From Republic.ru, Feb. 13, 2025, https://republic.ru/posts/115030. Condensed text:

Editors’ Note. – Hopes for an end to the Russia-Ukraine war in 2025 have so far failed to materialize: Ukraine is in a difficult situation, and Russia has the initiative, although neither side is capable of reaching their stated goals. . . .

Can Zelensky and his team find a way out of this complex combination of factors so as to remain in power and preserve Ukrainian statehood? We spoke about this with independent political analyst Konstantin Skorkin, a former Ukrainian journalist who now lives in the UK.

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Question. – The military confrontation between Ukraine and Russia has been going on for just under three years now. How would you describe Kiev’s current state in this conflict?

Answer. – In these three years, Ukraine has reached the limits of its capabilities. The country is exhausted, and the demand for a reprieve is becoming ever stronger in society. I would venture to say that if the Ukrainians were dealing with a less stubborn aggressor, the negotiation process would have already started. But the Ukrainians do not believe there is a chance for a lasting peace with the current regime in the Kremlin, so they continue to resist despite the fatigue. Late last year, 69% of Ukrainians said they believed in the country’s ability to fight back against the aggressor.

The dominant mood is the desire for peace, but not at any cost. For example, most people are still categorically opposed to the idea of possible territorial concessions in exchange for peace. But it is worth noting that this option is more popular than it was at the start of the war: In 2022, 8% to 10% [of Ukrainians] were in favor of the possibility of such concessions, but in January 2025, 38% were.

Q. – The tentative Kellogg-Trump plan does not envisage a return to the 1991 borders, which Kiev politicians have repeatedly referred to, but instead proposes drawing the borders at troop positions at the end of hostilities. What do you think about this? Does Kiev need to fight for the territory currently occupied by the Russian Army? Or are peace and people’s lives more important? It’s a complicated question. But I think it is precisely this dilemma that will be a stumbling block in the future peace process.

A. – Even though the 1991 borders remain Ukraine’s official priority, no one in Kiev still seriously believes that this goal can be achieved, especially by military means. As I’ve already said, territorial concessions aren’t popular, but there is an awareness of the realities on the ground.

Ukraine does not have the resources, primarily the human resources, it needs to fully liberate its territory.

The price of liberating my native Lugansk, for example, is becoming prohibitively high. At the same time, the Ukrainians will never agree to recognize the seized lands as legal Russian territory (including the Crimea) or leave without a fight the provinces that Putin declared from afar were part of Russia (the Russian Armed Forces do not have full control of Donetsk, Zaporozhye and Kherson Provinces, which were declared annexed territories in September 2022 [see Vol. 74, No. 39, pp. 3‑6]). I don’t think the US will be able to force them to give up these territories, even if the Trump administration gets the idea to do so.

The course of hypothetical talks is easy to imagine if we recall the ill-fated Minsk process [for a ceasefire in the Donetsk Basin; see Vol. 66, No. 37‑38, pp. 3‑6, and Vol. 67, No. 8, pp. 3‑7 – Trans.]. At that time, the parties had irreconcilable differences: Russia wanted to make its proxies, the Donetsk and Lugansk peoples’ republics (DPR/LPR), full parties to the talks and legitimize their status before sovereignty over the Donetsk Basin was transferred to Ukraine. This would have given it an enclave under its control, but Ukraine did everything possible to resist that. And all the endless summits and the Steinmeier formula [for holding elections in the Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics – Trans.](remember that?) were dashed against this fundamental misalignment of the parties’ interests. There is a high likelihood that this same scenario could be repeated, only with different input data. There are more than enough points where differences are insurmountable, from Ukraine’s accession to NATO (which is enshrined as a goal in the Constitution) to territorial demarcation. Moscow also understands this and wants to squeeze Ukraine as much as possible in the run-up to the talks and force it to capitulate, taking advantage of the changing of the guard at the White House to dictate its terms rather than bargain.

Q. – Moreover, Russia’s President Putin has made it clear that he does not intend to sign any treaties with Zelensky, since he is allegedly illegitimate [see Vol. 76, No. 21, pp. 8‑10]. The idea that Ukraine could now hold a [presidential] election has been voiced by US special envoy to Ukraine Kellogg. What do you think about this?

A. – Putin believes that every Ukrainian government since 2014 has been illegitimate in one form or another, so it’s not worth paying attention to this rhetoric. If it’s advantageous to him, he’ll close his eyes to any “illegitimacy.” An election is only possible in Ukraine after the hostilities have ceased and martial law has been lifted. The elites and the public in Ukraine agree on this, despite all the complaints about Zelensky that have piled up over the years.

