Nature produced only one Russia.
Alexander Suvorov
MARIA Zakharova, Director of the Information and Press Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in her article “The Global West and Global South: Development Paths,” outlined several positions that are fundamentally important for the theory and practice of international relations.
Essentially, Russia cannot be categorized as belonging to either the Global West or the Global South.1 The former represents a community of “Western democracies” (or “liberal democracies”), where the most active powers have chosen Russia as an object of “deterrence.”2 The latter (Global South), defined primarily by geographical and particularly economic criteria, is much more diffuse in terms of composition. For example, several countries traditionally considered part of the Global South – primarily China and India – are world leaders in economic and industrial development.
In this context, it is logical to question the applicability of the concepts “Global East” and “Global North” when characterizing Russia’s position on the international stage. Zakharova noted that in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation dated March 31, 2023, the “special position of Russia as a unique state-civilization and a vast Eurasian and Euro-Pacific power”3 was emphasized. In this regard, Zakharova pointed out that Russia does not simply belong to the Global East and Global North but extends beyond these “conventional classifications.”4
While fully supporting and developing this idea, it is appropriate to recognize the Russian Federation’s role as a unifying force – or to use mathematical terms, a common denominator – for both the Global East and Global North. This approach is fundamentally important in the context of Russia’s substantial, objectively constructive contribution to the formation of a new world order. Russia is compelled to bear a very heavy burden in countering a global utopia that is extremely dangerous for humanity’s future – namely, the desire of the Western democracies to geographically and functionally expand their values, influence, and presence without restriction, aiming to become the sole dominant community on the global stage.
As world history teaches, such a path is a priori impossible over extended periods. It leads to a global imbalance and poses a significant danger to states that would take such a path. The reason lies in the inevitable growth of resistance to attempts by a group of players to ensure their exceptionalism in the world at large. The further these two closely linked processes develop – the persistent push toward global hegemony as a utopia, and the increasingly strong natural resistance – the greater the risk of a large-scale war. History shows that the main outcome of such a conflict is the collapse of the existing form of the community of states that sought to be the sole significant center of attraction on the international stage. However, in modern realities, considering the factor of weapons of mass destruction, a major military conflict is very likely to be disastrous for all humanity.
Fully aware of this, Russia has assumed the responsibility and found the courage to try to persuade the community of Western democracies to abandon the global utopia of boundless expansion of their influence and presence before the dangerous culmination of this process. Thus, Russia is implementing a strategy to encourage the Western democracies to act with prudence. A crucial component of this strategy is the forced Special Military Operation (SMO), intended to demonstrate the logical limits of the not-so-boundless expansion of the zone of dominance of Western democracies. Naturally, these actions by Russia, which are constructive and rational from the perspective of ensuring overall international security interests, will today and for a considerable time be strongly opposed by the collective West. But it must be counterbalanced; that is the only way to overcome the global imbalance. This task underscores the aforementioned need for Russia to assume the role of a unifying force for the Global East and Global North.
The Global East, in which Russia naturally assumes the role of a guiding center, is inherently positioned to counterbalance the collective West. Russia’s role within the Global North is equally important. Russia and friendly countries must exert significant influence within the Global North to balance the strong drive for dominance by the community of Western democracies. The privatization of the concept of the Global North by these democracies has led to the relationship between the Global North and the Global South being characterized not as an “agent-agent” relationship but rather as an “agent-object” one. This dichotomy has been termed neocolonialism5 and postcolonialism6 in Russian political literature. This phenomenon is also a factor in the imbalance on the international stage. The Global South seeks equal dialogue with the North, aiming to acquire effective assistance in ensuring stable development and real (not merely pro forma or declarative) sovereignty for its actors.
The search for effective ways to transition countries in which armed conflict in the Global South has arisen to the stage of postconflict development is particularly noteworthy. The ability to achieve this in practice relatively quickly (in a few years) and with sustained long-term results is a significant criterion of the readiness of a Global North state to be a security guarantor for the most conflict-prone countries in the South, thereby making a substantial contribution to the security of this vast region and the world as a whole.
In this context, on one hand, Russia’s successful cooperation with Iran and official Damascus in combating international terrorism in Syria stands out. On the other hand, the forced withdrawal of Western countries from Afghanistan (by mid-2021) and Mali (mostly by 2024), as well as from neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger, is also significant. It seems unlikely that the key reason behind these trends lies in the ability or inability of external actors to successfully combat international terrorist groups or, more importantly, to promote the nationalization of conflict resolution. This concept refers to the transfer of control over the process to domestic forces that are willing and able to ensure the cessation of organized violence and achieve intra- or interstate reconciliation.
