Abstract. This article examines how the Russian Federation and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have perceived each other during the process of instituting and developing of military-political interaction since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1990.

The establishment of bilateral military dialogue took place amid a fundamental change in the priorities of the USSR’s foreign policy starting in the second half of the 1980s, then the collapse of the country and Russia’s assumption of its obligations as its legal successor of the Soviet Union. Moscow aimed to de-ideologize and abandon the principles of the Cold War period and instead establish strong ties with the countries of the “Western camp,” which put the Republic of Korea among a number of promising partners in Asia. Seoul perceived Russia as a way to exert a beneficial influence on the DPRK and increase its own importance in the Asian region.

The further development of military-political relations showed that both sides intended to systematize the dialogue in this field. However, they did not envision such significant results as, for example, speaking from coordinated positions on key Northeast Asia security issues or fixing clear long-term goals in bilateral agreements on military cooperation.

Bearing the above circumstances in mind, the author has analyzed the importance that the countries attached to the military-political component of bilateral relations, whether there were grounds to expect the formation of a proper level of trust between them in this area, and whether there is a possibility of developing full-fledged military ties in the future, which are currently in an almost frozen state due to the influence of external factors.

After Mikhail Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in 1985, the doctrinal and politico-philosophical foundations of Soviet foreign policy gradually began to change, leading to the formation of the so-called “new political thinking.”1 One expression of the principles of this thinking in Soviet policy was reaching out to an ideological opponent – the Republic of Korea (ROK), one of the US’s closest allies in the Asia-Pacific region – and establishing diplomatic relations with it in 1990. It was expected that both sides “would develop interaction to strengthen stability and ensure further prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region”2 in line with a peaceful foreign policy, gradually transitioning into a broad cooperation format for addressing regional and international military-political issues.

The process of establishing and developing military-political cooperation (MPC) between Russia and the ROK can be divided into the following stages, each with its own characteristics in terms of the level and nature of interaction: (1) the “pre-Russian” period (September 1990-December 1991); (2) the period of making ties institutional (December 1991-1999); (3) the period of stable dialogue (2000-2013); (4) stagnation and the freezing of contacts (2014-2024).

The “Pre-Russian” Period of MPC (September 1990-December 1991)

The “pre-Russian” period in the context of establishing a military-political dialogue with the ROK was characterized by the Soviet leadership’s desire to quickly achieve “new international recognition.” The emergence of military-political ties with Seoul demonstrated Moscow’s firm willingness to break down the wall of distrust between the communist and Western ideological blocs.

For the ROK, the key objectives were to strengthen its position in Northeast Asia by developing relations with one of the two superpowers3 and to enhance its stance in its confrontation with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Moscow’s distancing from direct involvement in conflicts under Gorbachev allowed South Korea’s leadership to shift its attention from Pyongyang to an alternative strategy for consolidating its position in East Asia and to propose full-fledged relations, including in the area of security. The South Koreans achieved their goal, gaining, in particular, mechanisms for military-political consultations with Moscow, while the DPRK lost its monopoly on exerting favorable influence over Russia.

Both countries took organizational steps to establish military-political contacts, the main result of which was the opening of military attaché offices in Seoul and Moscow in September and October 1991, respectively.4

The Period of Making MPC Institutional (December 1991-1999)

After becoming the legal successor of the USSR in December 1991, Russia continued its course of developing a constructive military-political dialogue with the ROK, which gradually took on clearer contours. This was facilitated by Seoul’s complete satisfaction with the “emphatically unilateral orientation of the Kremlin toward accelerating cooperation with the Republic of Korea”5 alongside Moscow’s parallel policy of the “inevitable distancing of Russia from the DPRK.”6

However, Russia and the ROK appear to have perceived the significance of their military-political ties differently. The Russian leadership relied on Soviet experience, believing that without strengthening military dialogue, there was little justification for expecting the successful elevation of relations to higher levels. Russia emphasized that there was no “deep-rooted historical distrust” between the two countries that could have served as a fundamental obstacle to fostering friendly cooperation. On the contrary, Russia was able to point to a history of good-neighborly relations, which, in the pre-Soviet period, was characterized by a shared struggle against the common national security threat of militarist Japan.

