“It is really impossible to knock the letter ya off the end of the word “homeopathic” [in Russian: gomeopaticheskaya] and think that doing so will turn a Russian pharmacy into a Ukrainian one.”
Mikhail Bulgakov1
THE party-state visit to the People’s Republic of China on December 11-12, 2024, at the invitation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, once again demonstrated the unprecedentedly high level of bilateral relations between Russia and China. There are no forbidden topics of discussion between us. During the negotiations with Chinese partners, issues such as the situation in Ukraine, the Syrian crisis, and measures to counter unilateral economic sanctions imposed in circumvention of the UN Security Council were addressed.
The reason for such a trusting dialogue is evident. The Russian and Chinese peoples are united by friendship and good-neighborly relations based on deep historical traditions. In 2024, we celebrated the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations and the founding of the PRC. Despite the profound changes taking place in the world due to the emergence of a multipolar order, certain constants have remained unchanged for decades. Russia and China continue to bear responsibility for the present and future of humanity. We will continue to fulfill this challenging mission together while addressing unresolved issues inherited from the past, which I would like to elaborate on.
“Divide and Rule”: Two Dimensions of One Pernicious Policy
THROUGHOUT history, Western civilization has sought to impose its will on external actors. Rather than relying on direct military defeat – rarely feasible due to the perpetual lack of material and human resources among Europeans – the preferred strategy was far simpler: the destruction of existing power structures from within, using others as proxies. The West aimed to prevent the unification of peoples, thereby undermining their ability to resist external threats. It sought to provoke rivalry and discord among them, prioritizing the exploitation or creation of objective ethnic, linguistic, cultural, tribal, or religious differences to its advantage.
Numerous instances can be recalled where certain segments of the population or specific groups fell prey to this deadly snare, becoming entangled in protracted and bloody ethno-social and ethno-confessional conflicts. The essence of this policy is encapsulated in the principle divide et impera – “divide and rule.” While the term emerged in Britain only in the 17th century, the policy was held in high regard as far back as the Roman Empire and reached its zenith during the era of European colonial empires. It played a decisive role in ensuring the viability of nearly all major colonial systems and became an integral component of the activity of colonial powers. Even today, it remains a core element of Western administrative practices.
History provides countless examples of the deliberate incitement or exacerbation of interethnic conflicts. No colonial power was ever interested in the prosperity of its dependent territories. It was far easier to pit nations against one another and draw artificial boundaries on political maps that would cut through entire ethnic groups. This strategy aligns with a concept described by the prominent German sociologist Georg Simmel at the turn of the 20th century. According to Simmel, “a third element intentionally produces a conflict in order to gain a dominating position,” wherein two opposing elements “so weaken one other that neither of them can stand up against [the third party’s] superiority.”2
The policy of “divide and conquer” operated on two levels – horizontal and vertical. Horizontally, colonizers fragmented local populations into distinct communities, often based on religious, racial, or linguistic criteria. The vertical dimension emerged when foreign rulers stratified society along class lines, thereby isolating the elite from the masses. These two methods typically complemented one another synergistically.
One of the primary tools for implementing the “divide” component was the deliberate imposition of religious and ethnic discord in the colonies. The consequences of these actions remain acute and are still being addressed by the UN today.
For example, a significant “achievement” of British imperial policy was the creation and subsequent exacerbation of Hindu-Muslim antagonism. British colonizers imported cheap labor from Muslim Bengal into Burma for agricultural work, particularly after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, which increased European demand for rice and turned colonial Burma into a “rice bowl.”3 This [influx of workers] led to the formation of a Muslim Bengali community (the Rohingya) distinct from the Buddhist Burmese majority. Concentrated in northern Rakhine State (formerly Arakan), this community developed a unique identity rooted in radical attitudes. The mistrust and competition over limited resources (land ownership rights) between the indigenous population and the descendants of labor migrants culminated in the bloody events of 1942-1943, referred to in British historiography as the “Arakan massacres.” Tens of thousands of people lost their lives as a result.4 In the following decades, interethnic, religious, and social tensions continued to escalate, culminating in the 2017 mass exodus of the Rohingya to neighboring countries. This exodus was recognized as the largest population displacement in Southeast Asia since the Indochina crisis of the 1970s.5
Britain gave a similar “ethnic gift” to Cyprus, working diligently to deepen the longstanding conflict between the Greeks and Turks on the island.
Another favorite “pastime” of Western civilizations was the propagation of myths about the superiority of certain peoples over others. In Algeria, French colonists skillfully exploited tensions between Arabs and Kabyles, capitalizing on stereotypes of inequality. These tensions were fueled by Paris’s promotion of prejudices suggesting that the Kabyle people were allegedly more predisposed than Arabs to assimilate into “French civilization.”
