Abstract. The US Indo-Pacific Strategy, whose main principles were formulated in the US National Security Strategy released in December 2017, is aimed at preserving a unipolar structure of the world in an era of global changes that undermine US claims to world dominance. The more the authority of the unipolar world’s overlord is undermined, the more diverse and dangerous the overlord’s attempts become to preserve its dominant role by drawing into its orbit the countries that previously took a neutral stance toward the unilateralists’ activity. This paper analyzes South Korean policy regarding the Indo-Pacific Strategy and examines the policy’s political and economic aspects. The authors proceed from the view that South Korea, which has remained within the American global influence system for many decades, cannot ignore practically any American initiative. At the same time, the authors express doubt about the possibility of the transformation of the Indo-Pacific bloc being created under the auspices of the US into a significant international structure capable of altering the vector of the ongoing global changes. Moreover, the Indo-Pacific Initiative of the Republic of Korea (ROK), which has a straightforward pro-American orientation both in foreign policy and the economic sphere, including top priority sectors (the military industry, IT industry, green technologies, etc.), is being implemented to the detriment of its own interests and of cooperation with the country’s main economic partner – the PRC. This could result in adverse consequences for South Korea in the near term.

Political Aspects of the ROK’s Indo-Pacific Strategy

In recent years, the US policy in Asia has expanded considerably, which was reflected in the declaration of America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) in December 2017. Originally, this strategy did not occupy a prominent place in the general US National Security Strategy announced by US President Donald Trump on December 18, 2017. It was explained in subitem 1 “Indo-Pacific” under the item “The Strategy in a Regional Context” within Pillar IV “Advance American Influence.” The text was focused mainly on characterizing the economic, political, and military policy of the PRC. In the opinion of official Washington, China’s infrastructure investments and trade strategies reinforce its geopolitical aspirations, whereas its efforts to restrict American access to the region endanger the free flow of trade, threaten the sovereignty of other nations, and undermine regional stability. Therefore, the document comments: “States throughout the region are calling for sustained US leadership in a collective response that upholds a regional order respectful of sovereignty and independence.”1 Considering that the overtly anti-China nature of the strategy could raise doubts among certain countries about the viability of its active support, the US also deemed it necessary to cite North Korea’s nuclear missile program.

This American declaration was primarily addressed to US allies in the region. From among the ASEAN countries, the Philippines and Thailand were named first because the US enjoys special conditions and privileges in them, then came Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore – “growing security and economic partners” of the US. The US declared that ASEAN and APEC “remain centerpieces of the Indo-Pacific’s regional architecture and platforms for promoting an order based on freedom.” However, when the US hosted the Summit for Democracy in 2021, it did not invite Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand, and four other ASEAN countries not mentioned in the strategy. Evidently, in the opinion of the US, these countries were not yet “mature enough” to promote an order based on freedom in the American sense of the word. Consequently, when implementing its strategy, the US will ignore these countries’ interests and concerns. And if one considers that out of the 10 ASEAN states only three are considered democratic by the US,2 then the strategy’s statement that ASEAN and APEC remain centerpieces in the architecture of the Indo-Pacific region (IPR) can be considered untenable.

On February 11, 2022, US President Joe Biden declared a new IPS concept, which comprised a much longer list of states within the IPR.3 South Korea, which has remained within the system of American global influence for many decades, cannot ignore practically any American initiative, and then-South Korean president Moon Jae-in immediately announced the integration of the ROK’s New Southern Policy with the IPS in a format that could not spoil South Korea’s relations with the PRC and the ASEAN countries.

On May 10, 2022, a new president of the ROK, Yoon Suk Yeol, took office. His foreign policy staff consists entirely of employees of the former pro-American conservative-oriented president Lee Myung-bak. Under Lee Myung-bak, all achievements in inter-Korean relations made by South Korean presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun were condemned to oblivion. The action program for the new South Korean president’s administration bearing the title «윤 석열 정부 120대 국정과제» (120 Objectives for the Policy of Yoon Suk Yeol’s Government), defines six main tasks, the fifth of which encompasses issues of defense, security, and peace «자유, 평화, 번영에 기여하는 들러벌 중추국가» (Global State Contributing to Freedom, Peace, and Prosperity).4 In total, eight subtasks are formulated, among which the main ones are: enhancing the capability to rebuff North Korea’s nuclear missile threat, including through the use of modern technologies such as the employment of unmanned weapons and artificial intelligence; increasing the pressure on the DPRK to restrict its nuclear capabilities, etc.5 South Korea is planning to attain these goals by expanding its military cooperation with the US and interacting on military technologies, as well as through a US-Japan-ROK trilateral partnership on security. To that end, not only will intelligence data be exchanged, but tripartite military exercises will be conducted.5