However, the collapse of the Soviet Union was perceived in South Korean society as the defeat of communist ideology and its primary proponent. Combined with the fact that for several decades, the USSR had been an ideological and military adversary of the ROK, this did not foster a belief within South Korea’s military elite in the feasibility or necessity of establishing fundamentally strong military-political ties with Russia. Seoul limited itself to demonstrating a positive attitude toward developing contacts and reciprocal visits of defense officials, while also declaring its intentions to jointly strengthen regional stability.

The visit to Russia on July 7, 1992, by First Deputy Chairman of the ROK’s Joint Chiefs of Staff General Song Eung-seop, marked the beginning of a regular high-level military dialogue. Between 1994 and 1999, four meetings of defense ministers took place, accompanied by the signing of formal military exchange plans for the following one to two years, which represented only a modest outcome for negotiations at such a level.

A notable event in this series was the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on Russian-South Korean Cooperation in Military Exchanges on November 4, 1996, in Moscow by Russian Defense Minister I.N. Rodionov and South Korean Defense Minister Kim Dong-jin. The memorandum outlined concrete plans to expand programs for training military specialists, organizing military conferences, and conducting maneuvers. From the South Korean perspective, it was intended to “increase pressure on the DPRK and prevent Russia from taking steps to restore special relations with Pyongyang.”7 Thus, there is a clear link between Seoul’s approach to developing MPC with Russia and the changing nature of Russia’s relations with the DPRK. In the mid-1990s, as soon as the Russian leadership demonstrated an intention to establish a dialogue with the North – such as State Duma Speaker G.N. Seleznev’s 1996 visit to Pyongyang and other events8 – South Korea responded by ostentatiously expressing its willingness to deepen military ties.

As a continuation of the aforementioned memorandum, during a visit to Moscow by a South Korean delegation led by Deputy Minister of Defense Lee Jong-rin in November 1997, the Agreement on Military-Technical Cooperation was signed.9 Mutual port visits by naval vessels began in 1993. However, the first-ever visit by Russian warships to the ROK, which took place on August 31, 1993, was only made possible by Russia’s flexibility and understanding of the need to consider South Korean public sentiment. This included fulfilling a promise by the Pacific Fleet Command to apologize to the families of the victims of the 1983 downing of KAL 007 and to state that such tragedies should never happen again.10

Almost immediately after the initiation of delegation exchanges, military-technical cooperation (MTC) issues began to be discussed. Amid Russia’s worsening economic situation, the South Korean market was attractive for arms and military equipment exports, providing opportunities to secure contracts and maintain the scientific and industrial potential of Russian defense enterprises. Seoul was interested in acquiring “up-to-date military hardware and space technologies that cannot be obtained elsewhere.”11 South Korea also viewed Russian arms purchases as a means of increasing the DPRK’s vulnerability by strengthening its own military capabilities.

In October 1992, during a visit to Seoul by a Russian military delegation led by First Deputy Minister of Defense A. Kokoshin,12 the South Korean leadership first expressed its intention to conduct a trial purchase of Russian weapons. As soon as the US learned of the potential deliveries of MiG‑29 fighters and S‑300 air defense systems to South Korea – systems capable of effectively competing with their American counterparts, the F‑16 and the Patriot missile system – the US administration immediately blocked the deal.13 Nevertheless, a military-technical component of cooperation between the two countries eventually emerged, though largely artificially, as a mechanism for Russia to repay Soviet-era debt to South Korea.

Russia first proposed this approach during Deputy Prime Minister A. Shokhin’s visit to Seoul on August 24-26, 1993.14 In July 1995, an agreement was signed on the partial repayment of the Soviet debt, which at that time stood at $1.47 billion, through the export of military goods to South Korea. Ultimately, the project, known as “Brown Bear-1,” was agreed upon with modest parameters that did not threaten the American monopoly on the South Korean arms market in terms of volume and inventory. The credited amount was $457 million, covering the supply of military equipment and raw materials, including nonferrous metals, with $213.6 million allocated specifically for weaponry.15 By 2000, Russia had delivered to South Korea 33 T‑80U main battle tanks, two T‑80UK command tanks, 33 BMP‑3 infantry fighting vehicles, 33 BTR‑80A armored personnel carriers, 70 Metis‑M anti-tank guided missiles, more than a thousand rounds of ammunition for them, and several dozen Igla man-portable air defense systems.