Taiwan’s Experience: Linguistics as a Weapon of Militant Separatism
TODAY, the Anglo-Saxons have devised division schemes targeting all those who oppose their aggressive interference in the internal affairs of states worldwide.
For instance, alongside the relentless arming of Taiwan, they intentionally turn a blind eye to the Taiwanese administration’s efforts to promote “de-Sinicization” and “Taiwanization” of the island. These efforts are carried out through policies aimed at cultivating a so-called “Taiwanese identity” or “Taiwanese self-awareness,” encouraging residents to identify as “Taiwanese” detached from their roots, rather than as Chinese. A deliberate narrative is being instilled into the collective consciousness of the island’s residents, suggesting that, through the course of historical processes – during which the island or parts of it were under the control of various forces including aboriginal tribes, Spaniards, Dutch, assorted pirates, and Japanese – a new nation distinct from the dominant Han Chinese ethnic group was supposedly formed.6
The political essence of these actions is epitomized by a series of provocative statements from Taipei, such as: “To this day, everyone who has ruled Taiwan has been part of a foreign regime,” and “Let’s turn Taiwan into a new Central Plain!”7 To support such ideological constructs, various “Taiwan-centric” academic concepts have been formulated. These include the theme of the “Taiwanese nation” proposed in the early 2000s, along with its variations: a “Taiwanese nation by blood,” a “Taiwanese nation by culture,” a “political-economic Taiwanese nation,” a “newly emerging nation,” and even a “community of destiny.”8 The authors of these artificial theories aim to move the collective consciousness of Taiwanese people away from traditional “Chineseness” and impose a sense of “non-Chineseness” as a new national-civic identity. In doing so, they present Chinese culture as merely one of many cultures on the island, allegedly not forming the core of Taiwan’s cultural identity.9
To implement these objectives, tools such as manipulative linguistic separation, the cultivation of local nationalism, and the promotion of pro-Western values and ideas alien to traditional Chinese national culture are employed. To that end, the island’s proponents of separatism, spurred on by US legislators and retired officials under the supervision of numerous overseas NGOs, vigorously advocate the idea that “national identity” is the sole basis for forming a nation and justifying the existence of a state.10
In their effort to sow maximum discord, strategic adversaries vigorously invent contrived differences. They place significant emphasis on linguistic conflicts and attempts to reshape the “soul of a people” to suit their agenda. Washington, London, and Brussels are well aware that language, as defined by the prominent Soviet linguist Sergey Ozhegov, is more than “the primary means of communication and a tool for exchanging thoughts and mutual understanding within society.” It is also a vital tool for preserving centuries-old traditions that bind generations together, a sociocultural component, and a marker of political preferences. For this reason, the West launches ideological attacks on language as an element of civic solidarity. The objectives are clear: to provoke an externally induced crisis of self-identification and historical memory, to undermine the values inherent in our civilizations – justice, kindness, mercy, compassion, and love – and to replace them with a surrogate neoliberal agenda.
At the heart of this effort lies an insistent desire to dismantle the millennia-old algorithms of human activity. To artificially amplify the topic of a so-called “Taiwanese language,” Western forces are eager to exploit differences in character script, minor lexical variations, and features of the Southern Min dialect. Taiwanese separatists, for example, exaggerate insignificant differences between the official language of all of China (including Taiwan), historically referred to in Republican China as Guoyu (“national language”) and renamed Putonghua (“common language”) in the PRC in 1955.
It is symbolic that the island’s authorities find themselves compelled to manipulate language as a political tool. The current emphasis of the Taiwanese authorities on differences between local and mainland linguistic practices is part of broader efforts to create a “Taiwanese identity.” In practical terms, this includes publishing books that highlight insignificant phonetic distinctions in the Chinese language on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, educational programs in schools and universities emphasize (inevitably with political overtones) the differences between Guoyu and mainland Chinese and its alleged superiority.
In terms of the objective logic of historical, cultural, and linguistic processes, the linguistic balance between the Taiwanese and mainland variants of the Chinese language is somewhat analogous to the relationship among the dialects of the German language. Few – whether scholars or laypeople – would deny the existence of the Bundesdeutsch, Austrian (Southern German), and Swiss national variants of the German language. Yet, all these variants belong to a shared continuum common to Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, with the “gold standard” being the literary German language, Hochdeutsch. Similarly, the relative autonomy of British and American English is rarely recognized in modern linguistics. Centuries of separate development, which have resulted in certain phonetic, orthographic, and grammatical distinctions, do not serve as obstacles to communication and mutual understanding between the citizens of these two nations.
A particularly destructive role in hindering China’s development is played by the [US] National Endowment for Democracy (NED), whose activities have been declared undesirable in Russia. The NED exploits issues related to Taiwan and Hong Kong to provoke division and conflict within the PRC.11 This dubious organization has long engaged in subversive cognitive operations worldwide on behalf of its founders in the US Congress and is often referred to as the “second CIA.”