Yoon Suk Yeol’s government pursues the goal of improving South Korea’s international image by using foreign political arrangements. In this connection, the objective of the president’s foreign policy is to “come out” of the Korean Peninsula and become a “global state,” also by assisting the US in implementing the IPS. Therefore, less than two weeks after Yoon Suk Yeol took office as president of the ROK, he approved South Korea’s joining of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), launched by US President Joe Biden on May 23, 2022. Wishing to demonstrate its full and unconditional support of the American initiative, in December 2022, the ROK government announced its own Indo-Pacific strategy under the title Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region. While explaining to their citizens such close attention to the IPS and their intention to actively participate in it, in the respective document, the South Korean authorities state inexact figures about the states joining the strategy’s structure. In particular, it is stated that these countries make up 65% of the world population, 62% of global GDP, 46% of world trade, and 50% of the world’s maritime transport. It also stated that this region accounts for 78% of exports, 67% of imports, 70% of trade partners, and 66% of foreign investments of South Korea.7 Meanwhile, the GDP and population of the countries that participate in the strategy are actually much lower than the figures presented by the South Korean government. For example, the total population of these 13 countries is 2.5 billion people, which amounts to 30.1% of the global population, and their GDP is about $32 trillion – i.e., about 35% of the world GDP, much less than the document indicates. It should be added here, for example, that of the 13 countries within the IPEF, 11 are members of a larger association bearing the title Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which includes the PRC, all 10 ASEAN countries, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand.

Moreover, as we see it, the South Korean government overestimates India’s desire to consolidate the IPR’s position as a center of world politics. The second section in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 229 (March 31, 2023), bears the title “Eurasian continent.” Here, special attention is focused on Russia’s relations with the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India: “A comprehensive deepening of ties and enhancement of coordination with friendly sovereign global centers of power and development, which are located on the Eurasian continent and committed to approaches that coincide in principle with the Russian approaches to a future world order and solutions for key problems of world politics, is particularly important for achieving strategic goals and major objectives of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation.”8 Further in the text, a description of relations with the PRC is followed by an article concerning relations with India: “Russia will continue to build up a particularly privileged strategic partnership with the Republic of India with a view to enhance and expand cooperation in all areas on a mutually beneficial basis and place special emphasis on increasing the volume of bilateral trade, strengthening investment and technological ties, and ensuring their resistance to destructive actions of unfriendly states and their alliances.”9 Therefore, it is far from evident that India will be closely tied with a US-controlled structure. Inevitably, discrepancies will arise between India’s interests within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS, and its interests in the IPR, because the principles of activity in these are different. Sooner or later, it will be asked: On whose side is India? Certainly, it cannot be ruled out that, in a couple of decades, India most probably will reach the developmental stage of monopolistic capitalism. Its economic interests and, possibly, ambitions may lead to closer cooperation with the former classical imperialist countries; these may have lost their former might but remain major centers of scientific, industrial, and financial influence in the world. But India’s traditional policy based on the “Pancha Shila” principles, the famous postulates of peaceful coexistence, makes it possible to suppose that India will choose the path of cooperation in a broader context and on an egalitarian basis, not in the narrow framework of the IPS imposed by the US.