However, Seoul did not have plans to field Russian military equipment into active service, so the tanks and BMPs were initially used only for personnel training at military test ranges.16 This indicates that the South Korean Ministry of Defense had no original intention of reequipping its armed forces with Russian hardware. Nevertheless, importing Russian weapons allowed South Korea to acquire “those [weapon systems] that North Korea was currently using and was planning to purchase in the future.”17

It is also necessary to mention cases in the mid-1990s when, under the guise of MTC, deals of questionable legal integrity were conducted. These included the sale of the aircraft-carrying cruisers Minsk and Novorossiysk under contracts between the Russian Ministry of Defense and South Korea’s Young Distribution Corp, dated October 6, 1994, for $4.583 million and $4.314 million, respectively.18 The ships, decommissioned just 15 and 11 years after their commissioning, were effectively sold for a pittance. South Korea also acquired 32 other military vessels of various classes and several hundred T‑54 and T‑55 tanks.

The Period of Stable MPC (2000-2013)

In 2000, Seoul put forward a purely political initiative to implement the second phase of the “Brown Bear” project. The South Korean National Security Council (NSC) sought to improve the military-political atmosphere of bilateral relations and mitigate diplomatic tensions arising from Seoul’s cancellation – under US pressure – of a deal to purchase three Varshavyanka-class submarines from Russia for $1 billion that same year.19 During this phase, an agreement worth $534 million was reached, with $267 million allocated to military goods deliveries as part of debt repayment. Between 2003 and 2005, Russia exported to South Korea over 150 Metis‑M anti-tank guided missiles, 37 BMP‑3s, two T‑80U main battle tanks, three Murena-class air-cushioned landing craft, seven Ka‑32 helicopters for the Air Force, and 23 Il‑103 training aircraft.20

The armored vehicles delivered through both phases of the “Brown Bear” project (80 T‑80U tanks, 70 BMP‑3s, and 33 BTR‑80As) were integrated into the 3rd Mechanized Brigade of the South Korean Armed Forces in 2004, significantly enhancing its combat capability at the time. However, the deliveries were relatively small in volume, and given that the ROK’s military operates over 2,200 tanks, 500 infantry fighting vehicles, and 2,500 armored personnel carriers,21 they had little impact on the country’s overall defense capability.

The results of MTC between 1995 and 2005 indicate that Seoul successfully leveraged the opportunity to acquire military hardware from one of the world’s leading arms and military equipment producers under favorable conditions, particularly considering that Russian equipment was more advanced than the outdated systems in the South Korean military. Some South Korean researchers have even limited their assessment to stating that “the supply of weapons under the ‘Brown Bear’ program helped South Korea familiarize itself with the communist armament system.”22

It must be acknowledged that by 2005, no long-term prospects for MTC had materialized. A certain degree of responsibility for this lies with Russia, which was not always able to provide timely and effective after-sales service and maintenance for equipment.23

However, the main obstacle appears to be that the South Korean leadership prioritized the strengthening and inviolability of its military alliance with the US. The pro-American political lobby in Seoul effectively ruled out any possibility of large-scale arms import contracts with any supplier other than American corporations, occasionally making exceptions for certain NATO members.24

In almost all international tenders held by South Korea for modernizing its armed forces in which Russia participated, American companies emerged as winners, despite Moscow’s more competitive pricing. A telling, though not unique, example was the 2002 selection of Boeing’s F‑15K at a cost of $4.4 billion over the Su‑35, which cost less than $3 billion, in South Korea’s FX fighter procurement program.25

After 2006, attempts to agree on a third phase of the “Brown Bear” project failed. Disagreements over the selection of military products to be included in the project ultimately reinforced negativity toward acquiring any finished Russian military equipment among South Korean Ministry of Defense officials.26

The interaction between the two countries within mechanisms intended to develop effective ways to enhance MPC was also far from ideal. These mechanisms included annual meetings of the Defense Policy Working Group and sessions between chiefs of staff, meetings of the Joint Committee on MTC, consultations between branches of the armed forces, and scientific-practical conferences of military experts, among others. While these contacts were regular, they primarily focused on external aspects of bilateral ties (such as establishing communication lines and creating an information exchange system) and were largely declarative in nature, lacking concrete joint plans in the military domain. As a result, none of the five meetings of defense ministers held after 2000 resulted in substantive agreements aimed at long-term cooperation.