After 1945, the authorities in Taiwan actively pursued policies of forced “de-Japanization” and “Sinicization” (introducing Guoyu instead of Taiyu) in the realm of language policy. Since 2000, they have attempted, though with little success, to reverse this course and replace the official Guoyu with the “Taiwanese language” (Taiyu). These efforts bear a striking resemblance to language policies in Ukraine promoted by people like Kravchuk, Kuchma, Yushchenko, and Poroshenko after 1991. From 2007 to 2015, the NED allocated over $30 million to support Ukrainian NGOs and “civil society.” During the 2013-2014 Euromaidan, it funded the Institute of Mass Information to disseminate false narratives and spent tens of millions of dollars fueling ethnic tensions in Ukraine through social media platforms like Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), and Instagram.12
Beijing, in turn, has no need to prove anything to anyone. Putonghua is the common language for all PRC citizens, a powerful source of wisdom and inspiration – the language of a modern, progressive, and prosperous China.
The so-called “original” linguistic traditions of Taiwan are far from the only tool exploited by Western neocolonialists. The issue of historical memory has not been overlooked either. Contrary to the official historiography of the PRC, which asserts that Taiwan historically existed as part of Fujian Province and, from 1887, as a separate province of the Qing Empire – demonstrating that Taiwan belongs to “one China” – Taiwanese “experts” equate the Qing Empire with other foreign powers that colonized the island.13 Their efforts clearly follow the well-worn Anglo-Saxon pattern of historical falsification.
From these similarly biased positions, proponents of Taiwanese independence seek to exaggerate the positive aspects of the island’s economic modernization under Japanese rule, contrasting them with the actions of Chinese authorities in the first decades after the war. These narratives disregard the opinions of political forces with a moderate attitude to the PRC, which highlight the negative aspects of colonial administration during the Japanese occupation of Taiwan (1895-1945).14
In a similar vein, the administration of Lai Ching-te constructs its falsified interpretation of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971), which recognized the PRC government as the sole legitimate representative of China at the UN, replacing the so-called “Republic of China” under Chiang Kai-shek. However, separatists claim that the resolution makes no explicit reference to the island or its political status. Thus, they argue, it cannot serve as a basis for restricting Taiwan’s international legal personality, which they contend gives Taiwan the right to claim a seat in the UN and other intergovernmental organizations – and, in the future, to become part of the Western “democratic family.”
Taipei’s course, as usual, finds understanding and support from the Anglo-Saxon states, which approach the one-China principle with notable duplicity. On the one hand, they acknowledge the exclusive authority of the PRC government to represent China in the UN system. On the other, they encourage Taipei’s efforts to gain participation rights in intergovernmental mechanisms such as the WHO and ICAO. A recent example occurred in November 2024, when the Canadian Parliament, closely coordinating its approaches with allies through the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (a coalition of Western lawmakers sympathetic to Taiwan), unanimously adopted a provocative resolution calling for Taipei’s involvement in UN specialized agencies and other international organizations.
Such false and tendentious provocations are a common occurrence. Among them are unfounded demands from Ukraine to deprive Russia of its seat on the UN Security Council. However, it is worth recalling the international legal outcomes of World War II. The issue of returning Chinese territories occupied by Japan, including Taiwan, was settled and codified in a series of international legal documents, including the 1945 Potsdam Declaration. Following the establishment of the PRC on October 1, 1949, sovereign rights over all internationally recognized Chinese territory, including Taiwan, were transferred to the PRC. Thus, Taiwan’s status was never subject to discussion in Resolution 2758, which instead enshrined the one-China principle.
In the long term, the Anglo-Saxon powers are pursuing a clear political objective: to comprehensively reshape the “island identity” of Taiwan. This would dilute the one-China principle, declare Taiwan’s independence following a Kosovo-style scenario, and destabilize the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Ultimately, it would lead to the establishment of a formalized US-dependent stronghold in East Asia. This aligns with Washington’s ambitions to bring the Asia-Pacific region into NATO’s orbit and to pit states against each other.