Apparently, the present-day South Korean authorities are aware that current events mean the spreading influence of not just the US, but the whole system of Western countries and NATO rules all over this region. And the South Korean government seeks not just to take part in the IPS, but to make the ROK a leader of the IPS structure; not just to announce its participation, but to actively participate in all IPS arrangements and programs implemented by the US (especially in supplying weapons to the countries that most actively deliver armaments to the current Ukrainian regime). The South Korean government desires to get approval from other member states (including India and Australia, but primarily from Japan) in connection with the growing role of the ROK in the IPS. The South Korean president’s visit to Japan can be attributed to the desire to demonstrate South Korea’s leading role in the world. By using various concessions, Yoon Suk Yeol succeeded in having Japan return the ROK to the White List of its trade partners, permit the supply of some important components for producing microchips, and agree to resume cooperation in the exchange of military intelligence data (GSOMIA). In return, the South Korean side revoked its complaint letter to the WTO regarding Japanese violations of the standards of the Organization,10 and during the meeting, the South Koreans did not touch on the main disputed issues – the issue of the Dokdo Islands’ territorial affiliation and the problem of Korean females aged 12 to 34 forcibly sent to Japanese military brothels (vianbu) when Korea was occupied by Japan. On the contrary, during the talks, the Japanese even demanded that the ROK implement the vianbu agreement concluded under Park Geun-hye and never again raise the issue. As for the indemnification payment to Koreans (and their descendants) who were forcefully mobilized during the Second World War to work at plants of the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and the Nippon Steel steelmaking concern, on the eve of Yoon Suk Yeol’s visit to Japan, the South Korean government announced that the ROK itself would pay them the monetary compensation, citing an agreement with Japan under which Japanese firms would invest finances into a newly formed joint South Korean-Japanese future youth fund. Compensation payments would be made to Korean victims of Japan’s wartime forced labor namely from this fund. However, the Japanese side replied that it was only a South Korean proposal, not an agreed-upon decision.11 As a result, Yoon Suk Yeol’s decision annulled a ruling of South Korea’s Supreme Court that ordered the Japanese firms to pay the reparations.

When assessing the IPS of the US, Russian researchers should proceed from Russia’s assessment of this strategy and the notion of the IPR itself. A definition of the essence of the IPS is given in the “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on Deepening Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Cooperation Entering a New Era,” signed and published as a result of the Moscow visit by PRC Chairman Xi Jinping and his talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin on March 21-23, 2023: “The two sides pointed out that the United States adheres to the Cold War mentality and pursues the ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy,’ which has a negative impact on peace and stability in the region.12 Russia and China are committed to building an equal, open, and inclusive Asia-Pacific security system that does not target third countries, so as to maintain regional peace, stability, and prosperity.”13

The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation approved on March 31, 2023, does not contain such terms as the Indo-Pacific Strategy and Indo-Pacific Region, but it places emphasis on the Asia-Pacific Region14 and the ASEAN sub-region, and talks about “increasing economic, security, humanitarian, and other cooperation with the states of the region and the ASEAN member states.” Later in the text, the Concept sets the goal of “establishing a comprehensive, open, indivisible, transparent, multilateral, and equitable architecture of security and mutually beneficial cooperation in the region based on collective and non-aligned approaches, as well as unleashing the region’s potential aiming at the establishment of a Greater Eurasian Partnership.” This goal will be attained through developing a broad international cooperation to counter policies aimed at drawing dividing lines in the region.15

It can be assumed that these actions will significantly reduce the effectiveness of the IPS pursued by the US and gradually nullify it. In view of this, the current South Korean government’s policy in the IPR may prove to be a failure in the medium and long term when taking into account the interests of the country and its people.

Economic Aspects of the ROK’s Indo-Pacific Strategy

The text formulating the IPS of the ROK emphasizes that South Korea is an Indo-Pacific country, and its national interests are directly connected to peace and prosperity in this region.16 According to the strategy, the ROK seeks to become a “global state” that will play a significant role in the international arena on all key issues, including economic ones. In this connection, its national economic interests get somewhat subordinated. The ROK prefers to concentrate on foreign economic tasks and not on solving the accumulated domestic socioeconomic problems, which have a primary importance for the country’s citizens who are tormented by the unstable economic situation, high inflation, large household debts, and rising energy bills.