Essentially, military-political interaction between Russia and South Korea functioned as an ancillary element of the broader bilateral relationship and did not resemble a genuine effort by the two countries to elevate their partnership to a strategic level.

For instance, in September 2008, following South Korean President Lee Myung-bak’s visit to Moscow, it was announced that both sides had “expressed their determination to elevate bilateral interaction to the level of a strategic partnership … and agreed to continue cooperation in the military domain, including the development of delegation exchanges and military-technical cooperation.”27 Two years later, the Joint Statement issued after Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to Seoul in November 2010 stated that the two sides had “reviewed bilateral relations to further develop them in the spirit of strategic partnership.… Welcoming progress in military-technical cooperation … [they] agreed to continue collaboration in this area.”28

As I.A. Novikov emphasizes, “a strategic partnership is a long-term interaction … implying a convergence of interests in vital areas such as security and defense.”29 In this context, the brief and general mentions of military cooperation in statements by Russian and South Korean leaders indicate that this crucial aspect of bilateral relations lacked substantive depth. Consequently, the talk of a strategic partnership was largely diplomatic rhetoric.

In this regard, it is also worth noting the lack of proper attention from South Korean counterparts to the Moscow Conference on International Security, organized by the Russian Ministry of Defense since 2012. Even when invitations were accepted, South Korea’s level of representation was very low, typically limited to staff from the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses or the leadership of the military attaché’s office in Moscow, with no public speeches. This effectively meant that Seoul avoided discussing its defense leadership’s stance on key military-political issues raised by the Russian side.

The Period of Stagnation and the Freezing of MPC (2014-2024)

South Korea consistently and sensitively responded to the deterioration of US-Russia relations, which inevitably led to restrictions or even the freezing of MPC between Russia and South Korea. A telling example was the cancellation of a planned visit to Seoul by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu in March to early April 2014, which was supposed to follow up on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to South Korea in November 2013. After Crimea’s incorporation into Russia in 2014, the South Korean Ministry of Defense requested to postpone the visit – evidently seeking to avoid accusations from its main ally of deepening military cooperation with an “aggressor state.” This predictable move prompted the Russian Defense Ministry to cancel the trip altogether. No meetings between the two countries’ defense ministers have taken place since.

At the same time, following Crimea’s accession to Russia, Seoul distanced itself from participating in sanctions pressure on Moscow, despite persistent calls from the US and other Western countries to “show solidarity.” This stance reflected South Korea’s desire to maintain and expand its economic presence in Russia, as well as to preserve a potential channel for indirect communication with Pyongyang through Moscow.

After the start of the Special Military Operation in Ukraine in 2022, the Republic of Korea could no longer maintain a neutral position and joined the [anti-Russian] sanctions. Russia, in turn added South Korea to its list of unfriendly states.30 At the same time, Seoul took advantage of the situation to strengthen its position in the global arms market. Several Eastern European countries used the conflict in Ukraine to modernize their armed forces by transferring outdated Soviet equipment to Ukraine and purchasing modern South Korean weapons in return.31 In 2022, South Korean defense companies signed major deals, including the sale of up to 648 K9 155-mm self-propelled howitzers, 980 K2 main battle tanks, 48 FA‑50 light attack aircraft, and 288 K239 multiple launch rocket systems to Poland alone. As a result, South Korea received a record $17 billion in revenue from foreign arms sales in 2022.

In summary, the specific nature of the military-political dialogue between Russia and the ROK and its complete dependence on the trajectory of US-Russia relations do not provide grounds for us to expect an increase in the significance of military-political ties in the future of the overall bilateral relationship. A telling indication of this is the latest military-related document signed between Russia and South Korea – the 2021 Agreement of Defense Cooperation33 – which does not outline any meaningful plans for military-political or military-technical ties, limiting itself to vague phrases such as “exchange of experience” and “exchange of views.”