The British and Americans also employ the principle of “divide and rule” in the case of Hong Kong, which was reunited with China in 1997 after more than a century and a half of British colonial rule. The false narrative of “Hong Kong attitudes” is almost a copy of the “Taiwan issue.” It includes empty rhetoric about a supposed “Hong Kong (non-Han) identity”15 and the audacious imposition of the idea that Hong Kong residents must follow a “special path,” meaning subservience to Anglo-Saxon elites. To that end, various projects aimed at destabilizing Hong Kong are funded – for example, in 2020, the NED allocated $310,000 for such activities.16 “Appropriate” research by compliant scholars, promoting the neocolonialist ambitions of London and Washington, also garners support. So do all other efforts aimed at undermining the unity of the Chinese nation.17
The 20th century offers additional examples of external forces attempting to reconfigure national identities for their own geopolitical purposes. Japanese invaders deliberately sought to eradicate the Han Chinese language in the puppet state of Manchukuo, while simultaneously imposing the Manchu language, which was scarcely used at the time. These linguistic experiments had a clear political goal: to destroy the cohesive fabric of shared Chinese ideological and cultural values and subject the population to total cultural erasure and indoctrination. This inhumane practice was ended in 1945 through the efforts of the Red Army and the Chinese patriots of the Communist Party of China.
Ukraine: The West’s New Exercises in Social Vivisection
SIMILAR social “vivisection” is being persistently carried out by occupiers – this time Western ones – in Ukraine today. Their aim is to eradicate the Russian language, erase shared glorious chapters of history from collective memory, and create “rootless people.” Ukraine has become a modern-day equivalent of the puppet state of Manchukuo established by the Japanese military administration in the 1930s. However, whereas Manchukuo was created by Imperial Japan through military force, modern Kiev is sustained by the collective West, which not only arms it but also governs it through “soft power” political methods. To that end, an entire network of NGOs controlled by American and European intelligence agencies has been established.
The West operates against us under the same hypocritical “divide and rule” principle. Its establishment and Ukrainian ideologues persistently attempt to apply the “Taiwanese,” “Hong Kong,” and even “Manchukuo” experiences to Ukraine. Their goal is to demonstrate that Russians and Ukrainians are as different from each other as possible, to tear Ukraine away from Russia, sow discord, and provoke ethnic division.
External support for this supposedly unique Ukrainian junta is provided openly. A range of seemingly respectable think tanks and publications on both sides of the Atlantic are involved, including the London School of Economics and Political Science, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, The Washington Post, Politico, and others. The Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, founded in the US in 1973, also plays a role in proliferating disinformation. For years, these organizations have systematically disseminated Euro-Atlantic propaganda clichés, churning out articles and reports with formulaic titles like “Fact-Checking the Kremlin’s Version of Ukrainian History,”18 “Ukraine and Russia Are Not the Same Country,”19 and [stories to the effect that] Ukrainians and Russians are not one people.20, 21
In reality, Western “experts” and their Soros-funded acolytes in various Ukrainian NGOs cannot prevail over historical truth. Nonetheless, they persistently introduce a banal set of ideas into public consciousness, steering discussions in a false direction. On the one hand, these wretched theorists acknowledge the spiritual closeness of the peoples of Russia and Ukraine and their belonging to a shared cultural space (sic!). On the other, they argue that our ideological values are allegedly radically different. Referring to the fact that certain territories were under the rule of Poland22 and Lithuania23 for several centuries (and later, starting in 1569, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth),24 they attempt to provide a scientific basis for the concept of the gradual development of a “distinct” identity among the Christian Orthodox population of these lands. This identity, they claim, was “free” and fundamentally different from the “enslaved” identity of the East Slavic population. Similarly, they offer a tendentious interpretation of the linguistic question: During the time these lands were part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Ukrainian language supposedly developed in relative isolation from Russian.
Is that really the case? Assuming an unconditional difference between the peoples of Russia and Ukraine and categorizing all Ukrainian residents as Ukrainians is a gross error. The term “Ukrainians” itself did not acquire its modern ethnic meaning until the mid-19th century. Before that, it was more of a geographical term, referring to a person’s place of origin or residence. The explanation is quite simple: No independent state formations existed on the territory of modern-day “independent Ukraine” during the emergence of the modern system of nation-states following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, nor in the 19th century, when new and independent states like Greece, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, Germany, and Bulgaria appeared in Europe. Viewing the genesis of Ukraine through the classical lens of “nation-state” is pointless. Ukraine’s history is inseparable from the history of events in its territories, which at various times were part of other states. Similarly, it is more accurate to discuss not a cultural-ethnic dichotomy of “Ukrainians vs. Russians,” but “hinterland [okrainizirovannyye] Russians vs. Russians.”
The ideological construct of a so-called “Rus-Ukraine,” introduced by the Russophobe M. S. Hrushevsky and supported by chauvinists and xenophobes like V.B. Antonovych, D.I. Doroshenko, and M.I. Mikhnovsky in the early 20th century, is utterly baseless. At the time, their objective was to substantiate the continuity of “political Ukrainianism” from the ancient Rus state – a project nurtured under the watchful eye of Austrian oversight in Western Ukraine. The goal was to extend the history of “independent Ukraine” as far back into the past as possible, appropriate the legacy of Rus, and instill an anti-Russian self-consciousness among the population. This simulacrum could not have emerged without the involvement of outside stakeholders. The sole legitimate successor of the ancient Rus state is Russia, and Russians and Ukrainians are not merely fraternal peoples but one people.