The document characterizes relations between the ROK and the US as a “global comprehensive strategic alliance” encompassing not only security issues but also advanced technologies, cyberspace, and supply chains. The supply chains are often mentioned in connection with semiconductors (microchips), and it is planned to solve the problem of stabilizing these chains by using such unions as the Fab 4 chip alliance, which is most certainly oriented against China and whose first conference was held in February 2023 by the US, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea.17 And if, as experts point out, according to the officially released information, the alliance is aimed at expanding US access to microchips and reducing risks of the disruption of global added value chains (due to the shortage of integrated circuits that emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic, etc.), then one key line of activity (which remains beyond the officially declared goals) is forming a “semiconductor barrier” around China in order to restrict the further development of microelectronics in that country.18

Within the region, an idea is in effect being pursued to strengthen economic groupings with proven member states (US-Japan-ROK, US-Australia-ROK, etc.) to solve the problems connected to supply chains, the extraction of the most important mineral resources, new technologies, cybersecurity, and climate change. But what mineral resources are meant here? Primarily those supplied from China and partially from Russia.

In particular, in February 2023, the government of the ROK designated 33 key subsoil assets and selected 10 as strategic ones: lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese, graphite, and five types of rare earth elements whose deliveries will be carefully controlled. It is planned to expand their imports through cooperation with partners who are members of the US-led Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) initiative. The MSP initiative was launched in 2022 and includes 12 countries, including Australia, Canada, France, and African states that are rich in mineral resources.19 In fact, the ROK is trying to avoid making purchases from the PRC and Russia: For example, leading South Korean companies have already signed a memorandum with Canadian firms on deliveries of lithium and cobalt,20 and plans call for replacing Russian LNG supplies to the ROK (which were reduced by 72% in January 2023, down to 0.2 billion cubic meters21), in particular, with deliveries from Australia and Indonesia (and starting in 2025, with Canadian deliveries and expanded supplies from Qatar as well22), whereas Russian coal is planned to be replaced by Australian coal.

Demand for energy is a weak link for the ROK, which is almost completely dependent on energy imports. According to 2020 statistics, the ROK occupies seventh place in the world in energy consumption.23 The attempt to abandon Russian energy resources has hit South Korea hard and, among other things, has led to rising electricity prices for both enterprises and households and increasing commodity costs. And whereas in early 2022 the ROK tried to avoid buying coal from Russia and replaced it with Australian coal,24 in late 2022 South Korean energy producing enterprises again switched over to active purchases of Russian coal because of its lower price and higher quality. For that reason, deliveries of Russian coal to South Korea increased by 24% in 2022 compared to 2021 – up to 26.5 million metric tons.25

The new South Korean administration has taken a questionable stance; it stresses the importance of the “green agenda” in its new strategy, whereas in 2020, no more than 7% of electric power in the country was generated using renewable energy sources (RES). President Yoon Suk Yeol put forward a plan to restore the nuclear power generation industry. Under the plan, over 30% of the country’s electric power could be generated by atomic power stations in the future. However, the possibility of implementing the plan also provokes debate, because it will be difficult to reach an agreement with opponents who consider nuclear power generation to be not quite “green.” At the same time, the new atomic energy administration will have to quickly solve the problem of waste burial.26 Moreover, in atomic energy, the ROK has actively cooperated with Russia, but this partnership will most probably be suspended (which is confirmed by not mentioning Russia as a partner in this area in the IPS) in connection with the pro-American policy of the new South Korean administration, which will first of all negatively affect South Korea’s nuclear power generation industry.

As for cybersecurity, some South Korean experts directly name the countries against which South Korea can act to considerably enhance NATO’s cybersecurity as part of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. They mean attacks from Russia and China (and North Korea).27

By contrast, no attention is paid to US cyber attacks against Russia. Such attacks were confirmed in 2022 by General Paul Nakasone, commander of the United States Cyber Command. He informed Sky News that the US had conducted a series of “offensive cyber operations” in support of Ukraine.28 Hacker groups from the US, Ukraine, and Georgia are actively engaged in carrying out cyber attacks against the Russian Federation’s state bodies and databases of Russians and foreigners. In 2022, such illegitimate operations against Russia were performed by 22 hacker groups; the most active among them were the IT Army of Ukraine (Ukraine), GhostClan (US), GNG (Georgia), and Squad303 (Poland).29 Based on the results of 2022, the total number of repelled hacker attacks amounted to about 50,000.30