The idea of replacing [him] with someone else comes mainly from the Kremlin, although, you’re right, they have started talking about this in the West. But I think this is a pointless undertaking.

No one in Ukraine will agree to “replace” Zelensky with a politician who would benefit Putin; the return of a hypothetical [pro-Russian Ukrainian politician Viktor] Medvedchuk is only possible with Russian bayonets.

Even if we could imagine an election during a war or ceasefire, any Zelensky successor will be forced by the very logic of events to continue his course (especially if the successor is [former Ukrainian Armed Forces commander in chief] Gen. [Valery] Zaluzhny, who believes that a third world war is under way). As we remember, Zelensky came to power as a peacemaker, but was forced to fight, just as [former Ukrainian president Pyotr] Poroshenko was in his time. The root cause is the Kremlin’s aggression, not the ambitions or intransigence of Ukrainian leaders.

Q. – Under the Biden administration, there was a lot of criticism that there was not enough aid; that there was a lot of talk, but no action; that the administration was limiting long-range missile strikes against Russian territory; and so on. But now there’s Trump. What do you see happening with his future military and financial assistance?

A. – The first thing Trump will do is try to make a deal with Putin, to fulfill his campaign promise of ending the war in Ukraine. But if Putin doesn’t make any concessions, then I can assume that US military aid will continue or even increase. That’s what Kiev is counting on, in any case. The main mood in government offices there is that Ukraine must hold out until Trump is convinced that Putin is impossible to negotiate with.

Q. – What do you think of the Trump-Zelensky initiative to exchange American arms for rare earth metals in Ukraine? Is this a fair business approach? Or is it immoral? After all, people are dying, both civilians and soldiers. What kind of trade can there be? But even if there is bargaining, how effective can it be?

A. – This initiative originally came from Zelensky. He spoke about this before Trump’s victory, which he already suspected would happen. His “victory plan” [see Vol. 76, No. 42, pp. 3‑7] contains an invitation to foreign investors interested in access to Ukraine’s reserves of titanium, lithium, uranium and so forth. Zelensky is trying to find common ground with Trump, using the logic of business to show that the US will benefit directly from participating in this war, aside from the ephemeral (for Trump) values and priorities. Since we’re talking about the country’s survival, this is no time for moral sentimentality, although this all sounds extremely cynical, of course. But there is not much choice here: Either these resources go to the Americans and Ukraine remains standing with the help of Western weapons, or Russia seizes them and Ukraine ceases to exist in its current form. . . .

Q. – Russian political émigrés, who so wanted [former US vice-president and former presidential candidate Kamala] Harris to win [the US presidential election], were disappointed with Trump’s victory and are, apparently partly because of this disappointment, obsessively looking for something Trump and Putin have in common. Some are even almost conflating the two. But still, the US political system will never allow Trump to become the new Putin. And then, no matter how you slice it, the US and Russia will have some geopolitical differences regardless of who is president. What do you think? Will Trump and Putin find common ground based on the fact that they are both macho alpha males inclined to authoritarianism, and will appeal to traditional values, “reactionaries” and so on?

A. – I think Trump has some illusions about Putin, like many right-wingers in the West. They see him as a kind of pole of healthy conservatism, an ally in the fight against the global, left-liberal elite. But if you dig a little deeper, it immediately becomes clear that Putin’s “conservatism” is simply camouflage for an aggressive mafia regime created by former officers of the Soviet special services. For example, I was very amused by the fact that, in his infamous interview with Tucker Carlson [see Vol. 76, No. 6, pp. 7‑11], Putin eluded questions about his belief in God and Christianity, a basic element for any Western conservative.

So I think that Trump will quickly become disillusioned with his counterpart. . . .

Q. – Be that as it may, things aren’t as bad for Ukraine as they may seem. For example, Sweden will give Ukraine a record package of military aid worth around $1.2 billion. This was recently announced by Swedish Prime Minister Pal Jonson. There are reports that France has transferred Ukraine Mirage 2000 fighter jets. The most likely winner in the German elections is the Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), whose leader, Friedrich Merz, is more resolutely opposed to Russia than current [German] Chancellor Olaf Scholz. And NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has promised that NATO will not allow Trump to win and has praised Germany for stepping up military aid to Ukraine. Two considerations immediately come to mind. Will the Ukraine factor become a bone of contention between the Old and New Worlds? And if the US distances itself from this conflict, will a united Europe have the strength and patience to stand up against Russia, or is this just bravado? Has the population of European countries grown weary of Ukraine by now?

