From Izvestia, Sept. 10, 2024, p. 3. Complete text:
The 2024 single day of voting has ended, and with it a major electoral cycle that has been not only complex in a number of respects, but also unique in terms of the general political context. Its leitmotif has been the SMO and its impact on all areas of life in Russian society – from politics and the economy to the system of public relations and the set of values.
The current specifics of Russian elections are predetermined by the new normal resulting from citizens’ adaptation to the present-day reality shaped by the SMO on the one hand, and the government’s successful efforts to maintain stability and acceptable social standards (in the opinion of the majority of the population), on the other. These include not implementing shocking scenarios, indexing social benefits [and] maintaining the volume of state investments in major infrastructure projects.
The new normal is cementing the consolidation of society around the goals and objectives of the SMO amid unprecedented external pressure on Russia.
A new trend has emerged, whereby mass electoral behavior has generally become more conservative and loyalist. This provides additional advantages to the ruling establishment and its candidates, since voters see their support as a guarantee of victory on the battlefront and stability on the home front. They also believe that even raising the question of changes at this stage is unnecessary and harmful.
What we are seeing is most likely a deferred choice. In other words, in the future, when the goals and objectives of the SMO are achieved or the old normal is partially restored (only partially), a sociologically significant number of voters will make new requests and possibly demands of the ruling authorities, and turn to alternative electoral proposals by opposition candidates. But right now, “rallying around the flag” to the maximum degree possible is as necessary as it is inevitable.
Therefore, patriotic consolidation, socioeconomic stability and the results achieved on local agendas are the main factors in all successful election campaigns this year – from gubernatorial to municipal.
What conclusions can be drawn from the outcome of the 2024 single day of voting? First, the system’s stability and resilience: It has not broken down or cracked, even though the blows from the outside that it has been sustaining and will continue constantly in the foreseeable future are palpable enough.
Second, the political representation trend today is that the maximum possible number of citizens have an opportunity to find “their” candidate.
Third, participants in the electoral process are gradually transitioning from political incantations to down-to-earth, much-needed plans, projects, ideas, [and] actions. The productivity of political actors is increasing, so to speak, and this is precisely what is influencing the electorate’s mood, as is the fact that the system has fulfilled one of its main functions: It has protected the people, met its obligations, and set a course toward rapidly [and] proactively building up mechanisms and amounts of support across a broad spectrum of areas. This shows not only [the system’s] socially oriented nature, but also its high economic safety margin. The process of the Russian economy going “belly up” – eagerly awaited by the country’s critics – is being postponed indefinitely, and the recent Eastern Economic Forum [in Vladivostok; see Vol. 76, No. 36, pp. 3-9 – Trans.] has actually called into question the credibility of such forecasts: Our economy was seriously “injured” but survived – the recovery process is plain to see. And the election results bear out these conclusions.
At the same time, it should not be forgotten that in crisis situations, when all is said and done, society can react to hot-button issues in two ways: with social upheavals or a so-called deferred choice. Society has opted for the latter: We will save the country first and deal with problems later. Voters have postponed many questions for later, including those that are awkward for the authorities.
Many of Russia’s foes were looking forward to social destabilization, but citizens, both collectively (through electoral procedures) and personally (everyone for themselves), decided that [they] would deal with problems (numerous and sometimes rather serious) when the intensity of military and political pressure from the outside decreased. This has become a modern form of civic awareness. Like it or not, this is precisely what should encourage the authorities to preemptively solve those problems – and not with a Band-Aid approach, but through accelerated development: After all, questions will be asked sooner or later, and a timely response to them will be of the essence.
Separately, it is essential to look at the configuration of the [political] party landscape, which, on the one hand, is shaping the current political situation, and on the other, is reflecting domestic processes. Several important points need to be made. First, the nonestablishment opposition and the political institutions that have failed to respond to society’s patriotic demand – simply put, [those who] wished their country ill – have left the electoral field.
Second, the ongoing crisis of the left. I believe that the Communists made an abortive attempt to regain their status as the country’s main opposition force. They have failed to do so, which has come as a serious signal in the context of preparations for the 2026 Duma [election] campaign: The RFCP itself is in fact creating all the prerequisites for losing its political influence, losing a significant number of seats in parliament and finally becoming one of the opposition parties, of which there are quite a few.
Third, A Just Russia – Patriots – For the Truth have failed to find its niche. It has remained neither “white” nor “red.” [The party’s] ill-defined position, the ambiguity and incoherence of its message, [and] the absence of a line responding to the electorate’s needs and demands – all of that is a path to stagnation, with no opportunities to grow or consolidate its electoral base.