At the same time, Seoul clearly does not wish to completely sever ties with Russia, as it has refrained from applying most sanctions-related restrictions. The Russian Foreign Ministry considers South Korea “one of the friendliest among unfriendly countries,”34 acknowledging its attempts to maintain flexibility in its approach while emphasizing that “stabilizing the situation in the region and guaranteeing the security of the Russian Far East is impossible without taking into account Russia’s position and direct involvement in inter-Korean settlement efforts.”35 Moscow also asserts that Russia’s participation in the modernization of the security architecture in East Asia is indispensable.

It seems increasingly evident that South Korea should recognize the necessity of deepening the military-political dialogue with Russia in the interest of maintaining stability and predictability on the Korean Peninsula, especially given repeated statements from the US about the existence of a military option for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue.36

If Moscow considers steps to restore MPC with Seoul, it should proceed strictly based on principled and pragmatic agreements that offer Russia clear long-term benefits. Experience shows that the approach of signing non-binding memoranda of understanding or largely framework agreements, which have yielded little in terms of tangible military-political dividends, should be avoided. The most effective strategy for building military-political relations focused on a good-neighborly future would be to rely on political realism, which, as V.I. Dobrenkov aptly notes, “soberly assesses the balance between the desirable and the possible, does not succumb to intimidation by external forces, and is not lulled by self-imposed myths.”37

The military alliance between Seoul and Washington remains the most significant source of discord between Russia and South Korea. However, given the shifting global order toward a more multipolar structure, in which Seoul may gain greater foreign policy autonomy from Washington, this author believes it is important to continue viewing South Korea as a potential partner. In the future, Seoul could be invited to engage in a joint search for shared, fundamentally significant military-political objectives, the achievement of which would, in turn, require intensive coordination of efforts.

NOTES:

1. Polynov M.F. M.S. Gorbachev i novoye politicheskoye myshleniye: istoki, osnovnyye idei, rezul’taty [M.S. Gorbachev and the new political thinking: origins, main ideas, results], Noveyshaya istoriya Rossii, No. 2 (4) (2012), pp. 136-152.

2. Dogovor ob osnovakh otnosheniy Rossiyskoy Federatsii i Respubliki Koreya [Treaty on the fundamentals of relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Korea], Diplomaticheskiy vestnik, No. 23-24 (1992).

3. Sukhinin V.Ye. Rossiysko-yuzhnokoreyskim otnosheniyam chetvert’ veka: nekotoryye otsenki [Russian-South Korean relations are a quarter-century old: some assessments], in Koreyskiy poluostrov v epokhu peremen [The Korean Peninsula in an era of change], Moscow: IDV RAN,2016, p. 32.

4. 유영철. 한-러 군사 협력 30 주년 주요 성과와 과제. 대외학술활동시리즈 [Yu Yeong-chul. The main results and tasks of 30 years of military-political cooperation between Russia and the Republic of Korea: a series of scientific papers], 한국국방연구원, December 16, 2020, 7쪽, https://dl.nanet.go.kr/search/searchInnerDetail.do?controlNo=NONB12021000011436#none  (retrieved on February 11, 2024).

5. Vorontsov A.V. Evolyutsiya politiki SSHA, KNR, Yaponii i Rossii v otnoshenii Koreyskogo poluostrova na rubezhe vekov [The evolution of the policies of the USA, China, Japan and Russia toward the Korean Peninsula at the turn of the century], in Koreya na rubezhe vekov: sb. nauch. tr. [Korea at the turn of the century: collection of scientific papers.], Moscow: IV RAN, 2002, pp. 251-314.

6. Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii (utverzhdena 23.04.1993) [Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (approved on April 23, 1993)], Diplomaticheskiy vestnik., No. 1-2 (1993), pp. 3-23.

7. 한러 군사협력 양해각서 [Korea-Russia Memorandum of Understanding], National archives of Korea, https://www.archives.go.kr/next/search/listSubjectDescrip-tion.do?id=002931&pageFlag=&sitePage= (retrieved on January 18, 2024).