For years, the US has been coming in second after the PRC in foreign trade with the ROK. But even though the PRC remains the leader among the ROK’s trade partners, the efforts aimed at reducing China’s role in trade with South Korea brought about a decrease in South Korean exports to China in 2022 (they dropped by 4.4%, and the resulting amount was $155.789 billion). At the same time, Chinese imports to the ROK continue to grow (+11.5% compared to 2021) and in 2022 amounted to $154.567 billion.31 The importance of the PRC to the South Korean economy remains substantial; this is also understood by South Korean experts. According to the Korea Chamber of Commerce & Industry, although South Korean companies expect profitable cooperation proposals for member states as a result of launching the Indo-Pacific initiative, they are rather cautious about the initiative, since the IPS has a definite anti-Chinese bent. Evidently, the ROK is trying to avoid another quarrel with China. But in its strategy, the South Korean government, though not criticizing the PRC directly, expresses reservations that partnership with China must be regulated by international norms and rules. It is not stated what rules are meant in this connection, but it is evident that the rules are most probably dictated by South Korea’s main ally, the US.

The ROK is planning to build its Indo-Pacific strategy on three principles: inclusivity, trust, and mutuality.

As for inclusivity, according to the text formulating the strategy, it is not aimed at deterring any specific nation, which is not true, in our opinion. The strategy is unquestionably oriented toward deterring “unwelcome countries,” primarily China.

The second principle, which implies partnership relations based on absolute mutual trust, also raises doubts. What kind of trust can one talk about when the US practically uses its allies to its own economic ends without considering their needs? For example, a major blow to South Korean producers of electric automobiles is the Inflation Reduction Act, which closes the American market to exports from the ROK, because it grants state subsidies only for US-made electric automobiles and stipulates that a certain share of parts and materials for the storage batteries should be supplied from the US or countries that have signed free trade agreements with Washington. Moreover, 2023 may prove complicated also for operating in the European market, where the EU is planning to bring into force the Critical Raw Materials Act that is designed to support local manufacturers and weaken their dependence on imported components.32

The principle of mutuality and trust does not work because the US dictates its will to the ROK as to how and with whom it should maintain foreign economic relations. Among other things, the US has de facto forbidden the ROK to cooperate with the PRC in the field of semiconductors (microchips); this jeopardizes the biggest South Korean companies operating on the market. In February 2023, microchip exports from the ROK decreased by 42.5% ($5.963 billion), which is 11.9% of the total export volume (compared to 23.8% in the same month a year earlier).33 For its part, due to pressure from the US, the ROK was forced to introduce economic sanctions against Russia, which led to a reduction in bilateral trade volume and suspension of its big investment projects in Russia.

There is no consensus, either, on big projects where South Korean companies can sideline American manufacturers. For example, it is namely for this reason that the possible participation of the state-owned South Korean corporation Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) in the project of constructing a second atomic power station in Poland encountered resistance from the American company Westinghouse (WEC),34 which filed a suit against the KHNP to impede its participation and possible victory in this competitive bid.

The strategy especially stresses the importance of partnership in such innovation areas as semiconductors, AI, quantum science, advanced biology, next-generation telecommunications, space technologies, as well as assistance in narrowing the digital divide. Moreover, Seoul immediately designates the circle of its main partners here, noting projects developed jointly with the US, and expanding technology cooperation with Europe, Canada, and Australia.

In this document, the ROK mentions practically all countries, including European ones, while completely ignoring Russia, although quite recently the RF was among the top 10 trade partners of South Korea. This can be interpreted in two ways: On one hand, the ROK does not see any serious prospects for economic cooperation with the Russian Federation in the near term; on the other hand, it is trying to maneuver without giving a negative assessment of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine. However, actions of the ROK aimed at suspending big projects in Russia and possibly expanding the range of goods subject to export restrictions and related to chemicals, steel, automobiles, machines, quantum computers, etc. (the inclusion of an additional 741 commodity items),35 will not remain unnoticed by the Russian side and may entail negative consequences.

Summing up the above, we will point out that the strategy, which gives top priority to selected partners headed by the US – the so-called democracies opposed to “unwelcome states” – may negatively affect primarily the ROK itself:

– South Korea is risking seriously spoiling its relations with Russia and the PRC; they will lose interest in the ROK as a valuable foreign political partner in any respect. South Korea may also lose their support in addressing the problems of greatest importance to it (denuclearization, the normalization of inter-Korean relations, and national reunification).

– the IPS of the US, in the form in which it is being implemented, may stir major controversies among the ASEAN countries and, as a consequence, weaken ASEAN’s role and significance in the region and in the world. The ASEAN member states may put the blame for that not only on the US, but also on Japan and the ROK as countries pursuing their own IPS.