Damascus was able to assume such a role thanks to the effective military assistance provided by Russia (and Iran) in combating the main forces of the Islamic State (a group banned in Russia). The main efforts of the Russian Armed Forces occurred between October 2015 and December 2017.7 In this situation, Russia established itself as a Global North state that provided effective assistance in resolving a conflict in and restoring the sovereignty of a country in which armed conflict in the Global South has arisen. This is no ordinary example of what advanced cooperation between a Northern state and a Southern country can and should be.
In contrast, the diverse and extensive efforts of Western democracies, including the prolonged deployment of military contingents and instructors, did not result in a positive turning point in ensuring peace and security in Afghanistan and Mali. Yet, the collective West considered these areas to be of utmost importance in combating instability risks, including for their own security – until their forced withdrawal.8
However, the result was more conflict management than conflict resolution – maintaining outbreaks of violence in conflict zones at a certain (far from zero) level, rather than eliminating them entirely. Just as an untreated illness inevitably leads to relapse and regression, the deterioration of the situation in the conflict zone was postponed but not averted. In Mali, for instance, in the late 2010s and early 2020s there was a resurgence and intensification of terrorist groups that had not been fully defeated earlier. These groups regrouped from the north of the country to the previously calm south, simultaneously stepping up their activities in neighboring Burkina Faso.9 In this region, terrorists began to merge with organized crime and certain local corrupt officials – i.e., those who prioritized seeking personal gain over ensuring the functioning of the state as an institution.
That precipitated the emergence of a new (fifth) generation of international terrorist groups, a phenomenon stemming from the agent-object relations between Global West countries (primarily France and Germany), which largely positioned themselves as part of the Global North, and Global South countries (Mali, Burkina Faso). This is an example of what relations between actors from these communities should not be.
The limited effectiveness of Western democracies’ actions to ensure peace and security in Afghanistan and Mali was closely linked to the even less effective steps taken by elites aligned with them – the governments in Kabul and Bamako at the time.10 The combination of these factors led to the Taliban’s rise to power in Afghanistan and the takeover by local military forces in Mali, and later in Burkina Faso and Niger. Despite their numerous differences, all these forces aimed to nationalize the conflict resolution process, excluding the previous elites and minimizing the involvement of Western democracies.11 At the same time, this qualitatively new model of resolution did not rule out cooperation with states outside the West, including Russia. Both the Taliban12 (with discussions in Russia in late May 2024 about removing the group from the list of banned organizations13) and the national military forces in the aforementioned countries of the Sahel-Sahara region14 have shown interest in partnering with Russia as a country that not only respects sovereignty but often shares expertise in strengthening it. Russia has thus started to play a crucial role in these regions, establishing an important connection between the Global North and Global South based on the agent-agent model.
These practical examples show how vital it is for Russia, both for itself and for the fate of the world, to fulfill its role as a unifying force for the Global East and Global North. However, there are several obstacles along this path, stemming from how Western democracies have attempted to distort the meaning of the terms Global East and Global North, particularly in minimizing Russia’s role within these vast spaces.
It is worth highlighting a set of tactics aimed at the concepts of the Global East (primarily) and the Global North.
The first tactic is the attempt by Western democracies to downplay the decisive contribution of the Soviet Union in defeating Nazi Germany and, more broadly, the Axis powers in World War II, as well as to devalue the significance of the Great Patriotic War. These efforts are aimed at erasing and tarnishing a crucial process – the most massive in terms of efforts, losses, and consequences – shared by the peoples of the USSR and the subsequent post-Soviet space. The victory in the Great Patriotic War stands as a crucial imperative, reflecting the axiomatic leading role of Russia as the successor state of the USSR within the Global East and Global North. The Soviet Union triumphed over the most formidable military machine in history – Nazi Germany – which was not only part of the historical West but also relied on the resources of nearly the entire continental European portion of that space.