8. Sukhinin V.Ye., Zakharova L.V. Tekushcheye sostoyaniye otnosheniy mezhdu Rossiyey i KNDR [Current state of relations between Russia and the DPRK], in Rossiysko-koreyskiye otnosheniya v formate parallel’noy istorii [Russian-Korean relations in the format of parallel history],Moscow: Aspekt press, 2022, p. 570.

9. Savel’yev R.V. Rossiysko-koreyskoye voyennoye sotrudnichestvo: nastoyashcheye i budushcheye [Russian-Korean military cooperation: present and future], in Problemy koreyskogo poluostrova i interesy Rossii [Problems of the Korean Peninsula and Russia’s interests.], Мoscow, 1998, p. 46.

10. «크렘린 무명용사 묘에 헌화하는 최초의 한국군 장성 보며 전율 느껴». 초대 주러시아 해군무관윤종구 제독의 한·러 군사교류 비망록[“When I watch the first South Korean generals laying flowers at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier near the Kremlin, it takes my breath away.” Notes by the first military attaché of the Republic of Korea in Russia Yun Jung-gu on Korean-Russian military exchanges], 월간조선, 2016, 년 7월호, http://monthly.chosun.com/client/news/viw.asp?nNewsNumb=201607100030 (retrieved on January 9, 2024).

11. Ahn Se Hyun.“Understanding Russian-South Korean arms trade. A nontraditional security approach?” Armed Forces & Society, No. 35 (3) (2009), pp. 421-436.

12. Sergounin A.A., Subbotin S.V. “Sino-Russian military-technical cooperation: a Russian view,” in ed. Ian Anthony, Russia and the Arms Trade, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 195.

13. See [11].

14. Kalashnikova N. Vizit Aleksandra Shokhina v Yuzhnuyu Koreyu [Alexander Shokhin’s visit to South Korea], Kommersant, August 26, 1993, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/57654 (retrieved on February 7, 2024).

15. 서종열. 돈 대신 받은 무기, ‘불곰사업’을 아시나요? [So Jeongyeol. Weapons instead of money; do you know about the Brown Bear project?], 글로벌이코노믹, March 13, 2022, https://www.g-enews.com/article/Industry/2022/03/20220313164249733514fb262fcb_1 (retrieved on February 7, 2024).

16. Kwak Tae-Hwan, Joo Seung-Ho. “Military cooperation between Russia and South Korea,” International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, Vol. 8 (1999), pp. 147-177.

17. Ahn Se Hyun. Multi-dimensional Security Cooperation Between Russia and South Korea: Progress and Obstacles, Ann Arbor: ProQuest LLC, 2014, p. 285.

18. Prestupleniye veka: Kak byli prodany «Minsk» i «Novorossiysk» [Crime of the century: how Minsk and Novorossiysk were sold], Informatsionnyy elektronnyy resurs «Korabli proyekta 1134A» [Project 1134A ships electronic information resource] July 16, 2011, https://kresta-ii.ucoz.ru/news/quot_prestuplenie_veka_quot_kak_byli_prodany_quot_minsk_quot_i_quot_novorossijsk_quot/2011–07–16–2683 (retrieved on March 13, 2024).

19. 금기호. 방위사멉청 공군중령. «한 러 군사기술협력 필요성 고찰». 제10차 한러 국방학술회의자료집 [Kum Giho, air force major. Korea defense acquisition program administration. “Studying the importance of South Korea-Russia military-technical cooperation.” Report for the 10th Korea-Russia National Defense Academic Conference], 한국국방연구원, November 6, 2010, 151-168 쪽, https://www.kida.re.kr/frt/board/frtNormalBoardDetail.do?sidx=375&idx=26&depth=3&lang=kr (retrieved on January 17, 2024).

20. 유영철. «한 러 군사협력 20주년 평가 및 전망». 제10차 한러 국방학술회의 자료집 [Yu Yeong-chul. assessment and prospects of 20 years of Korean-Russian military cooperation. Collection of papers for the 10th Korean-Russian Scientific Conference on National Defense Issues], 한국국방연구원, November 6, 2010, 87-105 쪽, https://www.kida.re.kr/frt/board/frtNormalBoardDetail.do?sidx=375&idx=26&depth=3&lang=kr (retrieved on December 21, 2023).

