From Republic.ru, Aug. 19, 2024, https://republic.ru/posts/113374. Condensed text:

Editors’ Note.– In this interview with Republic, Russian political analyst Abbas Gallyamov explains how the [Ukrainian] attack on Kursk Province [see Vol. 76, No. 32, pp. 3‑8] is changing perceptions in Russia and abroad of [Russian President Vladimir] Putin’s military and political power and what kind of mobilization may be acceptable to the Kremlin (spoiler alert: for now, mobilization may be limited to border provinces).

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Question. – Ukrainian forces have seized a part of Kursk Province. What military and political consequences might this have, in your opinion?

Answer. – This attack caught everyone by surprise, of course. Initially, there were claims that the Russian commanders actually knew from intelligence reports that there was a large group of Ukrainian forces positioned across the border from Kursk Province. So, it seemed at the time that the top brass merely underestimated the threat and decided not to move additional forces to the area. But then Western media started publishing interviews with Ukrainian soldiers taking part in the operation, and it became clear from their accounts that the Russian forces they engaged on the first day were completely unprepared. They were sitting drinking coffee, unarmed. So, it seems mistakes were made not only at the top, when the top brass decided against reinforcing the area with reserves; mistakes were also made at an earlier stage, at the stage of intelligence gathering. This means the Russians knew nothing about the coming attack.

If that’s the case, this whole situation may have extremely far-reaching consequences. It would not be as bad if we could just say that the Ukrainians outsmarted the Russian generals. First, they carried out a couple of minor incursions in Bryansk and Belgorod Provinces – I’m referring to last year’s raids by the Russian Volunteer Corps and the [Freedom of] Russia Legion [see, for example, [see Vol. 75, No. 21, pp. 8‑11 – Trans.]. This was to make Russian generals relax and let their guard down. Now it was easy for them to misinterpret intelligence reports, thinking that this was going to be another small raid by 100-200 troops at the most, and that there was no need to send reinforcements because the troops protecting the border should be well-able to repel the attack on their own. If this were the whole story, Russia could dismiss it as a one-off failure. But now it turns out Russian intelligence is just unable to monitor the movement of Ukrainian forces – which means the same situation may repeat again and again.

So, what might be the consequences? You know how they say, “Once bitten, twice shy.” I think the Russian military leadership will interpret every little move by the Ukrainian forces as preparations for another incursion. Generals now know they can’t rely on intelligence reports to keep them informed. Imagine now what might happen if, on top of that, the Ukrainians create a special mobile unit – it doesn’t have to be huge, 100 men should do – to move along the border and make their presence known here and there from time to time. The border is long – about 2,000 kilometers. So, if Ukrainian assault troops are spotted in a forest near the border a few times, the Russian commander in charge of the area will think this is where Ukraine is going to attack. For every bureaucrat, including those in the military, their biggest concern is to minimize their personal accountability risks for the decisions they make. They are all belt-and-suspenders guys. So, the commander will say to himself, “If I don’t raise an alarm now and the Ukrainians do launch an attack in my area, I will be made the scapegoat. I should start calling and requesting reinforcements before it’s too late.”

So, this commander will immediately call his superior and say, “Send me a tank division as soon as possible. The Ukrainians are poised for a major breakthrough.” And his superior, once he gets such a call, won’t have the courage to turn down his request for assistance and tell him to cope with whatever forces he has in place. “What if the Ukrainians are really planning a major offensive, and when it comes to assigning blame, they throw me under the bus?” That’s what experienced boxers do: They keep their opponents guessing by feinting constantly. A small Ukrainian force will pop up here and there, and the Russians will rush their reserves from one part of the front to another. In a situation like that, it is very hard to focus on the main axis of the offensive; instead, the Russians will have to keep moving their troops along the border, trying to avoid another debacle like the one they suffered in Kursk.

I am not a military expert, but I know how bureaucracy works. And I know that military people are perhaps the worst kind of bureaucrats. So, I think that the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Province is a major operation that will have very serious consequences. This is not to mention the morale dimension, although it is important as well, because the Ukrainians are very inspired now.