It was a rare moment in history when Anglo-Saxon countries engaged in full-scale cooperation with a non-Western power (the USSR) to defeat an aggressor state from within the Western community itself (the Third Reich). Immediately after the destruction of the Nazi regime, the leading Western democracies set out to “deter” the USSR. However, the Soviet Union’s victories in the war laid the groundwork for the emergence of the East as a long-standing effective counterbalance to the collective West. The USSR, as the core of the East, demonstrated its democratic nature to the greatest extent, most consistently and effectively opposing the most undemocratic regimes: German Nazism, Italian Fascism, and Japanese militarism.
World War II taught that the most democratic state is the one that most persistently and successfully combats the grotesque antitheses of democracy, such as Nazism and similar ideologies. In this respect, the East held the indisputable moral and political edge over the West. Hence the West’s desire to diminish the significance of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War, which serves as a perpetual common denominator for the historical unity of the Global East.
In this context, it is concerning that there is no journal titled The Great Patriotic War among the scholarly periodicals published in Russia (at least in the Higher Attestation Commission’s list). Such a journal should serve as a platform for uniting the Global East and Global North under Russia’s guiding role.
The second tactic of the liberal democracies involves associating the term “Global East” with the West-East confrontation, where, due to largely subjective reasons (primarily the policies of Mikhail Gorbachev), the liberal democracies managed to gain an advantage. For them, it was crucial not only to ensure the dissolution of the USSR and the socialist community, which constituted the East at the time, but also to demonstrate the impossibility of its recreation in any completely new forms.
Hence, the West’s consistent desire to ensure the uninterrupted expansion of Euro-Atlantic institutions – particularly the EU and especially NATO – thus establishing full control over more and more of the post-socialist space, especially the post-Soviet and post-Yugoslavian regions. However, the West’s actions and plans in those two areas have faced significant challenges, as evidenced by not only the case of Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership but also the bottlenecks encountered in the Berlin Process for the Western Balkans and the setbacks in constructing the post-Yugoslavian framework that the Western democracies had been promoting since the 1990s.
The stance of Serbia and Republika Srpska (as an entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) is particularly illustrative in this regard.15 The lack of success in expanding influence over new parts of the post-Soviet and post-Yugoslavian spaces by the mid-2020s has led the West to seek compensation both in terms of image and practical achievements by demonstrating the capability for further NATO expansion.
For instance, Finland and Sweden, which had previously been part of the alliance but maintained a conditionally neutral status, joined it in April 2023 and March 2024, respectively. These events not only significantly extended the line of NATO’s deterrence of Russia (the border between Russia and Finland exceeds 1,271 kilometers) but also highlighted the ongoing strategic strengthening of the Western democracies in the Arctic region, particularly in the Arctic Ocean. The balance of power there between the West and Russia – especially in military and political terms –has become a much clearer indicator of their comparative influence within the Global North as a whole.
Noteworthy in this context are the sharp intensification of NATO member states’ military exercises16 since the late 2010s, and especially the early 2020s, and the expansion of the US base network in Norway.17 Norway is being positioned as the cornerstone of the Russia deterrence system on the northern (Arctic) flank.
The third tactic involves the efforts of Western democracies not only to exclusively associate the concept of the Global North with themselves but also to privatize the notion of Europe. In practice, this term has come to refer only to the European part of the community of Western democracies. However significant and large this community may be, the term “Europe” is much broader in every respect. Geographically, it includes vast territories outside the community of liberal democracies, particularly the European part of Russia and Belarus.
Historically, our homeland – Rus, Russia, and the Soviet Union – played a central role in defeating those forces that, having occupied other European countries, sought world hegemony. The most striking examples of this are the successful defeat of aggression by Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany. In today’s reality, the Russian Federation, within the expanse of Europe – and on lands historically part of its own territory, no less – is halting a new global utopia: namely, the creeping, continuous expansion of the influence and presence of “Western democracies.”
The names of NATO’s multinational formations deployed in Eastern Europe by the mid-2020s are also illustrative: North, Northeast, Centre, and Southeast.18 These names encompass all directions directly associated with the East, but the East itself is not explicitly named (instead, Centre is used). This naming scheme signals both an intention to advance eastward, to deter the Global East, and simultaneously to prevent its consolidation. The explicit avoidance of the term “East” in NATO’s declarations shows that while they have formally softened some of their most injurious countermeasures against [the East], they are not interested in fostering its unity – this is why it is not openly named by the West.
