From Kommersant, Nov. 20, 2024, p. 6. Complete text:
On Tuesday [Nov. 19], President Vladimir Putin’s decree “On Approving the Fundamentals of Russian State Policy in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence” was published. Essentially, this is Russia’s updated nuclear doctrine. . . .
‘An extremely important document.’
The presidential decree revokes Russia’s previous nuclear doctrine, which has been in effect since June 2000, and brings its new version into force. As Russian presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov explained to reporters, the doctrine had to be updated due to the “current situation” [and] “present-day realities.” This refers to the special military operation in Ukraine and a sharp escalation of the confrontation between Russia and the West.
“What is the most vivid example of present-day realities? The US authorities have decided to use their weapons, American-made weapons, against Russia. This is a vivid example of the new situation around our country, and this requires that the [nuclear] concept be updated,” he said (as quoted by TASS).
Readers are reminded that on Sunday, US media reported that US President Joe Biden “has allowed” Ukraine to strike deep into Russian territory with long-range ATACMS missiles. On Tuesday, US Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Brian Nichols confirmed these reports. Also on Tuesday, the Russian Defense Ministry said that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had struck a military installation in Bryansk Province with six ATACMS missiles. Five of them were shot down [and] one was damaged by combat crews operating S‑400 and Pantsir surface-to-air missile systems.
Against this backdrop, Dmitry Peskov described Putin’s signing of the updated nuclear doctrine – “an extremely important document” – as timely. According to him, nuclear deterrence is aimed at “ensuring that a potential adversary realize the inevitability of retribution in the event of aggression against Russia and/or its allies.”
Generally, it was [already] known how the doctrine would change: In late September, President Vladimir Putin held a special meeting of the Russian Security Council, during which he spoke in detail about the upcoming innovation during the open part of the meeting. Notably, several important provisions remained effectively unchanged compared to the 2020 decree. For example, the new document states that Russia “views nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence used as a final, desperate measure, and is doing all it can to reduce the nuclear threat and prevent a deterioration of interstate relations that could provoke military conflicts, including nuclear ones.” In 2020, the Russian authorities viewed nuclear weapons “solely as a means of deterrence.” The word “solely” is missing from the new doctrine. Otherwise, the approach has not changed.
As in 2020, the “guaranteed deterrence of a potential adversary from aggression against Russia and/or its allies” is described as “one of the highest state priorities.” It is ensured by “Russia’s entire military capabilities, including nuclear weapons.” It is noteworthy that both the old and the new documents say that “state policy in the field of nuclear deterrence is defensive in nature.”
Several points of the new doctrine, however, reflect what Dmitry Peskov called the “current situation.” For example, as before, it says that “Russia exercises nuclear deterrence against a potential adversary, meaning individual states and military coalitions (blocs, alliances)” that consider the Russian Federation “as a potential adversary and possess nuclear and/or other types of weapons of mass destruction or significant combat capabilities of general-purpose forces.” However, the new doctrine goes further by adding that “nuclear deterrence is also exercised against states that provide the territory, air and/or sea space under their control and resources to plan and commit aggression against the Russian Federation.” The decree does not mention specific blocs or countries, but it goes without saying that NATO and Ukraine are meant.
In accordance with the prevailing situation, Russia has also expanded the number of the “main military dangers.” The 2020 doctrine listed six, [and] now there are 10. The newly added [dangers] are as follows: the establishment or expansion of existing military coalitions (blocs, alliances), the approach of their military infrastructure toward Russian borders; actions by a potential adversary aimed at isolating parts of Russian territory, including blocking access to vital transport communication lines; actions by a potential adversary aimed at demolishing (damaging, destroying) Russia’s environmentally hazardous facilities that may lead to manmade, environmental or social disasters; [and] actions by a potential adversary aimed at planning and the conduct of large-scale military exercises near Russian borders.
Five scenarios.
Perhaps the most significant changes were made to the section about conditions for the use of nuclear weapons. There were four such scenarios in the 2020 doctrine. Now there are five.
Two conditions remained unchanged. For instance, Russia still reserves the right to use nuclear weapons if it receives “reliable information of ballistic missile launches against Russia and/or its allies,” as well as in the event of “enemy actions against critical state or military facilities, the incapacitation of which could result in the failure of retaliatory action by nuclear forces.”
One scenario is absolutely new: Russia may use nuclear weapons if it receives “reliable information about the massive launch (takeoff) of air and space attack weapons (strategic and tactical aviation, cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, [and] hypersonic and other aircraft) and their crossing of the Russian state border.”
Another scenario is supplemented with an important qualification. For example, the 2020 doctrine stated the Russian authorities could use nuclear weapons “in response to a nuclear attack or an attack with other weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies.” Now this passage continues as follows: “as well as against military formations and/or military facilities of the Russian Federation located abroad.”
In other words, as of now, Russia’s “nuclear umbrella” also covers its military bases overseas. Vladimir Putin did not speak about that during the open part of the September meeting.
Finally, important changes were made to a scenario whereby in 2020 the Russian authorities reserved the right to use nuclear weapons “in the event of aggression against Russia involving conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is threatened.” Now they are ready to use nuclear weapons “in the event of aggression against Russia and/or Belarus as members of the Union State involving conventional weapons that poses a critical threat to their sovereignty and/or territorial integrity.”
Thus, Belarus is being provided special protection guarantees, while the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons is being lowered somewhat, at least on a rhetorical level, since this is no longer about an existential threat to both states but about the critical violation of their sovereignty and territorial integrity. As Kommersant reported earlier, this wording is closer to Russia’s 2000 military doctrine (the decree on “Fundamentals of State Policy” was not published separately at the time), as well as to the doctrines of Western powers (the US, France and Great Britain) that reserved the right to use nuclear weapons “as a means of self-defense in extreme circumstances” and to “protect vital interests.”
The Russian authorities hope that the West will closely study Russia’s updated nuclear doctrine, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on Tuesday. “I hope that they (the West – Ed.) will read this doctrine. And not the way they read the UN Charter, seeing there only what they need, but [that they will read] the doctrine in its entirety and interconnectedness,” he told reporters (as quoted by RIA Novosti).
Russian Security Council deputy chair Dmitry Medvedev is also hoping that the West will take Moscow’s signals seriously. On Tuesday, he published a post on his Telegram channel about how the decision to use Western missiles to strike deep into Russian territory ties in with the new nuclear doctrine. “The use of alliance (NATO – Ed.) missiles in such a way can now be regarded as an attack by [Euro-Atlantic] bloc countries against Russia. In this case, [Russia] has the right to deliver a retaliatory strike with weapons of mass destruction on Kiev and NATO’s main facilities wherever they may be. And that would be World War III,” Dmitry Medvedev warned.
Lt. Gen. Yevgeny Buzhinsky (Ret.), chairman of the executive board of the PIR Center [for Nuclear Nonproliferation Studies] and a professor at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, explained to Kommersant that documents like the presidential decree published on Tuesday take a long time to prepare and go through a complex process of interagency coordination. According to him, their approval and publication can be viewed in a more general context of confrontation between Russia and the West – in other words, not only in connection with particular current events. He predicted that the West “will carefully read [the new doctrine] and is sure to get upset, since the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons has been doctrinally lowered – and significantly so.” “However, I don’t think they will believe – they will not believe that Russia can really use nuclear weapons in response to actions that they consider insignificant,” [Buzhinsky] suggested. In his opinion, a symmetric response would be a more effective measure with regard to the ATACMS – for example, deliveries of Russian [mobile] surface-to-ship missile systems, such as Bastion or Bal, to Yemeni Houthis, who are at war with the US.