But the most important effect is that the whole world can see now that all those claims by various Putin-Verstehers [Putin-understanders]– Tucker Carlson, Elon Musk, Donald Trump and others – who say that Putin can wage this war forever, that he has mobilized Russia and all of its resources, and hence it is useless to fight him – the whole world can see now that all those claims mean nothing. . . .

Public opinion inside Russia is an equally important factor. The segment of society that is loyal to Putin is demoralized. Only recently, these people were thinking that all of Russia’s debacles were left in the past, and Putin’s generals had finally learned all the lessons. Yes, they had to retreat from Kherson and Kharkov in the fall of 2022, but after that, they had been steadily advancing, more or less. And now it turns out that the actual situation is not what it seemed to be. It turns out that the Ukrainians are not as tired and exhausted as they pretended to be. It turns out they were just putting on a show, while in reality they were preparing for an offensive operation. People watch those videos with crowds of captured Kadyrovites [forces loyal to head of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov – Trans.]. People think it’s a disaster. At times like these, they become bitter and angry with their leaders: If you don’t know how to wage a war, why did you start it in the first place? Why make a laughingstock of ourselves?

So, it will be even more difficult for Putin to mobilize public opinion now. Clearly, it will be more difficult to recruit cannon fodder. The Kremlin will have to offer new recruits even higher sign-on bonuses. . . .

Q. – After Ukraine launched its attack in Kursk Province, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova appealed to the international community, asking other countries to condemn Ukraine’s heinous attack. The Kursk [Province] governor began to use the Battle of Kursk rhetoric. Propagandists can claim now that Russia is defending against aggression. Do you think they can persuade public opinion in Russia to accept this view and use it to mobilize people?

A. – No, that won’t work. None of those arguments will persuade anybody. This would only make sense if we were in the same situation as in 1941, when Russia was the victim of aggression. But that’s not what happened in our case. In our case, the war started with Russia planning to take Kiev “in three days.” So, the prevalent sentiment among the Russians loyal to Putin right now is that they have been cheated. There is no rallying effect. People who are in favor of authoritarianism only rally around strong and victorious leaders. When the leader is defeated, they become mad with him. . . .

Everybody remembers who started this war. And people remember that their leaders did not consult with them before making this decision. But now, when things have gone terribly wrong, they suddenly remembered about the people and started explaining to them that their homeland was in danger.

We were all taught at school that “all the wars Russia ever fought were always just and defensive.” This is nonsense, of course, but this cliché is deeply ingrained in our people. And it would be wrong to think that Russians automatically think that all their wars are just. This is only 50% true. As for the other 50%, people tend to change their opinion about wars over time. It doesn’t happen quickly, but after a few years, once they get tired of the war, they tend to change their view of how just this war is. The Levada Center conducted polls in 2005, 2010 and 2014, asking people which of the wars that Russia waged in the 20th century were just. And the Great Patriotic War ended up being the only war that was recognized as just. All the other wars – the Russo-Japanese War, World War I, the Winter War against Finland, the Afghan War and the two Chechen Wars – were characterized by respondents as unjust. The same thing is happening to the current war today. People are in the process of changing their view. Gradually, their perceptions are being transformed, and they are coming to the realization that this war is unjust. For this transformation to happen, it is extremely crucial for people to realize that propaganda lies to them – and this realization comes to them precisely at moments like the current one, when instead of promised triumphs they are faced with defeats. So, to make a long story short, there will be no rallying around the flag as propagandists on Russian television are calling for.

Q. – It’s true, we don’t see people queuing up in front of recruitment centers. Are you saying this is not going to change?

A. – I wrote an op-ed piece the other day where I asked this question: Where are all those men who used to put anti-Western decals on their cars, like “We can do it again,” or “Next stop: Berlin?” Where are all the women who used to dress up their little kids in military uniforms? One would think that now is the time for all of them to rise up. The enemy has invaded our beloved motherland. But no – there are no patriotic rallies, not a single one! After I mentioned this in my op-ed, they did organize one rally in Magadan – almost as if to address my criticism. They gathered locals and staged a rally. Their slogan was, “America will pay for Kursk and Belgorod.” But why are they protecting Kursk in Magadan? There were plenty of military-age men at that rally. Some of them were even dressed in camouflage. The local recruitment center was just around the corner from the place where they chanted their slogans. Why won’t they drop in to enlist and go to Kursk to make America pay? . . .

