuries of Western domination, see Karaganov S.A. “Ukhod voyennogo prevoskhodstva Zapada i geoekonomika,” Polis. Politicheskiye issledovaniya, No. 6 (2019), pp. 8-21.
9 Bordachev T.V. “Rezhim kontrugroz i strategicheskaya frivolnost,” Fond razvitiya i podderzhki Mezhdunarodnogo diskussionnogo kluba Valday, December 12, 2021, https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/rezhim-kontrugroz-i-strategicheskaya-frivolnost