It is telling that Centre (currently a division-level command) is located in Hungary and Slovakia19 – two NATO member states that are among the few that maintain friendly relations with Russia in the current context. This calls into question the completeness of the “collectivism” of the West and, therefore, the accuracy of this epithet, as several Russian researchers have commented.20
The fourth tactic involves the criticism or disregard by Western actors of interstate dialogues and multilateral organizations that are of key importance to the Global East. At the official level, the Western establishment tends to avoid acknowledging the high level of cooperation between Russia and China. Simultaneously, several Western states and institutions consistently “ignore” the existence of the CSTO and its successful peacekeeping operation in Kazakhstan in January 2022.21 In general, the logic of “cancel culture” is employed in the West to taboo the very concept of the Global East, especially the key elements that constitute it.
The fifth tactic involves attributing the sources of numerous classical security threats22 to key centers of the Global East – Russia, China, and Iran, which maintains very friendly relations with the other two. These threats are understood to have a primarily military (force) component. Naturally, particular emphasis in this regard was placed on Russia’s SMO: Western democracies fundamentally distorted the forced and strategically defensive nature of the SMO, as well as its constructive significance for restoring balance to international security at the global level.
Portraying Russia and other of the most active powers as alleged sources of classical security threats is extremely convenient for the Western democracies in at least two respects. One is the opportunity to transition toward a long-term increase in all the main parameters of their national “military machines” and NATO’s power as an organization, especially after having approached critically low capabilities in the mid-2010s.23 The other is the justification for changing the paradigm for ensuring a global presence. Having failed to turn the tide in combating instability threats in conflict zones in the Middle East or in Africa north of the Sahara, the Western democracies chose a different path. This involves declaring the need to deploy various groups and missions in the context of deterring Russia, Iran, and China, which also necessitates the deployment of Western military forces in various regions of the world. Meanwhile, they ignore the fact that non-Western countries – specifically Russia and Iran in the Syrian theater – contribute to security not only for themselves and their allies but also for Western states through their actions to counter international terrorism and instability.
These steps by NATO member states and their closest partners are leading to further refinement in cooperation between the national armed forces of the Western democracies, enhancing their structural power. This emphasis on their community’s superiority over others is reflected in the much more frequent use of the term “collective West” than “Global West.” That is the sixth tactic. Meanwhile, the East, North, and South are each referred to with the epithet “Global.”
At the same time, the “collectivism” of the West raises questions about the full sovereignty of many of its players, especially small and medium-sized countries, but also some large ones (notably Germany). In contrast, the Global East and the non-Western part of the Global North exhibit a different quality of sovereignty – the example of Russia is particularly illustrative in this regard.24 Mutual respect for sovereignty may somewhat hinder the deepening of structural ties between the most active non-Western players; however, in terms of both image and practical implications, this is often just as much a significant advantage as it is a disadvantage. The appeal of the BRICS platform, as evidenced by the increase in its member states from five to 11 on January 1, 2024,25 is a prime example.
The seventh tactic employed by the Western democracies is their effort to limit the influence of leading Global East players within their “home” regional subsystems. This tactic is particularly evident in their approach to the post-Soviet space – a region that is key for Russia26 and has historically been an essential center of gravity. The states and institutions of the collective West are not merely attempting to orient certain countries in the post-Soviet space (ideally, all except Russia) toward themselves, but also to exclude Russia from ongoing processes in the region. This trend is unnatural and extremely dangerous, and it was a major factor in Russia’s decision to launch the SMO.
The regime in Kiev that came to power as a result of the February 22, 2014, coup was assigned the role of a key link in the effort to “lock down” Russia. Ukraine’s significance is underscored by the multilateral military presence of NATO, especially in the forward parts of its zone of responsibility (including reinforced troops in Poland and the Baltic states, as well as newly adapted, significantly reinforced forces in NATO’s East European member states to the south, particularly in Romania, since 2022).27
NATO’s new force model, which provides the alliance with a potential force of 800,000 troops, closely matched the size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces at their peak strength in 2023.28 The power of NATO’s forward deployment forces was comparable to Ukraine’s strategic reserve forces, which played a key role in the failed summer offensive of 2022.29 Despite this, Ukraine has not been admitted into NATO – a factor that the Western democracies exploit to involve Ukraine to the greatest extent possible in countering Russia and to carry out highly provocative actions to strengthen Kiev militarily (with the constant shifting of “red lines”).30 The absence of NATO’s umbrella is viewed by the Western democracies as a safeguard against uncontrolled escalation resulting from their own highly provocative actions.31 The primary deterrent to escalation, however, is Russia’s carefully measured response.