There are situations where one has to walk the walk, not just talk the talk. Through his own actions, Putin brought Russian politics to a place where words no longer matter. According to Clausewitz, war is a mere continuation of policy by other means. And he was right: while peacetime policies are implemented through speech, wartime policies are implemented through guns. . . .

Q. – You have explained what ordinary Russians think about their leadership’s failures in the context of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Province. Does the same apply to people close to Putin?

A. – Yes, the same applies to the elites. They see and understand things much better than ordinary people do. You can fool ordinary people with all this patriotic nonsense, but these guys are seasoned veterans, they are not as gullible. It is no coincidence that [Oleg] Deripaska said the other day that this war was crazy and should be stopped as soon as possible. Deripaska is an old hand. Back in the 1990s, he was a wild one, but, as he’s getting older and weaker, he’s become very conservative. He is not going to go out on a limb like that unless he knows something.

If Deripaska says something like that, that means it isn’t just Deripaska who thinks like that. He is speaking on behalf of a significant group of top-tier elites.

Deripaska is friends with many people at the very top. It isn’t just business elites who are disappointed; administrative elites are disappointed as well. Like I said earlier, they are basically telling Putin, “Enough is enough. Since you turned out to be not such a great general after all, let’s cut bait and end this war.”

Q. – When war came to Russia, to Belgorod Province, the entire nation kind of ignored it. Now Kursk Province has turned into a war zone. As some commentators have pointed out, Russian propagandists cover the fighting in Kursk Province the same way they would cover a natural disaster happening in some remote part of Russia. In other words, they do all they can to distract people from it.

A. – It would be a huge mistake to think the Russian people are easily distracted. No, they see everything. Their reaction may not be so obvious, but it doesn’t mean they haven’t noticed anything. At this point, their response manifests itself in the fact that the number of people willing to enlist has dropped. The Kremlin is clearly running out of personnel; they don’t even have enough troops to guard the border of the country they are at war with. So, right now a lot of people are making their choice: “I’m not going to enlist. Yes, they offer lots of money, but still, I think I’ll be better off staying where I am.” It is not so obvious just yet, but right now people are realizing that Putin is not so great after all. True, this disillusionment doesn’t convert into something material at this point, into some political action. Elections are rigged, dissent is quashed, opposition is persecuted. But still, there is this invisible process that’s happening in people’s heads at full steam, eroding the regime’s base, which is what precedes every revolution.

The Kremlin is oblivious to this problem, which makes it much worse. The regime does not have any mechanisms to get feedback from the people. As a result, its behavior becomes increasingly erratic. For example, it was an extremely stupid move to ban YouTube [see Vol. 76, No. 33, pp. 12-14] at a time when people are getting restless because of all the military failures. People are saying, “They can’t cope with Ukraine, so now they are trying to conceal the truth from us, hoping we won’t find out. . . .

Q. – Former Kursk [Province] governor Roman Starovoit was appointed transportation minister in May. So, he got a promotion and got out of a problematic province close to the conflict zone. Do you think he should be held responsible for what is happening there now?

A. – Of course, he got out at the right time, but he has a serious problem, because he was supposed to build a line of fortifications along the border. On paper, the fortifications were there, but the problem is, when the Ukrainians launched their offensive, it seems that, oddly enough, they did not encounter any fortifications along the way. It would be difficult to sweep this under the rug. At the same time, it won’t be easy to hold Starovoit responsible for that, because Starovoit works for the Rotenberg brothers [Arkady and Boris]. So, we can assume that he did not embezzle all the money allocated for the fortifications alone. He probably split it with some very influential people who are close to Putin. . . .

Q. – Do you think Kadyrov, too, may fall out of favor with Putin? His Akhmat units surrendered to the Ukrainians without a fight. Critics say that they failed to protect Kursk Province from the Ukrainians, hiding behind the backs of 18-year-old conscripts.