– failure of the IPS project may also lead to major image losses for the ROK as a country whose leadership has failed to choose the right goals and has ended up among the foreign policy losers.

– South Korea risks losing two major markets that its manufacturers are interested in – the PRC and Russia (whose combined population is nearly 20% of the world’s total population36) – and losing access to food supplies, resources, and strategically important minerals (in particular, the ROK imports 80% of these from the PRC, and even if the most favorable forecasts come true, South Korea will only manage to reduce this dependency to 50% by 203037).

– Finally, the ROK is going to complicate the economic situation of its enterprises that are still operating in the markets of Russia and China.

NOTES:

1. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. December 2017, p. 46.

2. Summit for Democracy: Invited Participants. US Department of State. URL: https://www.state.gov/participant-list-the-summit-for-democracy (Retrieved on February 21, 2023.)

3. White House Announced New Indo-Pacific Strategy. TASS. URL: https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/13686677 (Retrieved on February 10, 2023.)

4. 윤 석열 정부 120대 국정과제 (자유, 평화, 번영에 기여하는 들러벌 중추국가) [120 Objectives for the Policy of Yun Seok Yeol’s Government (Global State Contributing to Freedom, Peace and Prosperity)]. 2022 년 7월/ 때한민국 정부. p. 3.

5. 북핵 미사일 위협 대응능력의 획기적 보강 [Effective Enhancement of the Capability to Respond to the Nuclear Missile Threat from the North]. 2022 년 7월/ 때한민국 정부. p. 174.

6. 한미 군사동맹 강화 및 국방과학기술 협력확대 [Consolidation of the US-South Korean Military Union and Expansion of the Military Scientific and Technological Cooperation]. 2022 년 7월/ 때한민국 정부. p. 175.

7. Strategy for Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea. December 28, 2022. p. 4. URL: https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322133 (Retrieved on April 5, 2023).

8. The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on March 31, 2023. Article 51. Official Site of the President of the RF. URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70811 (Retrieved on April 1, 2023.)

9. The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on March 31, 2023. Article 53. Official Site of the President of the RF. URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70811 (Retrieved on April 1, 2023.)

10. 한일정상 공동기자회견 발표문 [Text of the Joint Press Conference Following the Summit of the Leaders of the Republic of Korea and Japan]. Yonhap News Agency. URL: https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20230316170600001?section=politics/all&site=topnews01_related (Retrieved on March 14, 2023.)

11. 김효정, 오수진, 김지연.日에 규속력없는 «각자발푠노란…2015 년 위안부 합의와 달라 [Kim Hyeo Hong, O Soo Jin, Kim Ji Eon, The Turmoil Due to the Report on the Absence of Japan’s Obligation…It Differs Even from the 2015 Agreement on “Vianbu”]. Yonhap News Agency. March 7, 2023. URL: https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20230307156800504?section=politics/all&site=editors_picks_news_view (Retrieved on April 2, 2023).

12. The Asia-Pacific Region is meant here.

13. Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on Deepening Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Cooperation Entering a New Era. Official Site of the President of the RF. URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/5920 (Retrieved on March 22, 2023.)

14. The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Tochka Zreniya. March 31, 2023. URL: https://tochka.press/2023/03/31/91137 (Retrieved on April 5, 2023.)

15. The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on March 31, 2023 Article 55, P. 1,2,4,5. Official Site of the President of the RF. URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70811 (Retrieved on April 1, 2023.)

16. Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea December 28, 2022. URL: https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322133 (Retrieved on February 20, 2023.)

17. Taiwan says ‘Fab 4’ chip group held first senior officials meeting. Reuters. February 25, 2023. URL: https://www.reuters.com/technology/ taiwan-says-fab-4-chip-group-held-first-senior-officials-meeting-2023-02-25 (Retrieved on March 10, 2023.)

18. E.O. Zaklyazminskaya, Fab 4 Chip Alliance: Contradictions of the Parties and China’s Positions. Analytical materials of ICCA RAS. February 3, 2023. URL: https://www.iccaras.ru/analiticheskie-materialyi.html (Retrieved on March 13, 2023.)