The linguistic question is equally critical. Just as in the case of Taiwan with its linguistic games involving Putonghua, Guoyu, and Taiyu, [our] adversaries rhapsodize about not the beauty or melody of the Ukrainian language but its antagonism to Russian, deliberately tearing apart the fabric of centuries-old traditions. The genuine Little Russian [Malorossiyan] dialect, rooted in Church Slavonic literature, was much closer to Russian (not yet the modern literary language) until the 18th century. Numerous historical sources from Little Russia [Malorossiya] and Galicia from that era – such as Cossack orders of the Zaporozhian Host and the Lvov chronicles – still exist. Their language closely resembles the language used in documents from the time of the Romanov tsars Mikhail Fedorovich and Alexei Mikhailovich. This starkly highlights the superficiality of the theory underlying modern Ukrainian (movа), which is based on the “Poltava dialect” of T. Shevchenko.26 Equally flawed is the notion that the “real” Ukrainian language, supposedly found “somewhere out there” in Western Ukraine, must be as distinct from Russian as possible.
Were the Little Russians a discriminated group during the Russian Empire? Certainly not. In Russia, the inhabitants of Little Russia were recognized as an integral part of the titular nation, the Russian people.27 Their integration into the imperial social fabric was substantial. Legally, their political, cultural, and religious status was no different from that of Great Russians [Velikorossy]. Their opportunities for professional self-realization and career advancement are exemplified by prominent figures such as A.G. Razumovsky, K.G. Razumovsky, V.P. Kochubey, A.A. Bezborodko, field marshals and generals like I.V. Gudovich and his sons K.I. Gudovich and A.I. Gudovich, M.I. Dragomirov, and I.F. Paskevich (in the Patriotic War of 1812, 29% of the officers in the Russian Army were natives of Ukrainian provinces).28 Similarly, cultural and scientific luminaries included I.K. Karpenko-Karyi, N.I. Kostomarov, I.K. Kropyvnytskyi, P.K. Saksahanskyi, and M.S. Shchepkin.
For the entire 300 years that Little Russia-Ukraine was part of the Russian state, it was neither a colony nor an “oppressed nationality.”29 By contrast, among the diverse groups in the Russian Empire – referred to as inorodtsy (“non-Russians”) at the time – many proudly identified as “Russian Germans,” “Russian Poles,” “Russian Swedes,” “Russian Jews,” and “Russian Georgians.” Yet the phrase “Russian Ukrainians” objectively sounds absurd.
Could one imagine such a situation in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth or Austria-Hungary? On the contrary, Russians – in the broadest sense – were consistently treated as a deliberately discriminated minority. Galicia and Volhynia, today bastions of orthodox Russophobia associated with Bandera, Melnyk, Shukhevych, and torchlight marches celebrating Hitler’s collaborators, were not always this way. During their time under Austrian rule (and starting in 1867, under Austria-Hungary), following the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the late 18th century, there was a strong Russophile movement among Galician-Russian (Rusyn) public figures such as A.I. Dobryansky-Sachurov, A.V. Dukhnovych, and D.I. Zubrytsky.
These figures sought to achieve pan-Russian unity and align their efforts with Moscow to create a pan-Slavic world. Vienna, initially keen to prevent Russia’s influence in Galicia and Volhynia in the mid-19th century, eventually realized that it could exploit Ukrainian political agitation in the region to combat the very same Galician Russophiles under the “divide and rules” principle. Without the support of the Austrian administration, the Ukrainophile faction in Galicia and Volhynia would have stood no chance against forces aligned with Moscow.
As it prepared for World War I, Vienna decided to hasten the legitimization of Polish ethnographer F. Duchiński’s idea that the Russian people were not Slavs but of Finno-Ugric origin – an idea that still persists among the leadership of modern “independent Ukraine.” The goal was to infect Russia’s neighboring provinces with the virus of independence and Ukrainian separatism, provoking the secession of border regions from Russia. Emperor Franz Joseph’s court anticipated that, following a victory, these areas would fall under Austria-Hungary’s sphere of influence. Whether they became a satellite state of Vienna or achieved some form of expanded autonomy was of little importance. The primary task of Ukrainian nationalists was to make life a nightmare for the pro-Moscow faction in the region and to spread as far eastward as possible the notion of a fundamental difference between Little Russians and Great Russians, thereby inflicting maximum damage on Russia.