A parallel strategy can be seen in the US’s approach to China. The G2 initiative in the early 2020s aimed to associate China with the US and the broader community of Western democracies.32 The failure of that strategic project largely led to the onset of confrontation, with the US transitioning to deterring China, particularly within the Asia-Pacific region – or the Indo-Pacific region, as the Western democracies call it.
A key element in Washington’s strategy to partially exclude China from Pacific processes is its support for the administration in Taiwan. This strategy was exemplified by then US house speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island on August 2, 2023.33 The US has been constructing a system of formats for deterring China that in effect hinges on Taiwan. These platforms may not be explicitly directed against China (for example, the ROK-US-Japan triangle is officially focused on countering North Korea) or even overtly military-political (the Partners in the Blue Pacific). However, in practice, these formats form a unified chain according to US plans: a triangle involving South Korea and Japan to the north of Taiwan, and another triangle34 involving Australia and the UK35 as part of AUKUS to the south.36
The format intended to unify these efforts is the Partners in the Blue Pacific (initially including Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the UK, and the US).37 Symbolically, this entity was created in late June 2022, on the eve of the pivotal NATO Madrid summit, where the alliance’s strategic concept was adopted. This concept designated the task of deterring Russia as paramount, and countering China and Iran as key objectives.38 Thus, the Western democracies have been building a unified system of confrontation with key opponents, aiming to exhaust them and prevent the full consolidation of the Global East and the non-Western part of the Global North.
* * *
FOR EVERY action there is a reaction. The deterrence of Russia and other of the most active non-Western powers not only creates challenges for these nations but also further motivates them to strengthen their cooperation. The process of consolidating centers of influence outside the West is objective in itself; however, deterrence efforts significantly accelerate and positively reinforce this process.
Russian scholars have made significant progress in searching for a term that could unite the spaces outside the West – the Global East, the Global South, and the non-Western part of the Global North. The term “non-West” is comprehensive39 but has a certain flaw in its very name: It derives from the term “West,” indirectly highlighting the importance of the West as a community. For this reason, the term “collective majority”40 seems more advantageous.
At the same time, another term needs to be found that would designate the “core” of the “collective majority” as a distinct alternative to the West – something fundamentally different in nature that can counterbalance the Western bloc. While this community is still being formed, it is growing rapidly. The core of this community is already becoming clear, including key elements such as Russia, Iran, and China, along with very friendly partners like Belarus, Syria, and North Korea. These nations represent various parts of the globe. This list is bound to expand, including countries from the Global South. In seeking a term that would unify the states of the “core” within the collective majority, it is crucial to consider the strategic link between the Global East and the Global North (specifically its non-Western part), and particularly the role of Russia as a unifying force across these vast regions.
NOTES
1 Zakharova M. “The Global West and Global South: Development Paths,” International Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 3 (2024), pp. 1‑7.
2 NATO 2022 Strategic Concept. Adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid June 29, 2022, Brussels: NATO HQ, 2022, pp. 3-5.
3 https://www.mid.ru/ru/detail-material-page/1860586
4 see [1].
5 Volkov S.N., Deuch T.L. “Pomoshch Rossii Afrike v protivostoyanii neokolonializmy,” Electronic science and educational journal Istoriya, No. S23 (2023).
6 Degterev D.A. “K okonchaniyu ‘postkolonialnogo momenta’ antikolonialnoy borby: kontury issledovatelskoy programmy,” Postkolonializm i sovremennost, No. 1 (2023), pp. 13-46.
7 Manoylo A.V. “Konflikt v Sirii i vneshnyaya politika Rossii,” Aktualnyye problemy Yevropy, No. 2 (2020), pp. 146-147
8 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_113694.htm; Antrag der Bundesregierung. Fortsetzung der Beteiligung bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte an der Multidimensionalen Integrierten Stabilisierungsmission der Vereinten Nationen in Mali (MINUSMA). Deutscher Bundestag, 20. Wahlperiode. Drucksache 20/1761. November 5, 2022, pp. 6-9.
9 Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung. Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Lage und zum deutschen Engagement in Mali/Sahel. Aktuelle Lage, Ziele und Handlungsfelder des deutschen Engagements. Deutscher Bundestag, 19. Wahlperiode. Drucksache 19/18080. March 25, 2020, pp. 5-7.