19. S. Korea Designates 10 ‘Strategic’ Minerals, Introduces Early Warning System for Stable Supplies. Yonhap News Agency. February 27, 2023. URL: https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230227003300320 (Retrieved on March 11, 2023.)

20. A.G. Zuyeva, Modern Challenges of Economic Cooperation between the Republic of Korea and the United States. Problemy dal’nego vostoka, # 1, 2023, pp. 96-105. DOI: 10.31857/S013128120024220-3

21. LNG Exports from Russia Started Falling in January. Vedomosti. February 3, 2023. URL: https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2023/02/03/961513-eksport-spg-iz-rossii-
nachal-padat?ysclid=len8zknk4x789156982 (Retrieved on March 3, 2023.)

22. Qatar and South Korea Discussed Energy Cooperation. 1Prime. April 14, 2022. URL: https://1prime.ru/energy/20220418/836691964.html (Retrieved on March 1, 2023.)

23. Enerdata. URL: https://yearbook.enerdata.ru/total-energy/world-consumption-statistics.
html (Retrieved on May 23, 2022.)

24. South Korea Started Refusing to Buy Russian Coal. Lenta.ru. April 29, 2022. URL: https://lenta.ru/news/2022/04/29/ sk/?ysclid=len8lh3cej72891401 (Retrieved on March 31, 2023.)

25. Russian Coal Companies Oust Australian Suppliers from Asia. Khod Mysley [Line of Thinking]. March 31, 2023. URL: https://hodmysley.ru/rossijskie-ugolnye-kompanii-vytesnjajut-avstralijskih-postavshhikov-iz-azii/ (Retrieved on March 31, 2023.)

26. A.G. Zuyeva, V.G. Samsonova, South Korea’s Policy in the Sphere of “Green” Technologies. ICCA RAS. 30.06.2022. URL: https://www.iccaras.ru/analiticheskie-materialyi.html (Retrieved on April 4, 2023.)

27. Lim Tae Hung.Indo-Pacific Prospects. IPG – International Politics and Society. January 11, 2023. URL: https://www.ipg-journal.io/ru/rubriki/vneshnjaja-politika-i-bezopasnost/indo-tikhookeanskie-perspektivy-1629/ (Retrieved on March 31, 2023.)

28. The White House Confirmed Cyber Operations against Russia. RBC. June 2, 2022.
URL: https://www.rbc.ru/politics/02/06/2022/6297d5699a7947622ed04206 (Retrieved on March 25, 2023.)

29. The MFA Reports about Cyber Attacks from the USA, Turkey, Georgia, and Ukraine against State Bodies. RIA Novosti. June 9, 2022. URL: https://ria.ru/20220609/kiberataki-1794354746.html?ysclid=lenadxzybj958473246 (Retrieved on March 25, 2023.)

30. The MFA of the RF: US Actively Conducts Cyber Sabotage under False Colors. Vesti. January 28, 2023. URL: https://www.vesti.ru/hitech/article/3172054 (Retrieved on March 13, 2023.)

31. K-statistics. KITA. URL: http://www.kita.org/kStat/byCount_AllCount.do (Retrieved on March 31, 2023.)

32. Korean auto, battery sectors brace for EU-first act. The Korea Herald. March 10, 2023. URL: https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20230310000478&ACE_SEARCH=1 (Retrieved on March 13, 2023.)

33. Weak chip demand pushes economic recovery off track. The Korea Herald. March 2, 2023. URL: https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20230302000755&ACE_SEARCH=1 (Retrieved on March 23, 2023.)

34. see [20].

35. S. Korea to add 741 more items on exports ban list against Russia, Belarus. Yonhap News Agency. February 24, 2023. URL: https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230224005300320 (Retrieved on March 1, 2023.)

36. In 2023 China Will Lose the Status of the Most Populous Country in the World. Realtribune. July 14, 2022. URL: https://realtribune.ru/k-2023-godu-kitaj-utratit-status-samoj-naselennoj-strany-mira?ysclid=len7ofuihj357929061 (Retrieved on March 23, 2023.)

37. Korea to cut dependence on China for key minerals. The Korea Times. February 28, 2023. URL: https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/tech/2023/02/129_346182.html (Retrieved on March 21, 2023.)

Translated by Igor Putintsev