It was no coincidence that in August 1914, with financial support from the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, nationalist political émigrés established the so-called Union for the Liberation of Ukraine in Lvov (and later in Vienna, after Lvov was captured by Russian forces). This organization carried out minor intelligence tasks for the Central Powers. Although it provided little practical benefit, Austrian funding ensured the sustenance of staunch Russophobes and social Darwinists like D. Dontsov, Y. Melenevsky, and M. Zheleznyak, who dreamed of severing Ukraine from Russia. This is a direct historical precedent to modern gatherings of various “Smerdyakovs” under the auspices of “forums of free peoples of post-Russia” (designated a terrorist organization by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation) as well as pseudo-democratic protests in Hong Kong in 2019. In all these cases, the same familiar “umbrella” is present – the CIA, MI6, BND. Their methods of sowing division among their adversaries have remained unchanged for centuries.
A true nightmare for the Galician-Russian population was the Austrian terror during World War I. The repression included death sentences handed down by military courts, massacres orchestrated by Ukrainian nationalists with Vienna’s approval, and deportations to remote regions of Austria-Hungary. A significant portion of Russophile residents, arrested for their views, were sent to the infamous concentration camps of Terezin and Thalerhof. Similar horrors would later be experienced by Slavic and Jewish populations in Nazi-occupied territories of the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia during World War II.
While the Holocaust and the genocide of the peoples of the Soviet Union have been officially recognized and condemned from both international legal and historical perspectives, the ethnocide of the Galician-Russian population has yet to receive similar acknowledgment. Such recognition remains highly appropriate today, as it would honor the memory of the innocent victims of Austrian terror. Some of these victims, such as Father Maxim Gorlicki, who was executed in 1914, have been canonized as martyrs by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. Self-styled nationalism and its spiritual heirs must never feel a sense of impunity – whether on the battlefield, in the quiet of libraries and archives, or at pseudo-academic gatherings organized by entities like the “World Congress of Ukrainians,” which are often teeming with descendants of collaborators and Nazi war criminals.
Russia and China: Returning Lands to the Historical Homeland
RUSSIANS and Ukrainians can be likened to the Han Chinese living in different regions and provinces of China. Throughout China’s history, various eras, including the Warring States period (5th century BCE to 221 BCE) and the period of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms in the 10th century, saw the existence of separate states (sometimes dozens), often engaged in bloody internecine wars, sometimes instigated by external forces. The era of unification under the Song Dynasty from the 10th to the 12th centuries marked unprecedented progress across all spheres of life, representing a true revolution of the time that shaped Asia’s character until the 17th century. Chinese historians view all these historical stages as part of a continuous process of a unified Chinese nation, with the temporary division into semi-independent states seen as a historical anomaly.
Similarly, Russian historiography interprets the country’s past as a cohesive narrative: from the initial integration of principalities into Ancient Rus, through the period of feudal fragmentation, to the eventual unification of Rus into a centralized state led by Moscow. These stages provided the foundation for Russia’s entire civilizational development up to the present day.
For both Russia and China, this historical continuity and the centuries-long unified ethno-national lineage are inexhaustible sources of cultural heritage and tradition. They play a crucial role in shaping the societal identity of each nation.
Notably, despite the fundamentally different nature of the Ukrainian and Taiwanese issues, Western narratives have merged the two into a single framework.30 This convergence further underscores their artificial origins, fostered by external destabilizing forces, primarily the US and the European Union. However, such reckless ventures detached from reality inevitably end in military failures, and rebellious provinces ultimately return to their home states.
The return of historically Russian lands – territories lost due to political missteps during the upheavals of the late 1980s and early 1990s – is no more “criminal” than the annexation of East Germany by West Germany in 1990. At that time, the historical process was invoked to justify the reunification of the German nation. In truth, however, there was no genuine “unification” of Germany. No referendums were held, no joint constitution was drafted, and no unified military or currency was created. East Germany was simply absorbed by its neighbor.
Did anyone condemn this precedent of irredentism, which contradicted the principle of the inviolability of borders enshrined in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act? On the contrary, the world applauded. Yet, whether the East Germans genuinely desired such unification or were manipulated into wanting it remains an open question even today. The economic realities, mentality, and even language of East and West Germans had diverged over the 45 years following World War II – arguably more so than the differences today between the Chinese mainland population and that of Taiwan, or between the residents of Smolensk and the Dnepr region. Yet, these differences were conveniently overlooked – they were the “right kind of differences.”
In light of this, it is worth noting that Russians differ from the people living in Ukraine no more than residents of Poland’s Greater Poland Voivodeship differ from those of the Pomeranian Voivodeship, or residents of North Rhine-Westphalia differ from those of Thuringia in Germany. Moreover, the differences between Schleswig-Holstein and Bavaria in Germany, Normandy and Occitania in France, or even the Basque Country and Catalonia in Spain, or between England and Northern Ireland in the UK, are far more pronounced – linguistically, culturally, and ethnically – than those between the residents of Pskov and Kharkov Provinces.