10 Davidchuk A.S., Degterev D.A., Sidibe O. “Voyennoye prisutstviye Frantsii v Mali: strukturnaya vlast subimperii ‘kollektivnogo Zapada’ ” Aktualnyye problemy Yevropy, No. 4 (2022), pp. 56-62.
11 Novikova O.N. “Chetvertaya afganskaya voyna Velikobritanii,” Aktualnyye problemy Yevropy, No. 4 (2022), pp. 215-230.
12 Machitidze G.G. “Afganskiy izlom v zerkale rossiyskoy politiki: Rossiya i dvizheniye ‘Taliban,’ ” Rossiya i sovremennyy mir, No. 1 (2022), pp. 6-21
13 https://tass.ru/politika/20911447
14 https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1954514
15 Botsan-Kharchenko A.A. “Kosovo at a Dangerous Point: The False Assumptions of the West and Genuine Dialogue as the Only Alternative” International Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 2 (2023), pp. 119-127
16 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/157833.htm; https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_192351.htm; https://www.forsvaret.no/en/nr
17 https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/new-norway-usa-defense-agreement-allows-extensive-us-authority-north
18 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm
19 Ibid.
20 Shamarov P.V. “O nepravomernosti ponyatiya ‘kollektivnyy Zapad’ v politicheskom leksikone Rossii,” Voprosy prava, ekonomiki i tekhnologiy, No. 1 (2024), pp. 6-18.
21 Shamarov P.V. “Mirotvorcheskaya operatsiya ODKB v Kazakhstane: pervyye itogi, uroki i vyvody,” Predstavitelnaya vlast – XXI vek: zakonodatelstvo, kommentarii, problemy, No. 5-6 (2022), pp. 22-35
22 see [2].
23 Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014-2023), Brussels: NATO, 2024. P. 8-12.
24 Shamarov P.V. “Suverennaya gosudarstvennost Rossii kak strategicheskiy imperativ yeye natsionalnogo razvitiya,” Predstavitelnaya vlast – XXI vek: zakonodatelstvo, kommentarii, problemy, No. 1-2 (2024), pp. 14-30
25 https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1901504
26 https://www.mid.ru/ru/detail-material-page/1860586
27 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm
28 https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220629-infographic-new-nato-force-model.pdf; https://www.rbc.ru/politics/12/12/2023/657818389a794 789e37688d5
29 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm; https://ria.ru/20230919/podgotovka -1897031813.html
30 Sidorov A.YU. “Russia and the West After the SMO: A New Level of Confrontation,” International Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1 (2024), pp. 105-117
31 see, for example: https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/suche/pressekonferenz-von-bundeskanzler-scholz-und-praesident-macron-zum-24-deutsch-franzoesischen-ministerrat-am-28-mai-2024-komplett–2288912
32 Lukin A.V. “Amerikano-kitayskoye sopernichestvo v ATR: deklaratsii i realnost,” Rossiya v globalnoy politike, No. 1 (2023), pp. 120-125.
33 https://pelosi.house.gov/news/press-releases/pelosi-statement-marking-one-year-since-historic-visit-to-taiwan
34 Istomin I.A. “Vashington – Seul – Tokio v doktrine Baydena,” Rossiya v globalnoy politike, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 208-212.
35 Vasilyev V.S. “Anglosaksonskiye skrizhali narastayushchego globalnogo tsivilizatsionnogo protivostoyaniya,” Aktualnyye problemy Yevropy, No. 4 (2022), pp. 235-252.
36 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/15/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus/; https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/03/13/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus-2/;https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/15/joint-leader-statement-to-mark-the-second-anniversary-of-aukus
37 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/24/statement-by-australia-japan-new-zealand-the-united-kingdom-and-the-united-states-on-the-establishment-of-the-partners-in-the-blue-pacific-pbp/; https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/24/statement-by-australia-japan-new-zealand-the-united-kingdom-and-the-united-states-on-the-establishment-of-the-partners-in-the-blue-pacific-pbp
38 see [2].
39 Alekseyeva T.A. “ ‘Zapad’ i ‘Ne Zapad’ v prostranstve teorii mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy,” Vestnik Rossiyskogo universiteta druzhby narodov. Seriya: Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya. No. 2 (2017), pp. 217-232.
40 Karaganov S.A. “Ot Ne-Zapada k mirovomu bolshinstvu,” Rossiya v globalnoy politike, No. 5 (2022), pp. 6-18