A. – Right after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 [see Vol. 74, No. 8, pp. 9‑13], French President Emmanuel Macron announced that his country and Europe as whole needed a military economy to ensure their security. However, the European Union cannot boast of any particular successes over recent years. First of all, governments have faced a lack of capacity for the mass production of weapons, which was cut back after the cold war. Back in 2014, after the start of Russian aggression against Ukraine, NATO countries adopted a target of increasing their military spending to 2% of their gross domestic product. Ten years later, eight of the 32 NATO countries have yet to reach that target (including Italy and Spain), and most other countries have barely crossed the 2% mark. In 2024, Germany spent only 2.12% of its GDP on the military, which is twice as much as in 2014, but still much less than West Germany spent on defense in the 1960s, when there were no open wars on the continent despite the tensions of the cold war. It is not surprising that European NATO countries have been slow to make this transition.

No one expected such a rapid return to a new arms race. So it is too optimistic to say that Europe will be able to easily take up the banner and continue supporting Ukraine at the same level as it did with the US on board.

Another matter is that there’s nothing the European countries can do about it: They will have to think about defending the continent and part with their previous illusions. This will be an extremely difficult process with the ascent of right-wing populists and Euroskeptics.

Q. – At the same time, what’s your assessment of the state of the Putin regime, judging by his own decisions and statements? How much longer is he willing to wage war?

A. – The war is advantageous to Putin. The invasion helped him meet almost all his domestic political objectives: He united the elite around himself and bound them to him with blood, he eliminated or exiled the opposition and the independent media, and found a use for marginalized layers of the population – unemployed or socially frustrated men, who are potential fuel for a rebellion. Three years later, it’s hard to imagine how this whole machine could function without the war.

Plus, Putin still has ambitions as a great geopolitician – his plans for Ukraine are immutable, and his desire to dictate the will of the world has not disappeared. This is why the topic of negotiations has been so controversial from the very beginning, since the Istanbul false start of 2022 [see Vol. 74, No. 27‑28, pp. 19] – what kind of agreement can be reached with someone who is not prepared to compromise and is used to playing a zero sum game? As pro-Kremlin political analyst Fyodor Lukyanov recently noted: “The West somehow got the idea that it was important for Putin to reach an agreement and put an end to everything. That’s not the case.”

Q. – What weak spots do you see in the Putin regime today?

A. – The regime’s main vulnerability is that Putin is not immortal, no matter how banal that sounds. The second most important factor is the economic one. Even though Russia has been able to adapt to sanctions and has jump-started its GDP, this strength still will not last for long. After all, the more powerful Soviet bloc broke down in the arms race. And here much will depend on economic pressure from the West.

Q. – If Russia wins, so to speak, then what?

A. – If the current regime is “victorious” and stays in power, Russia will remain a threat to its neighbors, and, in the face of increasing repressions and chauvinistic propaganda, its society will mutate toward normalizing the regime and adapting to it. And this even applies to people who do not currently accept the cult of Putin’s SMO and everything related to it. For many Russians, the war has now become part of the background, part of everyday life. Terrible as it is, the war is perceived as a risky but acceptable way to overcome life’s troubles and escape to the front to avoid creditors and criminal liability, and to earn some money for a change.

Q. – And if Russia is defeated?

A. – If the regime is defeated and collapses, it will be very important to include Russia in the space of the “Western world” (subject to compensation for damages to Ukraine and demilitarization, of course), which won’t be easy. On the one hand, for the aforementioned reasons, and on the other hand, there will be a real desire to punish Russians, especially on the part of Ukraine, which has suffered from Russia’s aggressions (and it’s hard not to agree with the Ukrainians’ arguments). But excluding Russia will only lead to more revanchism in the spirit of “we can do it again.”

If we stand on the shaky ground of historical analogies, then we must avoid the temptation of a “Weimar Russia” and try to create an [analogue of an] “East European Federal Republic of Germany,” disarmed and “denazified,” but part of the “free world.”

As for Putin himself, he and his inner circle, at least all the members of the [Russian] Security Council, which made the decision to invade Ukraine, should be tried as war criminals, preferably in Russia and with the active participation of its post-Putin government. It is important for Russian society to be included in the process of condemning the dictator – otherwise, everything will repeat itself in a new round. But it’s hard for me to say how, when and whether this will happen at all.

Q. – What are your expectations for 2025?

A. – I have the slight hope that there will be some talks, and, possibly, a suspension of hostilities or a shaky ceasefire, something like the situation in the Donetsk Basin after the Minsk agreements. It’s a long way to real peace, and I’m afraid that it will only come to this part of the world with a change of the regime in Russia. . . .