A Few Important Conclusions
THE points presented above allow us to draw several conclusions regarding the relationship between national identity and political choice. These conclusions are quite clear:
I. The classic principle of “divide and rule,” long employed by Western colonial powers, has brought untold suffering and calamities to the world. It serves as a source of numerous ethnic and sociocultural conflicts, as well as pervasive economic inequality. This was true in the past, and it continues to be the case today.
II. The modern strategy of inciting interethnic or interracial hostility often involves constructing a pseudo-national identity for a particular ethnic group to separate it from the state-forming people. This is precisely the approach Washington and its satellites employ against Russia, China, and other nations. Taiwan is an organic and inseparable part of the greater Chinese space – a mere administrative unit of the People’s Republic of China. Attempts instigated from overseas to fabricate a Taiwanese statehood, nation, or language are artificial and, as a result, unsustainable.
III. Ukraine today faces a fundamental choice: to be with Russia or to disappear entirely from the map of the world. Ukrainians are not required to sacrifice “body and soul” for their freedom. Instead, Ukrainians should temper their pride in their “otherness,” abandon their opposition to the pan-Russian project, and cast out the demons of political Ukrainianism.
Our task is to help the residents of Little Russia and Novorossiya31 build a Ukraine free from the delusions of “Ukrainianism.” It is essential to firmly establish in public consciousness that Russia is indispensable to Ukraine – culturally, linguistically, and politically.
If, however, so-called Ukraine persists in following an aggressive Russophobic course, it will vanish from the map of the world, just as the puppet state of Manchukuo, artificially created by militarist Japan as a proxy force on Chinese territory, once disappeared.
IV. Galicia and Volhynia, today’s “breeding ground” for political Ukrainianism, were once home to powerful public forces aligned with Russia. During World War I, these forces were subjected to genocide. In light of the Russophobia observed in these regions today, the events of the early 20th century demand an impartial historical assessment.
V.Russians and Ukrainians are one people. Any attempts to drive a wedge between them are historically baseless and criminal. Figures like Vyhovsky, Mazepa, Skoropadsky, and Bandera – all of whom sought to divide the Russian nation at various points in history – ultimately failed in their endeavors. They met their demise against the wall of pan-Russian unity. And so it will be today.
NOTES:
1 Bulgakov M.A. Cobraniye sochineniy v 10 t., Vol. 1, Мoscow: Golos, 1995, 464 pp., p. 302.
2 Simmel G. The Sociology of Georg Simmel (translated, edited and with an introduction by Kurt H. Wolff). Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1950, p. 162.
3 Simoniya A.A. “Massovyy iskhod bengaltsev-rokhindzha iz Myanmy: kto vinovat i chto delat?” Yugo-Vostochnaya Aziya: Aktualnyye problemy razvitiya, No. 36 (2017), p. 125.
4 Yefremova K.A. “Krizis vokrug rokhindzha: natsionalnyye, regionalnyye i globalnyye aspekty,” Yugo-Vostochnaya Aziya: Aktualnyye problemy razvitiya, Vol. 1, No. 1 (38) (2018).
5 Simoniya A.A. “K pyatoy godovshchine massovogo iskhoda rokhindzhey iz Myanmy,” RAN, INION, Institut vostokovedeniya, Rossiya i musulmanskiy mir, No. 4 (326) (2022), p. 96.
6 Dikarev A.D., Lukin A.V. “Tayvanskaya natsiya: ot mifa k realnosti?” Sravnitelnaya politika, Vol. 21, No. 1. (2021), p. 123.
7 Golovachev V.Ts. Ostrov imyanem Fromoza. Etnopoliticheskaya istoriya Tayvanya XVII-XXI vv., Institut vostokovedeniya RAN. Moscow, 2024, p. 208.
8 Ibid., p. 211.
9 Ibid., pp. 224-225.
10 Kaimova A.S. “Problemy interpretatsii ponyatiya tayvanskaya identichnost,” Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta, Seriya 13. Vostokovedeniye, No. 2 (2013), p. 32.
11 “Posol Kitaya v Rossii Chzhan Khankhuey opublikoval v rossiyskoy gazete Argumenty i fakty statyu ‘Deystvitelno li Natsionalnyy fond podderzhki demokratii SSHA yavlyayetsya demokraticheskim?’ ” October 2, 2024, https://ru.china-embassy.gov.cn/rus/sghd/202410/t20241001_11501824.htm?ysclid=m3orlrbqbe232108590
12 “The National Endowment for Democracy: What It Is and What It Does,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The People’s Republic of China, August 9, 2024, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/wjbxw/202408/t20240809_11468618.html
13 Kaimova A.S., Denisov I.Ye. “Status Tayvanya i evolyutsiya tayvanskoy identichnosti,” Sravnitelnaya politika, Vol. 13, No. 1-2 (2022), p. 123
14 “Perminova V.A. Istoricheskaya pamyat na Tayvane i yeye vliyaniye na otnosheniya Tokio i Taybeya pri prezidente Ma Intszyu (2008-2016 gg.),” Yaponskiye issledovaniya, No. 3 (2020), p. 119.