A. – I don’t think Kadyrov is in trouble at this point. Of course, this whole situation was not a great look for the Kadyrovites, and it was clearly another blow to their reputation. But it’s not like this changed their standing dramatically; people were making fun of them even earlier, calling them “TikTok warriors.” Strictly speaking, Kadyrov is not responsible for Kursk Province; it is chiefs of federal security agencies who should be held responsible for this debacle, first and foremost. For the Kadyrovites, this is bad PR at worst, whereas federal security chiefs can be officially held accountable for what happened. Some of them may go to prison and get sacked. Kadyrov, on the contrary, gained more influence as a result of this situation. His man, [Gen. Apti Alaudinov], does most of the talking on behalf of the Defense Ministry on the issue, which indicates that Kadyrov is actually expanding his influence and taking the military under his control. So, Kadyrov is actually sitting pretty.

Q. – One would think that, by occupying Kursk Province, Ukraine has crossed all the red lines. And yet, both Putin and Medvedev are keeping mum about nuclear weapons. They have been threatening to use them for two and a half years. Why did they suddenly fall silent?

A. – . . . If you have two men engaged in a brawl, who will be first to pull out a knife? It is always the one who’s losing, the one who knows he can’t win in a fistfight. Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling no longer works. Everybody knows he’s not going to use nuclear weapons. He will only make himself look weak if he keeps threatening the world with his nukes.

Q. – Does a new wave of mass mobilization look more likely to you now?

A. – With mobilization, the Kremlin faces an impossible dilemma. On the one hand, it is totally obvious that the Russian military desperately needs more personnel. Russia’s borders are all unprotected. Russia has sent all of its forces to the Donetsk Basin. And it is a terrible situation, of course. Once the Ukrainians realize this, they will pick us apart piece by piece. The next offensive may happen in some other province – in Rostov, Krasnodar, or Voronezh. So, Putin clearly needs more men. But, like I said, it will be much more difficult now to find new recruits. When your forces are advancing, albeit at a snail’s pace, and there is at least a glimmer of hope that the enemy might surrender at some point, you may still find somebody willing to enlist. But when your forces are routed, and even Chechen fighters are surrendering by the dozen, why would some hick from a small town who knows nothing about war suddenly decide it’s a good idea to enlist? The authorities will have to offer new recruits even more money, and it’s not like they have a lot of cash at the moment.

So, I think Putin may try to fill this gap by declaring mobilization. But even when you mobilize people, they will still be reluctant to join the military when it is losing the war. Hence, mobilization under current circumstances will outrage people much more than it would in a situation where Russia is winning.

I don’t know what the Kremlin will do. When confronted with a tough choice, Putin often shies away from making a decisive call. He is not as determined as some think he is. So, I think the Kremlin might opt for a half-measure. For instance, they might limit mobilization to Belgorod and Kursk Provinces. That would make sense. “The enemy has invaded your provinces, seizing your towns and villages, so it is your job to liberate them. It’s like the Great Patriotic War all over again for you. ‘Let’s give everything we have for the front, for victory!’ ” So, I guess they will start by declaring mobilization in border provinces, and after that they will play by ear.

Q. – You mentioned that news of mobilization will definitely outrage people. Does this pose a major threat to Putin? In fact, the people living on the border are in a terrible situation today. Nobody cares about them. The world doesn’t care about them, and their own government doesn’t care about them either.

A. – Of course, mobilization will cause outrage. Despite all the propaganda, most people in Russia don’t want to have a part in this war.

People don’t care about the Donetsk Basin. They understand that even if Russia at some point defeats Ukraine and seizes its territories, they won’t benefit from this victory. It will be the Rotenberg brothers, or the Kovalchuk brothers [Mikhail and Yury], or somebody like that who will profit in the end.

People know that, so they are only willing to enlist when offered a ton of money. Men in Kursk and Belgorod Provinces are no exception, so their reaction to mobilization will be extremely negative. But I think they are so shocked, so lost and disoriented, that they are incapable of organized resistance. At least, I don’t see any indication of that at this point. So, I guess, they will hang their heads and obediently shuffle their feet to the nearest mobilization center. Now, as regards your last comment about the Russian people affected by the war, that they don’t see much empathy within Russia or elsewhere, you are right about that. It’s a real problem, but it is a typical situation for the aggressor state. The Germans experienced the same problem in 1945. Now it’s the Russian people’s turn to face the music – and they know whom they should thank for that.