21. Rossiyskaya bronetekhnika v yuzhnokoreyskoy armii [Russian armored vehicles in the South Korean army], Voyennoye obozreniye, June 13, 2020, https://topwar.ru/171844-rossijskaja-bronetehnika-v-juzhnokorejskoj-armii.html (retrieved on December 21, 2024).

22. Om Gukho. Peregovornyy protsess po ustanovleniyu diplomaticheskikh otnosheniy mezhdu RK i SSSR i yego istoricheskoye znacheniye [The negotiation process on establishing diplomatic relations between the Republic of Korea and the USSR and its historical significance], in Rossiysko-koreyskiye otnosheniya v formate parallel’noy istorii [Russian-Korean relations in the format of parallel history], Мoscow: Aspekt Press, 2022, p. 555.

23. Safronov I. Rossiya mozhet liberalizovat’ eksport oruzhiya [Russia may liberalize arms exports], Kommersant, October 25, 2001, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/288788 (retrieved on January 29, 2024).

24. Kuznetsov R. Oslabit’ ob”yatiya amerikantsev [Loosen the American embrace], Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, June 17, 2021, https://nvo.ng.ru/nvo/2021-06-17/8_1145_hugs.html (retrieved on January 11, 2024).

25. See [17].

26. Kir’yanov O.V. «Buryy medved’» zatormozil sotrudnichestvo Rossii i Korei v voyennoy sfere [“Brown Bear” slows down Russia-Korea military cooperation], Rossiyskaya gazeta, June 27, 2008, https://rg.ru/2008/06/27/korea-oruzhie-anons.html (retrieved on December 20, 2023).

27. Sovmestnoye Zayavleniye Rossiyskoy Federatsii i Respubliki Koreya, Moskva, 29 sentyabrya 2008 goda [Joint statement of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Korea, Moscow, September 29, 2008], Prezident Rossii, http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/237 (retrieved on December 20, 2023).

28. Zayavleniye dlya pressy po itogam peregovorov s Prezidentom Respubliki Koreya Li Mon Bakom, Seul, 10.11.2010 [Press statement following talks with president of the Republic of Korea Lee Myung-bak, Seoul, November 10, 2010], Prezident Rossii, http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/copy/9476 (retrieved on December 21, 2023).

29. Novikov I.A. Strategicheskoye partnerstvo kak fenomen mezhdunarodnoy politiki [Strategic partnership as a phenomenon of international politics], Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seriya 4: Istoriya. Regionovedeniye. Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, No. 1 (17) (2010), pp. 117-124.

30. Rasporyazheniye ot 5 marta 2022 goda № 430-r [Order of March 5, 2022 No. 430-r], Pravitel’stvo Rossii, http://government.ru/docs/44745 (retrieved on January 11, 2024).

31. Kir’yanov O.V. Yuzhnaya Koreya priznana samym bystrorastushchim eksporterom oruzhiya za posledniye pyat’ let [South Korea named fastest growing arms exporter in past five years], Rossiyskaya gazeta, July 26, 2022, https://rg.ru/2022/07/26/iuzhnaia-koreia-priznana-samym-bystrorastushchim-eksporterom-oruzhiia-za-poslednie-piat-let.html (retrieved on February 9, 2024).

32. Respublika Koreya uvelichivayet eksport vooruzheniy [Republic of Korea increases arms exports], Tsentr analiza mirovoy torgovli oruzhiyem, December 14, 2022, https://armstrade.org/includes/periodics/news/2022/1214/111570797/detail.shtml (retrieved on February 11, 2024).

33. Soglasheniye mezhdu Pravitel’stvom Rossiyskoy Federatsii i Pravitel’stvom Respubliki Koreya o sotrudnichestve v oblasti oborony ot 29.03.2021 [Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Korea on cooperation in the field of defense dated 03/29/2021], MID Rossii, https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/international_contracts/international_contracts/2_contract/60080/ (retrieved on February 7, 2024).

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