15 “Almost nobody in Hong Kong under 30 identifies as ‘Chinese,’ ” The Economist, August 26, 2019, https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2019/08/26/almost-nobody-in-hong-kong-under-30-identifies-as-chinese
16 see [12].
17 Daly M. “House backs 3 bills to support protests in Hong Kong,” Associated Press, October 16, 2019, https://apnews.com/article/4d6d913d37ef44e4ad83dd4f32c14cf7
18 Düben B.A. “‘There is no Ukraine’: Fact-Checking the Kremlin’s Version of Ukrainian History,” The LSE International History Blog, July 1, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/02/10/putin-likes-talk-about-russians-ukrainians-one-people-heres-deeper-history
19 Yekelchyk S. “Sorry, Mr. Putin. Ukraine and Russia are Not the Same Country,” Politico, June 2, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/02/06/ukraine-russia-not-same-country-putin-ussr-00005461
20 Popson N. “Ukrainian National Identity: The ‘Other Ukraine,’ ” https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/ukrainian-national-identity-the-other-ukraine
21 Mankoff J. “Putin likes to talk about Russians and Ukrainians as ‘one people.’ Here’s the deeper history,” The Washington Post, October 2, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/02/10/putin-likes-talk-about-russians-ukrainians-one-people-heres-deeper-history
22 After the death of the last influential Galicia-Volyn prince Yuri-Boleslav II in 1340, the Polish king Casimir III added the monarchical domain “Prince of Rus” to his title (Grigoryev M.S. et al. Istoriya Ukrainy: monografiya. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 2022, p. 219).
23 The conquest of Red (Galician) Rus by the Polish king Casimir the Great and the calling of Jagiełło to the Polish throne led to unification with the Poles under one supreme power. (Kulish P.A. Otpadeniye Malorossii ot Polshi (1340-1654). Vol. 1. Moscow: Universitetskaya tipografiya, Strastn. bulv., 1888, p. 4).
24 In 1349-1352, Casimir III managed to take over Galician Rus, and Volyn was then captured by Lithuania. A long struggle for the Galicia-Volyn lands began between Poland and Lithuania. The struggle for Volyn ended only in 1366. Volyn remained with the Lithuanians, except for Kholm and Belz, which went to Poland (Istoriya Polshi v 3-kh tomakh. Vol. 1., ed. V.D. Korolyuk, I.S. Miller, P.N. Tretyakov. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1954, p. 105).
25 Under the second partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1793, Russia received Belarus and Right-Bank Ukraine, and after the third partition (1795) – the western part of Volyn. At the same time, Russia did not seize any of the ethnographically Polish lands. In general, the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth led to the reunification of most Ukrainian lands within the Russian Empire, which objectively corresponded to the interests of the Ukrainian people (Istoriya Polshi v 3-kh tomakh. Vol. 1., ed. V.D. Korolyuk, I.S. Miller, P.N. Tretyakov. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1954, pp. 341, 354).
26 The author of the lines “Muscovites are strangers, it’s hard to live with them, you can’t cry with them, you can’t talk to them” (Shevchenko T. Povne zibrannya tvoriv u 12-I tomakh. Kiev: Naukova dumka, 2003, Vol. 6, pp. 300-301) is considered by a number of researchers to have been a Ukrainian nationalist and a xenophobe (Belyakov S.S. “Taras Shevchenko kak ukrainskiy natsionalist,” Voprosy natsionalizma, No. 2 (18) (2014), p. 102).
27 Grigoryev M.S. et al. Istoriya Ukrainy: monografiya. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 2022, p. 219.
28 Smirnov A.A. “Prizyv derzhavy,” Rodina. Federal’nyy vypusk, No. 4 (419) (2019).
29 Ulyanov N.I. Proiskhozhdeniye ukrainskogo separatizma. New York, 1966, p. 3.
30 Afghanistan 2001-2021: Evaluating the Withdrawal and US Policies – Part I. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs. House of Representatives. One hundred seventeenth Congress. Second session. September 13, 2021, Serial No. 117-73, p. 56, https://www.congress.gov/117/chrg/CHRG-117hhrg45496/CHRG-117hhrg45496.pdf
31 Novorossiya (New Russia) is the historical name of an area along the northern Black Sea coast that Russia acquired from Turkey by a series of peace treaties in the 18th and early 19th centuries. – Trans.